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This thesis comprises a study of those socio-economic dynamics that establish 
and influence the existence, distribution, and evolution of rules for the outer space 
environment. In particular, this thesis analyzes how the initial State practice of launching 
objects into outer space led to the genesis of rules for the outer space environment. The 
presentation of this thesis includes an introduction, a methodology section, three studies, 
and a conclusion. The first study considers the formation of initial rules for the outer 
space environment as a consequence of State practice using historical analysis and game 
theory. The second study considers how States utilized their ability to practice foreign 
relations to produce and conclude the Outer Space Treaty and how the adoption of the 
Outer Space Treaty led to the subsequent adoption of specialized treaties regarding 
objects launched into outer space using economic analysis of public international law. 
The third study comprises a case study of the term “space object” and its adoption and 
subsequent evolution into State national laws that originated from the initial State 
practice of launching objects into outer space using comparative and economic analyses 
of public international law. Collectively, each study seeks to demonstrate how the rules 
for the outer space environment have evolved and converged in content (i.e., definition, 
meaning, and scope of a rule) as a result of the consumption (i.e., acceptance of the 
obligation of a supplied rule) of legal rules on which States depend to ultimately manage 










“Facts are not autonomous. They gain meaning from the frameworks within which 
human beings interpret them.”2 
 
a. Thesis Statement 
 
The thesis presented here comprises a study of those socio-economic dynamics 
that establish and influence the existence, distribution, and evolution of rules for the outer 
space environment. In particular, this thesis analyzes how the initial State practice of 
launching objects into outer space led to the genesis of rules for the outer space 
environment. In studying this issue, an economic analysis of international law is applied 
to three sources of rules of public international law: international custom, international 
agreements, and general principles of law. Rules of international custom, international 
agreements, and general principles of law arise from the supranational market of 
international relations. States develop rules for the outer space environment as a function 
of the exchanges (occurrences and transactions) of self-regarding units, i.e., States, in the
                                                 





supranational market of international relations. In order to purchase rules on the 
supranational market of international relations, States must give something of value to 
other States in the form of some element of their State sovereignty.3 Because States value 
their sovereignty so highly, exchanges result in the formation, proliferation, and 
consumption of rules of jurisdiction, which are considered a component of State power 
because it is the basis for which a State may legitimately assert its authority outside its 
territory.4 
When States enter the supranational market of international relations, they attempt 
to maximize their valued preferences (economic and national security, foreign policy 
preferences) by exchanging in the buying (i.e., accepting the obligation of a rule) and 
selling (i.e., supplying (or offering) rules that States may consume) of rules of jurisdiction 
supplied to the supranational market through a variety of respective State practices in 
relation to some source of rules.5 The supply of rules of jurisdiction is based on the 
demand of States as a product of their valued preferences in relation to the environments 
beyond a State’s sovereign territory.6 The sale of rules of jurisdiction in relation to some 
valued preference may occur when States supply rules to the supranational market of 
international relations through negotiation and/or conclusion of an international 
                                                 
3 See discussion infra and Figure 1. 
4 See JOEL P. TRACHTMAN, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Harvard Univ. Press 
2008) [hereinafter ECONOMIC STRUCTURE]; Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of 
International Law, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (1999) [hereinafter Dunoff & Trachtman]; and Joel P. Trachtman, 
Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001) [hereinafter Prescriptive 
Jurisdiction]. C.f. ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(Belknap Press 2013) [hereinafter POSNER & SYKES]. See also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (8th ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2012) [hereinafter BROWNLIE]. 
5 See Appendix for Glossary of Terms and Figure 2. 
6 Every environment outside a State’s territory has its own unique benefits, costs, and risks and therefore 
rules States supply and consume are taken in relation to those economic factors and priced into an 
obligation. 
3 
agreement, promulgation of national laws, regulations, and policies, or State practice 
itself. The buying of rules of jurisdiction in relation to some valued preference may occur 
when States consume (i.e., the act of giving notice to the acceptance of the obligation of a 
rule(s) of jurisdiction) a rule(s) supplied on the supranational market of international 
relations.7 Consequently, States may choose from a variety of possible rules of 
jurisdiction in relation to some valued preference depending on the type of market from 
which rules may arise because the type of market where an exchange could take place 
can also affect the types of rules that are supplied as the result of barriers to market 
entry.8 
The concept of rules is developed as a sufficient component of State practice 
because not all rules tend to become the product of public international law. Since rules 
comprise some social value to its subjects, i.e., States, the highest expression of social 
value for rules is the establishment of rules of law because such rules confer on the 
international community of States ordered authority outside of a State’s territorial 
boundaries.9 In order to measure how rules come into existence and evolve, game theory, 
economic analysis of international law, and comparative analysis are utilized. Since 
States make decisions under imperfect information, convergence on at least one common 
basis for the definition, meaning, and scope of a legal rule for space activities should lead 
to an efficient outcome within a particular interval of time. However, when valued 
                                                 
7 This may take the form of accepting obligations that arise from the signature or ratification of 
international agreements, expressed directly or indirectly from State practice, or through the publication 
within the State in the form of national laws, regulations, and policies. See discussion infra. 
8 See discussion infra. 
9 See DAVID A. LAKE, HIERARCHY IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Cornell Univ. Press 2009) [hereinafter 
LAKE], and BROWNLIE supra note 4. See also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW 
NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (Harvard Univ. Press 1991) [hereinafter ELLICKSON], and ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE supra note 4. 
4 
preferences change, rules and supranational markets related to those valued preferences 
will tend to evolve as well. Changes over time to the definition, meaning, and scope of a 
legal rule for the outer space environment demonstrates evolution, which may or may not 
tend to efficient rule supply. Consequently, evolution may engender potential and 
quantifiable ripple effects to social actors who rely on such rules in terms of social 
expectations, the legality of acts or omissions, the valuation of the types of permissible 
activities conducted in the outer space environment, and the management of risks and 
costs in the conduct of outer space activities. 
 
b. Outline of Thesis 
 
The general question this thesis seeks to answer is: how did the (unilateral) 
occurrences and (bilateral/multilateral) transactions of self-regarding units, i.e., States, 
create supranational markets of international relations that give rise to the development of 
rules of jurisdiction over activities regarding the outer space environment from the initial 
State practice of launching objects into the outer space environment? In other words, 
what economic processes describe how the State practice of launching objects over the 
territories of sovereign States toward and into the outer space environment gave rise to 
the entire corpus of space law? 
Supranational markets of international relations arise whenever States seek to act 
beyond their sovereign territories. States act beyond their territories to maximize the 
utility of their valued preferences, which tend to manifest through their foreign policy, 
national and economic security needs. When States seek to maximize the utility of their 
5 
valued preferences, States necessarily engage in State practice, the act of which supplies 
rules of jurisdiction to the supranational market of international relations. 
States supply rules to the supranational market of international relations through 
their State practice. Rules manifest through State practice in the form of rules of 
jurisdiction.10 Rules of jurisdiction are a function of a State’s sovereignty because it is the 
basis for the allocation of a State’s authority over objects and subjects to its jurisdiction.11 
Because the international system of States operates on the basis of sovereign legal 
equality and consent, a State’s authority is at its zenith within the borders of the State, 
while a State’s authority is at its nadir when it is acting beyond its territory.12 Thus, in 
order to minimize costs and maximize benefits in the pursuit of maximizing their valued 
preferences, States supply and consume rules of jurisdiction on the supranational market 
of international relations. 
This thesis explores how rules of jurisdiction in regard to the outer space 
environment have been valued by States over time. The value of rules is defined by four 
criteria: the nature of the activity, the environment in which the activity may take place, 
the minimization of uncertainty of State practice in the environment, and the rule source, 
i.e., international custom (State practice and opinio iuris), international agreements 
(treaties), and general principles of law (common rules of national law). Moreover, the 
sources of rules of public international law for which States may seek to supply, 
negotiate, and/or consume, vary in value.13 This happens because when States seek to 
                                                 
10 See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4, and Prescriptive Jurisdiction supra note 4. 
11 See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4, and Prescriptive Jurisdiction supra note 4. See also BROWNLIE 
supra note 4, and George Manner, The Object Theory of the Individual in International Law, 46 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 428 (1952) [hereinafter Manner]. 
12 See BROWNLIE supra note 4. 
13 This is because the obligation purchased varies depending on the source of the rule as a product of the 
prohibition on nonconsensual rule-making in the international system. 
6 
supply or consume rules for the outer space environment, it is implicit that those States 
value the ability to launch objects, the outer space environment, and the need to 
maximize their valued preferences through State practice in different ways. Some States 
will seek to supply and consume rules from all possible sources, while other States may 
not participate in rule supply or consumption at all. Furthermore, some States may only 
supply or consume some rules, but not all.14 
The number of States that engage in the supranational market of international 
relations for activities in the outer space environment has grown significantly since 
October 1957.15 Participant States that have consumed rules of jurisdiction on the 
supranational market regarding activities in the outer space environment buy these rules 
because they are willing to sell an element of their sovereignty to gain some authority 
over activities in the outer space environment in relation to other States. The cost of a 
rule of jurisdiction is in incurring obligations, the breach of which will generally impose 
some sanction, in order to extend a State’s authority over persons, things, and events 
outside its territory, e.g., in the outer space environment, to satisfy some valued 
preference in relation to the authority of other States.  
The supply of rules of jurisdiction only comes from those States that are 
interested in activities in the outer space environment.16 The initial supply and 
                                                 
14 See discussion in Chapter V infra. 
15 See Graph 2. 
16 Compare John Cobb Cooper, The Russian Satellite – Legal and Political Problems, 24 J. AIR L. & 
COMM. 379 (1957) [hereinafter Russian Satellite] with U.N. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 
[UNCOPUOS], Legal Sub-Comm., Annotated Provisional Agenda, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.295 (Jan. 
13, 2015), available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_L295E.pdf. See U.N. Comm. on 
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [UNCOPUOS], Legal Sub-Comm., Report of the Chair of the Working 
Group on the Definition and Delimitation of Outer Space, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2015/DEF/L.1 (Apr. 
17, 2015), available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2015_DEF_L01E.pdf. See also 
GBENGA ODUNTAN, SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION IN AIRSPACE AND OUTER SPACE (Routledge 2011), 
7 
consumption of rules for the outer space environment resulted from the launch of the 
Sputnik and Explorer objects between October 1957 and January 1958.17 Since January 
1958, the United States, the Soviet Union, and eleven other States continue to engage in 
the same State practice of launching objects over the territories of sovereign States into 
and through the outer space environment.18  
The rules of jurisdiction that arose from the State practice of launching objects 
over the territories of sovereign States and into the outer space environment grew at the 
greatest rate over the first twenty years following the launch of Sputnik.19 Moreover, the 
rapidity of the acceptance of the State practice to launch objects over the territories of 
sovereign States indicates significant consumption of rules from all three sources of rules 
of public international law, i.e., international custom, international agreements, and 
general principles of law – each source of rules represents an individual supranational 
market of international relations. Since October 1957, the State practice of launching 
objects over the sovereign territories of other States has solidified into international 
custom because there is sufficient evidence to indicate that States have purchased the 
obligation to ensure they can continue the State practice.20 Moreover, some States have 
accepted the obligations associated with the State practice of launching objects over the 
sovereign territories of other States as a matter of national law and international 
                                                 
and Dean N. Reinhardt, The Vertical Limit of State Sovereignty (Jun. 2005) (unpublished Master’s thesis, 
McGill University) (on file with the Institute of Air & Space Law, McGill University), available at 
http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=83956&local_base=GEN01-MCG02.  
17 See WALTER A. MCDOUGALL, . . . THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SPACE 
AGE (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1985). 
18 See Timeline of first orbital launches by country, WIKIPEDIA.ORG, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_first_orbital_launches_by_country accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
19 See Graph 10 infra. 
20 See MICHAEL P. SCHARF, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TIMES OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE 123-
137 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2013). 
8 
agreement.21 To a large degree, the obligation has at least converged on the content for 
the first rule of space law that may be defined as consisting of the following elements: (1) 
an object, (2) intended to be launched, or (3) launched, that includes a (4) launch vehicle, 
(5) payload, or (6) satellite – which also includes (a) remote sensing, (b) scientific, (c) 
telecommunication satellites, as well as (7) including the component parts and parts 
thereof of a launch vehicle, payload, or satellite. However, this definition is relative to 
States that exist on Earth because the limiting requirement of the State practice is that the 
object intended to be launched or launched is a function of the overflight of a sovereign’s 
territory. States only enjoy the benefits of sovereign territory relative to the Earth and 
there is a general prohibition on a State’s ability to extend unilaterally its sovereignty to 
the outer space environment without the consent of other States.22  
The proliferation of the State practice of launching objects into the outer space 
environment demonstrates the extent to which the international community of States 
values an interest in rules of jurisdiction over space activities. However, not all States 
participate in the supranational market of international relations for rules regarding 
activities in the outer space environment. Some States may only participate in one, some, 
or all supranational markets that arise, i.e., those supranational markets in relation to rules 
of each source of public international law. For example, one hundred and four (104) out 
                                                 
21 See Chapter V infra. See also Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature 
Jan. 27, 1967, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, 
the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 
22, 1968, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return Agreement]; Convention on International 
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 
[hereinafter Liability Convention]; and Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space, opened for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter Registration Convention]. 
22 See Outer Space Treaty supra note 21, at art. II. See also John H. Knox, A Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351 (2010) [hereinafter Knox]. 
9 
of one hundred and ninety three (193) United Nations Member States have ratified the 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of 
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty).23 
Moreover, the Outer Space Treaty was negotiated and concluded in the United Nations 
(UN) Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS), which began with 
eighteen (18) and has grown, as of October 2015, to eighty three (83) member States.24 
Of all the one hundred and ninety three (193) United Nations Member States today, 
approximately twenty nine (29) States have enacted rules of national (space) law the 
subject of which at least concerns the launching and use of space objects.25 
The rapidity of rule development across each supranational market that facilitates 
exchanges in rules of public international law for the outer space environment has varied 
since October 1957. Although consumption of rules of jurisdiction increased sharply 
when first supplied by international agreements, space treaty rule consumption has 
trended relatively flat since around 1980, except in a few supranational markets where the 
trend is clearly positive.26 However, supranational market participation has continued to 
increase somewhat sharply in some markets even as rule consumption remains flat.27 
Moreover, the number of States that consume rules of jurisdiction is at best one hundred 
and four (104) relative to treaty obligations and at least twenty-nine (29) relative to the 
number of States that have directly promulgated national (space) laws regarding space 
objects. Nonetheless, as changes to the supply of rules, in the number of market 
                                                 
23 See Outer Space Treaty supra note 21. 
24 See United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, Members of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, UNOOSA.ORG, available at http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/members/index.html accessed 
Dec. 10, 2015. 
25 See Chapter V infra. 
26 See Graph 10 infra. 
27 Id. 
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participants, and in rule consumption rates continue to arise with varied velocity, there is 
much fragmentation in the types of obligations States have purchased with respect to 
supranational markets of international relations for the outer space environment. 
Recent trends indicate that the rate of rule consumption and evolving valued 
preferences of States have shifted market participation and rule supply back to unilateral 
State practice with the deepening maturity of the commercial, civil, and military space 
sectors within States.28 This may be the product of inertial forces endemic to some States 
in determining the scope of their valued preferences to launch objects over the territories 
of other States because the rapid growth of technology makes it hard for States to 
consistently value the benefits and costs associated with the particular types of activities a 
space object could perform in the outer space environment. On the other hand, there is 
limited consensus on the scope of the types of obligations that a State could purchase in 
the form of rules of jurisdiction on the supranational market for the outer space 
environment.29 Consequently, despite attempts at coordination or cooperation among 
States, the supply of some types of rules has not settled in terms of the content, i.e., 
definition, meaning, and scope, because there is little incentive to supply or consume 
                                                 
28 This is observed in the recent growth in the number of States that have promulgated national space laws 
with respect to rules governing space objects and correlated growth in the acceptance of the set of rules that 
comprise the Registration Convention since it obligates States to institute rules regarding the registration of 
space objects launched by the State Party. See Registration Convention supra note 21, and United Nations 
Office of Outer Space Affairs [UNOOSA], National Registry Notifications, UNOOSA.ORG, available at 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/spaceobjectregister/national-registries/index.html accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
See also Louis Friedman, Op-Ed, The new space race: It's not just the U.S. and Russia anymore, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 9, 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/09/opinion/la-oe-friedman-new-
space-race-20131209 accessed Dec. 10, 2015, and Mark Magnier, Bruce Wallace & Shankhadeep 
Choudhury, A great leap skyward, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2007, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/nov/18/world/fg-spacerace18 accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
29 See, e.g., Michael Krepon, Space Code of Conduct Mugged in New York, ARMSCONTROLWONK.COM, 
Aug. 4, 2015, available at http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/404712/space-code-of-conduct-
mugged-in-new-york/ accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
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rules that may not help maximize some States’ valued preferences for utilizing space 
objects in the outer space environment.30 
There will most likely be some types of change to State practice that will force an 
evolutionary response in the generation of rules of jurisdiction for the outer space 
environment regarding space objects. If so, then State practice will necessitate the 
reevaluation of those valued preferences associated with space activities. In so doing, a 
re-supply of rules in response to changes in State practice will occur and, depending on 
the value of a new State practice, States will price the new supply of rules in accordance 
with the need to consume new rules of jurisdiction over persons, things, and events that 
could occur in the outer space environment. Ceteris paribus, this process should repeat 
every time there is a shift in a State’s valued preferences as a product of State practice; 
thus, further perpetuating the evolution of rules and rules of law for the outer space 
environment. 
 
c. The Theoretical Foundations of an Economic Analysis of Rule Formation 
i. Epistemological Approach 
 
 Generally, the subject of law and economics can be defined as “the application of 
economic methods to legal analysis.”31 Thus, the law and economic literature can be 
broken down into two basic analytical parts: 1) economic analysis of law and 2) 
economic analysis in law. (Emphasis added). The former analytical part reflects the study 
                                                 
30 Id. 
31 See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4, at 1. 
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of two basic questions: a) what are the effects of legal rules on the behavior of relevant 
actors, and b) how are the effects of rules socially desirable?32 However, these questions 
can also be reformulated to inquire about how economic methods of analysis are applied 
to the study of legal institutions and doctrines through comparative analysis focusing on 
the consequences of legal rules through cross-jurisdictional, historical, or hypothetical 
processes.33 The latter analytical part concerns the study of the underlying economics of a 
legal rule, i.e., “economic analysis supplies inputs to a legal rule.”34 For example, in the 
cases of antitrust or anti-dumping issues under international trade law, “whether two 
products are “like,” with the result that discrimination between them is prohibited, by 
reference to cross-elasticities of demand.”35 Or by way of another example, in US 
national law, a Herfindahl index for a particular industry may be used to determine 
whether the merger of companies would create market concentrations greater than the 
level of market share permitted by law.36 Hence, this latter analytical part considers the 
underlying economic forces and processes that govern how rules function in a system of 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW IN HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1661 (A.J Auerbach, et al. 
eds., North Holland 2002); AVERY WIENER KATZ, FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 
(Lexis Nexis 2006) [hereinafter KATZ]; ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS (Addison-
Wesley 2012) (2000); and RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (Wolters Kluwer 2014) 
[hereinafter POSNER]. 
33 See Dunoff & Trachtman supra note 4, at 7, and ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4, at 3. 
34 See Dunoff & Trachtman supra note 4, at 7. 
35 See Dunoff & Trachtman supra note 4, at 6. Cross-elasticities of demand is generally defined as the 
percentage change in demand for one good that occurs in response to a percentage change in the price of 
another good. The degree of elasticity or “responsiveness to change” in a good is measured in relative 
percentage. A relative negative change between two goods indicate that if the demand for one good 
decreases then a corresponding increase in the demand for the other good should arise. This signifies that 
the good are “complimentary goods.” If, on the other hand, an increase in the demand for one good 
corresponds with an increase in the demand for a second good, this signifies that the two goods are 
“substitute goods.” See also George Stigler, Law or Economics, 35 J. L. & ECON. 455, 467 (1992). 
36 See Nicole Palan, Measurement of Specialization – The Choice of Indices (Forschungsschwerpunkt 
Internationale Wirtschaft (“FIW”) Working Paper No. 62, 2010), available at 
http://www.fiw.ac.at/fileadmin/Documents/Publikationen/Working_Paper/N_062-Palan.pdf, and Eric 
Nauenberg, Kisalaya Basu & Harish Chand, Hirschman-Herfindahl index determination under incomplete 
information, 4 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 639 (1997). 
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law and the extent to which State practice may determine the existence of a legal 
obligation as a product of a particular outcome in a supranational market. 
Fundamentally, the approach taken in this thesis is a hybrid of both types of 
economic analysis as applied to public international law. With respect to the economic 
analysis of public international law, the issue of how economic methods are applied to 
doctrines of international law and international institutions provide a means by which to 
measure how rules of public international law arise and evolve over time. With respect to 
economic analysis in public international law, the secondary objective of this thesis is to 
design a means by which an observer can compare the content (i.e., definition, meaning, 
and scope) of rules over time. Furthermore, several economic methods are used in an 
attempt to model how rules are adopted and proliferate over time. When States seek to 
negotiate for or decide to follow some rule or rule of law, it is assumed that they seek to 
manage risks to State practice and maximize consistent definition and meaning for a rule 
of jurisdiction to minimize the cost of the obligation over time. However, as State 
preferences change, so may a rule or rule of law or a necessary element of a rule of law 
over time may also change.  
The application of economic methods to public international law and rule-making 
is the primary concern of this thesis. The power of this approach is that the various 
methodologies that comprise economic analysis can be applied to a variety of subjects 
related to public international law providing a foundation for measuring the distinction of 
belief from opinion in a justifiable and falsifiable manner. As Trachtman points out, 
 
14 
economics itself is not so much a methodology as an epistemology. 
Economics encompasses a broad range of methods. In this regard, 
economics is simply another word for rational social scientific analysis –
properly applied, it rejects no method that is rational. . . . Economics is a 
strong social science because it is an open system. The only conditions for 
inclusion in the system are rational analysis (but not necessarily the 
assumptions that people are rational) and methodological individualism.37 
 
From this starting point, the basic assumptions that underlie the economic analyses 
utilized in this thesis are “(i) methodologically, that individuals [i.e., States] seek to 
maximize the achievement of their [valued] preferences; and (ii) normatively, that the 
only valid source of preferences – of values – is individuals [i.e., States].”38 
 This thesis attempts to take a positivist view of rule formation and makes no 
assumptions or claims regarding how best rules should arise, which represents a 
normative view of rule formation.39 The major point of this thesis, therefore, is to analyze 
what may be termed “preference revelation” and its consequences for rule formation.40 In 
other words, this thesis assumes that States will seek to minimize costs and manage risks 
associated with extending State authority outside their sovereign territories in the form of 
a supply of rules of jurisdiction. Consumption of the same rules of jurisdiction permits 
States to assert their authority extraterritorially while accepting the obligations from such 
rules imposes liabilities on States. A breach of an agreed upon rule of jurisdiction may 
                                                 
37 See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4, at 1. 
38 Id. 
39 See Roberto Ago, Positive Law and International Law, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 691 (1957).  
40 See Dunoff & Trachtman supra note 4, at 9. 
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lead to sanctions in the form of tangible and intangible costs, e.g., shaming, warfare, 
monetary damages, declaration of responsibility, or collective denial of a State’s 
authority in the international system.41 
Preference revelation is observed when States enter the supranational market of 
international relations and seek preference satisfaction through the use of stratagems in 
relation to other market participants. States have wide latitudes of freedoms in 
determining their economic (i.e., health of the State), foreign policies (i.e., application of 
sovereign authority), and national security (i.e., internal and external security) needs in 
relation to other States.42 Underlying the analysis of preference revelation, as will be 
discussed below, are supranational market forces that drive States to develop rules under 
imperfect information in the course of conducting their international relations to achieve 
preference satisfaction. Any change in information regarding a State’s valued preferences 
or any element of a rule over time tends to drive the evolution of rules. Therefore, in this 
thesis, application of economic analysis does not seek to answer the question of how 
States should value their preferences, but how States seek to maximize their valued 
preferences and its consequences for rule formation and evolution. 
 Moreover, the economic theories underlying the study of rule formation can be 
differentiated.43 First, the Coase theorem assumes that a market mode of allocation is 
superior to bureaucratic allocation because bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome 
                                                 
41 See BROWNLIE supra note 4. See also CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 84 (Michael Howard ed., Peter 
Paret trans., Princeton Univ. Press 1989) (“War is not merely an act of policy but a true political 
instrument, a continuation of political intercourse carried on with other means.”). 
42 See LAKE supra note 9. 
43 I do not apply these theories below because the following analysis consists only of explaining the basic 
framework for rule-formation and evolution. I only mention these theories for completeness and address 
issues for future study. 
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regardless of the initial allocation of property if transaction costs are low.44 Second, the 
Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Economics “posits that under perfection competition 
the market allocates resources efficiently,” but “recogniz[ing] that in a world without 
perfect competition we cannot say that a move toward the free market will enhance 
efficiency.” 45  
Economic analysis of public international law as applied to the international 
system of States follows three basic questions. First, how many State participants are 
there in a given supranational market? Second, how does market participation via State 
practice lead to the supply, buying, and selling of rules in the form of rules of 
jurisdiction? Third, what are the consequences to the international system when the 
supply and types of rules evolve as a result of a change in the valued preferences of 
States?  
Chapters III-V attempt to outline an answer to these questions in relation to rules 
of jurisdiction that arose from the initial rule of launching objects over the sovereign 
territories of other States. In the context of the supranational market of international 
relations, both market participation and rule development may or may not lead to an 
efficient outcome in the supply and purchasing of rules of jurisdiction in accordance with 
State(s) preferences.46 In either case, how States enter the supranational market of 
international relations will depend on a variety of facts that must be observed to 
                                                 
44 See RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 95-156 (Univ. Chicago Press 1990). 
45 See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4, at 2. 
46 See discussion infra. The construction of Herfindahl indexes were utilized to determine market share 
concentration for different supranational markets to determine what types of markets exist. See supra note 
36. 
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determine whether a model of rule formation reflects an efficient means by which rules 
may arise based on the spectrum of market participation.  
Market participation will vary in the supranational markets of international 
relations because each market with respect to each source of rules will have different 
barriers to entry. On the basis of sovereign legal equality, each State in the international 
system will generally have an equal market share only in terms of rules supplied by State 
practice. However, when States purchase the set of rules that comprise a treaty, the act of 
signature or ratification will establish the level of obligation purchased. The consumption 
of the set of rules that comprise a treaty gives each State Party an equal share of the 
obligation that arises from the treaty’s rules. Non-States Parties do not purchase the 
obligation on the supranational market because they have not paid the price of accepting 
the treaty’s legal obligations. Therefore a non-State Party cannot extend its authority 
relative to other States Parties to the treaty with respect to the set of rules the treaty 
comprises.  
Since States are assumed to be rational, individualistic actors in the course of their 
international relations with other States, rules of jurisdiction may come about in a variety 
of ways open to States, either through cooperative or non-cooperative means.47 Although 
rule formation may not always be efficient, the fact that States seek to maximize their 
utility through rule development provides direct and indirect evidence of their valued 
preferences. When a State does find it in its interest to seek to develop rules for itself and 
wish to see such rules proliferate, it tends to find ways to enter the supranational market 
of international relations to at least attempt to achieve rules for itself and to manage risks 
                                                 
47 See BROWNLIE supra note 4, and Prescriptive Jurisdiction supra note 4. 
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and minimize costs to States individually or collectively as a function of information 
about the subject activity for which rules are sought. How States go about achieving rule 
supply manifests through a variety of ways including through specific markets or via 
institutional means – where States have access to such venues.  
 
ii. The International System of States Defined as a Private Legal System  
 
Throughout human history, social order has played an important role in 
minimizing relative costs to existence.48 Social order has and does come in a variety of 
forms, individually or collectively, e.g., warfare, religious or moral imposition, sovereign 
imposition, and familial imposition.49 Historically, the disorder among and between 
States has resulted in significant costs in terms of human life, physical resources, 
developing advantageous capabilities, time, and effort.50 Sometimes governments are too 
weak to perform the functions of protecting the lives of its people and their property.51 
When local governments fail to enforce social order, significant third-parties have been 
known to intervene in disputes to minimize social and real costs through the enforcement 
of general rules of conduct and self-restraint.52 For example, religious institutions have 
historically enabled dialogue and negotiation between disputing parties, proceeding on 
the rules of good faith and fairness, by swearing an oath to abide by the rules agreed 
                                                 
48 ADAM WATSON, THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (Routledge 2005) (1992). 
49 Amitai Aviram, The Paradox of Spontaneous Formation of Private Legal Systems (L. & Econ. Working 
Paper No. 192, Olin Program, Univ. Chicago L. Sch., 2003), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/192.aa_.spontaneous.pdf?origin=publication_detail. 
50 See supra note 48. 
51 See supra notes 48 & 49. See also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORME AND POWER 
OF A COMMON WEALTH ECCLESIASTICALL AND CIVIL (Thoemmes 2006) (1651). 
52 See supra note 49. 
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upon.53 This alternative to resorting to warfare tended to significantly minimize the costs 
to each disputant, even if for a short period of time. 
One apropos example of a third-party imposing external rules by consent of the 
disputants is found in the “Pax Dei” movement of the tenth century in Western Europe.54 
The decline and fall of the Carolingian Empire caused a political vacuum in Western 
Europe resulting in the consolidation of power by rival lords through warfare.55 Without a 
central, independent government to assert authority over Western Europe, rival lords 
resorted to the mutual destruction of their respective lands, in particular, farms and the 
peasants that worked the farms.56 Without a central government to put an end to the 
warfare and impose peace, an opportunity arose for a third party to take a role in easing 
tensions and minimizing further destruction. Because a majority of the people of Western 
Europe in the tenth century worshipped under the faith of the Church of Saint Peter in 
Rome, local Christian Priests introduced the concept of “Pax Dei” – the first known 
decentralized, popular peace movement, as a solution to the high and constant social 
costs of existence.57  
One of the primary functions of the Pax Dei movement was the design of rules for 
the regulation of warfare.58 The brutality that preceded the Pax Dei movement was so 
atrocious and unsustainable that all parties to such warfare desired for a way to end the 
suffering.59 The rival lords adopted the Pax Dei rules by oath, which the rival lords 









voluntarily accepted.60 The network of religious members of society took oaths seriously 
because they represented a covenant with the Christian God – a major aspect of social life 
in Europe at the time.61 Once the rival lords adopted the Pax Dei rules, which included 
rules regulating warfare, e.g., the rules of prohibition against harming non-combatants 
and suspending warfare during harvest season and times of religious significance, social 
order was imposed through the enforcement of the original oaths.62 If a party violated or 
derogated from the sworn oath that bound a party to a particular rule, then punishments 
would include social and religious ostracism – an imposition of significant real (i.e., 
tangible) and spiritual (i.e., intangible) costs to the violator.63 
The rules that members of the Pax Dei movement created and imposed on its 
subjects by consent provide an example of the formation of a private legal system.64 A 
private legal system consists of private ordering among subjects to third-party rules, 
which do not arise from a centralized government.65 Fundamentally, then, a private legal 
system can arise from “a non-governmental institution intended to regulate the behavior 
of its members.”66 Thus, in the absence of a supranational State to impose authority on 
the disputing rival lords, the lords consumed and supplied third-party rules to increase 
social order.67 
While the use and enforcement of Pax Dei rules of warfare waxed and waned over 
time, States – such as they were between the tenth and seventeenth centuries – were not 







66 Id. at 3. 
67 Id. 
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immune from the degrading forces of social and real costs in their international relations. 
Through the middle of the seventeenth century, European monarchs still engaged in 
devastating international warfare leading to a significant shift in the international political 
and legal landscapes. Nevertheless, oaths were still an important part of social life and 
oath breaking tended to be severely punished.68 
The modern system of international relations of States began in 1648 with the 
conclusion of the Treaty of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years’ War and the 
Eighty Years’ War.69 From the “Peace of Westphalia” arose new rules of international 
law that redefined State sovereignty, namely respect for sovereign boundaries, non-
interference in domestic affairs, political independence and self-determination, and 
sovereign legal equality in relation to other State sovereigns.70 Thus, two basic rules of 
the international system arose: 1) a State’s application of its authority extraterritorially 
must arise from the consent of States and 2) State sovereignty is confined within the 
territory of a State.71  
Both rules seek to enable a presumption against nonconsensual rule-making. 
Nonconsensual rule-making means the involuntary application of third party rules to 
State practice the breach of which imposes a sanction on a State although the State did 
not purchase the obligation of the rule72 If the rules supplied to the supranational market 
of international relations develop from nonconsensual rule-making, then consumption of 
                                                 
68 Id. 
69 See Treaty of Westphalia (1648), and BROWNLIE supra note 4. 
70 See BROWNLIE supra note 4.  
71 See BROWNLIE supra note 4, and STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 
(Princeton Univ. Press 1999) [hereinafter KRASNER]. See also Knox supra note 22. 
72 The act of nonconsensual does not impute liability on a State that has not purchased the obligation of the 
rule after subsequent breach of the rule.  
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such rules would violate the basic rule of the consent of States and impose obligations on 
States external to the State. The existence of such a supranational market of international 
relations would collapse the private legal system of States and create a supranational 
government above States.73 
As the new rules of international (or Westphalian) sovereignty permeated across 
Europe – and eventually all States on Earth, the circumstances leading up to and beyond 
the Peace of Westphalia produced a surge in scholarship directed at rival sovereigns on 
the scope of a State’s powers vis-à-vis other State sovereigns and peoples collectively.74 
Many of these scholars put forth theories of international relations, as well as on the 
scope of a State’s sovereign and international powers.75 Consequently, States consumed 
many of the rules that international legal scholars put forth, which States utilized these 
new preferred powers to exercise their authority extraterritorially, giving rise to a 
worldwide expansion of State activities with all the attendant risks, costs, and benefits 
such activities engender upon the international system of States.76 
Although rules of international law have permeated across the Earth, not all States 
have adopted every rule of international law. Over time, rules change; States abandon, 
repeal, or replace rules with disutility in favor of different rules with greater utility.77 This 
independence enables rule-making based on the exchanges (interactions and transactions) 
                                                 
73 If observed, the act of supplying and consuming nonconsensual rules from the supranational market is 
prima facie evidence that the private legal system among States has broken down because order no longer 
arises from the collective actions of States but from the will of some supranational entity acting on the 
international system of States. 
74 See BROWNLIE supra note 4. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Some examples include the transition from the League of Nations to the United Nations Charter from 
1920 to 1945; or the transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) from 1947 to 1994. 
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between and among States as a function of State practice. Moreover, this independence 
would not have been possible but for the rules that States adopted as a result of the Peace 
of Westphalia. The Peace of Westphalia and the principles that States adopted from the 
treaty comprise the sovereign foundation of the State.78 
The concept of the State has evolved significantly over human history.79 
Nevertheless, the definition of “the State” adopted in this thesis derives from relatively 
modern sources of public international law. First, the treaty definition is found in the 
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), which entered 
into force on December 26, 1934.80 The Montevideo Convention is the codification of 
international custom of those elements that define a State. As Article I of the Montevideo 
Convention affirms, a State is  “a person of international law [that] should possess the 
following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) 
government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.”81 Second, a 
codification of State practice for the definition of a State is found in the Restatement (3rd) 
on the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Restatements).82 Section 201 of the 
Restatements defines a State as being “an entity that has a defined territory and a 
permanent population, under the control of its own government, and that engages in, or 
                                                 
78 See BROWNLIE supra note 4. 
79 See supra note 48. Although this thesis does not consider the rules that have given rise to the formation 
of a State over time, it is worth noting, briefly, how States have evolved to be in a position to supply, 
negotiate, and consume rules of jurisdiction as a matter of binding obligations, i.e., what we today call rules 
of law. 
80 See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention), Dec. 26, 1933, 165 
L.N.T.S. 19, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp.) 75 (1934) (hereinafter Montevideo Convention), available at 
http://www.ilsa.org/jessup/jessup15/Montevideo%20Convention.pdf. See also Thomas D. Grant, Defining 
Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 403 (1999). 
81 Id. at art. 1. 
82 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) ON THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 201 (1987). 
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has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”83 Figure 1 below 
provides an illustration of each element that comprises State sovereignty. 
The Restatements definition is slightly augmented from the definition of the State 
provided by the Montevideo Convention. For example, the Restatements qualifies 
government with the aspect of “control”84 – a normative element – meant to distinguish 
whether a State’s government has the ability to govern,85 as well as augments the element 
of engaging in relations with other States by qualifying relations as “formal” and 
generalizing the subject of international relations to entities with which a State may 
“engage” in a variety of relationships.86 While these qualifications further illustrate the 
common core of the rules by which States are defined, they also illustrate the departure 
from the general rule that a State is defined by four basic elements. Such differences in 
the rules, even if minor, signify the way State practice has evolved over time from the 
supply of rules that define a State. 
 
 
Figure 1: Elements of State Sovereignty 
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85 See BROWNLIE supra note 4. 
86 Nevertheless, missing from both definitions is the concept of recognition. Recognition is an inherently 
political act and therefore a product of State practice that is subjective. Because the act of recognizing a 
State is inherently political, the degree to which States permit unrecognized States depends on factors the 
expression of which depends on the valued preference internal to States. See BROWNLIE supra note 4. 
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As discussed later in this chapter, States trade in components of power on the 
supranational market of international relations to satisfy some valued preference internal 
to the State.87 In particular, States trade in rules of jurisdiction because such rules 
represent a function of a State’s authority.88 Moreover, the act of trading in components 
of power, like rules of jurisdiction, arises from State practice because it is the 
manifestation of the physical will of the State in seeking to maximize its raison d’état by 
extending its authority extraterritorially.89 Since a State’s authority derives from its 
sovereignty, trading in rules of jurisdiction necessitates the trading in a State’s 
sovereignty as a means to extend State authority outside its territory.90 
 The State is inherently bounded by its territory.91 Conterminous, moreover, a 
State’s sovereignty is also bounded, but its authority may extend beyond its territory.92 
When States assert some authority beyond their respective territory, they may act without 
the protection of their sovereignty.93 Consequently, to manage the risks and minimize the 
costs of a State’s international relations, States seek to trade in rules of authority that take 
the form of rules of jurisdiction.94 These rules are generated by States through their State 
practice and form the basis of rule-making and supply in the international system of 
States. 
When States engage in the maximization of their valued preferences through State 
practice, their actions necessarily affect the social order established by the international 
                                                 




91 See BROWNLIE supra note 4. 
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93 See The S.S. Lotus (Fra. v. Tur.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10. See also BROWNLIE supra note 4. 
94 See supra note 4. 
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community of States. Because no supranational State exists with the authority to impose 
rules on all States, States will tend to order themselves in relation to those States that 
share the same or similar interests, the results of which create social ordering.95 A 
consequence of social ordering is the generation of rules of jurisdiction for which States 
may bargain to maximize their valued preferences.96 In order to maximize their valued 
preferences, States may independently or co-dependently develop rules as a function of 
their respective State practices and cooperate to bargain for rules of jurisdiction over 
some activity in some location beyond their territories.97 States tend to use any means 
necessary to accomplish this task, including the use of international fora and tribunals – 
both of which represent third party institutions.98 
Equating the international legal system with a private legal system creates two 
issues. First, must all rules of jurisdiction developed by States to govern their 
extraterritorial activities have binding legal effect (i.e., bargained for obligation the basis 
of which enables State authority extraterritorially)? If not, what good is the supply of 
rules that do not have binding legal effect? Second, how does an observer distinguish 
between rules of jurisdiction that are non-binding and binding? What is the process of 
transition? 
 In regard to the first issue, not all rules that could be supplied for consumption by 
States must have binding legal effect because not every State practice or supplied rule 
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may be considered obligatory as a matter of law.99 The benefit of the supply of such rules 
is dependent on a variety of factors. These include, inter alia, transaction costs, 
externalities, discounted enforcement costs, and the overall benefit assumed in the supply 
of such rules to enhance social order through cooperation or coordination.100  
For example, when members of COPUOS negotiated the Outer Space Treaty they 
relied on rules of jurisdiction expressed in the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (Declaration of Legal 
Principles).101 COPUOS members developed the Declaration of Legal Principles initially 
as a set of non-binding rules and supplied these rules to the supranational market of 
international relations.102 Consequently, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) consumed 
the Declaration of Legal Principles when it voted to adopt the rules as a UNGA 
resolution in 1963.103 By 1966, using the Declaration of Legal Principles as the basis for 
the negotiations, COPUOS concluded the Outer Space Treaty and supplied a set of rules 
of law as a multilateral international agreement.104 Once the Outer Space Treaty was 
opened for signature, interested States started to consume the rules of jurisdiction of the 
Outer Space Treaty by accepting the costs associated with the obligations the treaty 
establishes relative to the price paid, i.e., cost of signature, ratification, accession, or 
succession.105  
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With respect to the second issue, the process that governs how a rule transitions to 
a rule of law varies based on how the rule was initially supplied to the supranational 
market of international relations. A rule will have a particular content, i.e., definition, 
meaning, and scope, and that content may serve to maximize a State’s valued preference. 
The transition from rule to rule of law occurs when a State gives notice that it has 
purchased an obligation in relation to other States in the international system in order to 
enjoy the right of extending authority extraterritorially. When a State purchases the 
obligation of a rule of jurisdiction on the supranational market of international relations it 
gives notice to other States in the form of some affirmative act or omission as a product 
of State practice. Generally, an affirmation permits or signals that the State will or intends 
to exert its authority beyond its territory bounded by the content of the rule of 
jurisdiction.  
Moreover, each source of rules of public international law has its own associated 
costs and benefits. Because the international system of States functions as a product of 
the rule of the consent of States, some rules may not be desirable to some States. With 
respect to international custom, State practice itself is not clearly indicative of being 
performed out of a sense of legal obligation. If a State is a consistent objector to the 
obligatory nature of the rule as a function of its State practice, this is sufficient to signal 
to the international market that the rule has no binding legal effect because the State has 
not consumed the rule of law by accepting the cost of the legal obligation of the rule.106 
Instead, the State has supplied rule(s) associated with its State practice only. However, a 
State could take affirmative acts in the course of its State practice that would represent a 
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market signal of buying the legal obligation of the rule in the form of its sovereign 
authority.107 When this situation arises, a rule of international custom may form 
evidenced by a State’s practice conducted out of a sense of legal obligation.108 
With respect to international agreements, when States seek to negotiate and 
conclude an international agreement, the fact that States would participate in the 
development of rules of jurisdiction is indicative of the costs States are willing to accept 
based on the supply of the set of rules that comprises the international agreement. Since 
an international agreement manifests as a supply of choice of law rules of jurisdiction 
based on the intent of the negotiating States Parties, those States that participate in the 
supply of rules of jurisdiction will incur transactional costs whether or not those States 
sign or ratify the international agreement.109 Conversely, some States may never take part 
in the original negotiations and therefore will never expend any resources in the 
development of rules of jurisdiction underlying the international agreement, but may 
nevertheless later consume the rules of jurisdiction as a product of the international 
agreement. Subsequent consumption via signature or ratification generally implies the 
level of value the State has for the international agreement.110 Furthermore, when a State 
leaves an international agreement, the State will sell back its legal obligation and abandon 
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any benefits that derive from the agreement under conditions set forth by the international 
agreement.111 Because States commoditize their sovereignty in the form of rules of 
jurisdiction that are not fungible with other elements of their sovereignty, a State’s 
sovereign authority may be revoked and the rule’s obligation discharged once a State 
takes an affirmative act to do so because of the prohibition on nonconsensual rule-
making, i.e., compelled purchase of an obligation.112 
 With respect to general principles of law, each State has its own internal processes 
by which it discharges its sovereign authority to promulgate or publish rules of 
jurisdiction within its territory. This ability is a defining element of a State. However, 
when rules of jurisdiction internal to the State apply extraterritorially, such rules manifest 
as State practice based on how the State values certain preferences of its foreign policy, 
economic and security needs. Without evidence of consistent objection, any act by which 
a State discharges its authority extraterritorially can manifest as a supply of rules of 
jurisdiction with respect to the State itself because the legal obligation, i.e., opinio iuris, 
is based on the sovereign act of promulgating or publishing rules of jurisdiction within its 
territory.113 When States collectively or independently promulgate or publish the same 
rules of jurisdiction with respect to congruent activities and extraterritorial environments, 
they express the same State practice.114 Since States develop their national laws 
independent of other States, common rules of jurisdiction among States are considered 
general principles of law and are indicative of a common basis with regard to some 
application of a State’s authority extraterritorially. In other words, there is a presumption 
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that the commonly used rules of jurisdiction developed by States is evidence of 
purchased rules of jurisdiction because there is consensus among States about the content 
of the rule.115 
 The international system of States operates much like a private legal system.116 
The rules of jurisdiction that make up the basis of the international legal system are 
created by States through their State practice.117 When States have disputes among or 
between each other, they may violate the rules they accept from the sale of their 
sovereignty and accept the risks of breaching their obligations to other States. However, 
sometimes the costs of breach are sufficiently high that States resort to third parties to 
assist in resolving a dispute.118 Such third party entities can take the form of an 
international forum or tribunal, e.g., the United Nations Security Council, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), permanent and ad hoc international criminal or civil 
tribunals.119 Moreover, since participation in international tribunals and fora arise from 
the consent of the States Parties, generally no alternative imposition by an external 
authority exists.120 However, States may collectively act together to enforce or punish 
violations of international law, which develops fundamentally from State practice.121  
When international tribunals intervene to resolve disputes, they act pursuant to the 
vested authority granted by the consent of the States Parties to declare what the rule of 
law to be applied is and determine which State(s) Party breached an obligation it owed to 
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the other State(s) Party.122 The act of declaring what rules of international law are and 
how they apply to the disputant States is only binding between the disputants, but the 
declaration itself is a valued preference of the States Parties because they consented to the 
tribunal’s authority.123 Furthermore, the publication of a tribunal’s declaration represents 
another example of an exchange in the supranational market of international relations. 
Moreover, as a published document, the declaration issued by the tribunal will 
necessarily state the rule(s) of international law used in the decision regarding the 
dispute. Consequently, relative to non-States Parties, the publication of the declaration of 
the rule of law used in the decision is fundamentally a (re-)supply of rules to the 
supranational market of international relations.  
To summarize, first States develop their internal valued preferences generally 
based on foreign policy, economic and national security needs. Next, States will 
physically manifest the maximization of their valued preferences in the form of State 
practice. State practice may necessitate the need to enter a supranational market of 
international relations. By entering a supranational market, a State may supply rules 
unilaterally or bilaterally relative to other States. Once rules of jurisdiction are supplied to 
a supranational market, States may individually or collectively set an associated price on 
accepting the obligation of a supplied rule. If a State accepts the obligation of a supplied 
rule and gives notice of this fact in the form of published evidence, e.g., through the 
promulgation or publication of a national law, regulation, or policy, or via a signature or 
ratification of an international agreement, a State is said to have consumed the rule. The 
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cost of consuming a rule is the acceptance of an obligation to other States to ensure the 
extension of a State’s authority beyond its territory.  
Public international law may be described as a set of rules and processes that 
describe which and how rights, duties, and obligations apply to States via the supply and 
consumption of rules that arise from the exchanges of States in the supranational market 
of international relations.124 The benefit of such rules enables cooperation in the form of 
bounds of consent to the extension of a State’s authority beyond its sovereign territory.125 
The cost incurred results from giving notice that the State has purchased the obligation of 
the rule and may be held liable for its breach.126 Nonetheless, a sovereign State has the 
exclusive authority to make its own rules and rules of law, including the authority to 
change rules and rules of law. In doing so, it creates a process of orderly change in how 
rules and rules of law are created over time as manifested from rule- and law-making 
internal to a State.127 So long as States continue to supply and consume rules of 
jurisdiction and create obligations among and between States, the international legal 
system will remain stable until the valued preferences of States change potentially giving 
rise to a resupply of rules, via a change(s) in State practice, to the supranational market of 
international relations for possible consumption. Such an event would close the loop on 
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the processes of rule formation, development, and evolution.128 Figure 2 below illustrates 
this process.  
                                                 
128 The stability of preference revelation, rule supply, and rule consumption enables stability in the 
international legal system of States. Consequently, instability of the international system of States may be 
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iii. Supranational Markets of International Relations  
  
The general market under study here is the supranational market of international 
relations. Markets are generally defined as “a place of commercial activity in which 
goods or services are bought and sold.”129 In the context of the international relations of 
States, the place where such actions or activities may arise is anywhere States have 
interests in maximizing their valued preferences (i.e., individual utility).130 This occurs 
through the application of foreign relations, whether in specific fora or as a consequence 
of State actions or activities (i.e., State practice). The actions and activities in which 
States engage manifest broadly through components of power, developed and used 
generally to satisfy valued preferences regarding rules of jurisdiction, which are a 
function of the fundamental basis of legal obligations.131 When States engage themselves 
in centralized or decentralized supranational markets of international relations, the end 
result may lead to the buying and selling of goods or services which includes rules of 
jurisdiction. Whether rules of jurisdiction have binding effect as law depends on how 
such rules are developed or purchased by States.  
Through unilateral State practice or by negotiation in the supranational market of 
international relations, States seek to “sell” their valued preferences as rules or rules of 
law of jurisdiction by construction (e.g., international custom or national law) or in 
codified form (e.g., treaty law).132 When States engage in activities in the supranational 
market of international relations, the end result of the occurrences and transactions of 
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States can be the development of rules or rules of law that States seek to “buy” to 
maximize their individual preferences, but also to manage risk and increase certainty 
related to the activities subject to such rules or rules of law.133 Below I attempt to 
deconstruct what this means as a function of rule development. 
In terms of market participation, the entire international system of States is 
bounded only by the number of participant States, which an observer can measure 
relative to the interactions of self-regarding units, i.e., States.134 Rule formation under 
public international law is the product of, at least, those States that are recognized as 
members of the United Nations, i.e., potential entities that can and may supply and/or 
purchase rules of jurisdiction on the supranational market of international relations. 
Moreover, the international system of States is treated as an open system whereby States 
are generally free to maximize their preferences in relation to other States bounded only 
by the hierarchies of international relationships.135 Furthermore, there is no 
predetermined bound on market participation because the international system of States is 
open and therefore subject to evolution.136 In other words, the supranational market of 
international relations is what States make of it.137 
The supranational market of international relations arises because States have 
preferences which it values relative to its raison d’état. In particular, States tend to rank 
economic health, authority, and security high on their list of preferences and must seek to 
maximize each through a variety of means (i.e., strategies), including international 
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cooperation. When international cooperation arises, States can exchange in preference 
identification through negotiation to form a rule(s) or rule(s) of law to govern themselves 
within a private legal system of international rules and laws. Rules and rules of law of 
jurisdiction manifest as components of State power that, in theory, should minimize 
transaction costs relative to other States engaged in the same types of exchanges.138 In 
other words, States engage in negotiations in the supra-national market of international 
relations to trade in components of power, e.g., rules of jurisdiction, by seeking to 
maximize their set of valued preferences.139 In doing so, States must relinquish some 
level of autonomy in order to obtain benefits from various forms of international relations 
exchanges (i.e., occurrences or transactions).140  
The supranational market is postulated to arise from the activities of States that 
may be defined as the exchanges among and between States engaged in international 
relations. First, occurrences are defined as those positive acts that States independently 
take in the course of their international relations to satisfy a valued preference. When a 
State, due to changes in competence, capabilities, or resources, begins a State practice 
dependent or independent of other States, the State’s valued preference(s) may begin as a 
nonbinding rule relative to other States engaged in such practice. Over time, such rules 
may become a binding rule of public international law when codified or when such rules 
are observed as international custom if the State practice is general, consistent, and there 
is evidence of a purchase of a legal obligation.141 For example, as discussed in more 
                                                 
138 See ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4. 
139 Id.  
140 See supra note 95. See also KRASNER supra note 71, and ECONOMIC STRUCTURE supra note 4. 
141 See Office of the President, National Security Council, Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Scientific 
Satellite Program, NSC 5520 (May 20, 1955). 
39 
detail below, when the Soviet Union and US began a State practice of launching objects 
into orbit around the Earth, a preference highly valued by both States (but for different 
reasons), this initiated rule formation regarding the “freedom of space”142 or more 
precisely the creation of an informal rule that permits a State the right to launch and orbit 
an object over the sovereign territories of other States into the medium of the outer space 
environment. Thus, State practice initiated by the US and the Soviet Union catalyzed 
rules of jurisdiction applicable to both States necessarily created a supranational market 
because each State had a valued preference in the ability to launch objects into the outer 
space environment.143 
Second, States individually “encounter one another and sometimes have occasion 
to cooperate, to engage in what may broadly be termed “transaction[s].””144 Such 
transactions can manifest in the form of bi- or multi-lateral treaties, either conditioned for 
signature and ratification or open to all States. Regardless of how, if, or when States seek 
to transact and conclude an international agreement, States, through their preference 
valuations, must figure out for themselves the need to include some or all States in 
particular supranational markets as well as the need to close off some markets to some 
States. Nevertheless, the international system of States enables and permits these types of 
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transactions to occur even if the various supra-national markets that develop discriminate 
against or place barriers of entry on State participation.145  
There are many examples of conditioned participation to international 
agreements. For one, the Antarctica Treaty regulates international relations on the 
continent of Antarctica and those States Parties with initial claims have rights greater 
than other States that desire or have disputed claims to the continent.146 As Article IV of 
the treaty states “No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force.”147 On the 
other hand, the Outer Space Treaty is a multilateral treaty open to all States without 
precondition on capability of spaceflight or prior claims.148 Hence, States can and do 
limit entrance into particular markets for the purposes of rule development and 
consumption.  
The buying and selling of rules and/or rules of law of jurisdiction manifest and 
can be measured in a variety of ways. In the absence of a specific rule of international 
law, State practice, if objectively definite and distinguishable from other observed rules, 
may form nonbinding rules. A nonbinding rule, i.e., a rule that is not followed out of a 
measure of legal obligation, is distinguishable from a binding rule of law, i.e., a rule that 
establishes duties and obligations for which a breach could be measured and sanctions 
imposed, because the degree of the cost of enforcement significantly varies between each 
type of rule.  
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For example, the cost to enforce a treaty obligation may be less than the cost to 
enforce a national law or an international custom because being a State Party to a treaty 
provides prima facie evidence that a State Party has purchased the obligations of the rules 
that comprise the treaty.149 The enforcement of rules of national law or international 
custom may have a higher cost to enforce relative to international agreements because of 
the rule of consent to an obligation a breach of which would impose liability on the State, 
i.e., the presumption against nonconsensual rule-making.150 This is a foundational rule of 
a private legal system.151 
In order to mitigate or resolve international conflict(s), States may choose to 
resort to addressing disputes among and between States bi-or multi-laterally or through 
adjudication using third party rules.152 How States go about mitigating or resolving 
disputes will provide a supply of rules from State practice. Each type of rule may be 
priced by States on the supranational market of international relations and the purchase of 
the obligation of the rule may be evidenced by some affirmative act or omission.153 When 
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States seek to have their disputes adjudicated by third party rules, i.e., rules of public 
international law, States consent to the authority of the international tribunal for which 
the dispute maybe resolved.154 The rules of the adjudication include the requirement that 
the facts of the dispute must be agreed to by all States Parties to the dispute.155 The 
publication of the documents that consist of the resolution of the tribunal to render a 
verdict in the dispute apply only to the States Parties to the dispute, but the rules utilized 
to render a verdict are re-supplied to the supranational market of international relations.  
Rule formation and the buying of rules can be measured by looking at how valued 
preferences manifest as State practice and from deviations observed between State 
practice and in the types of obligations purchased by a State, respectively. First, how 
rules arise in and are supplied to the supranational market of international relations from 
the international relations of States may be measured as the consequence of stratagems of 
State practice: whether State preference(s) or action(s) lead to (a) cooperation or (b) 
defection (Strategy Testing) in the supply of rules.156 This test enables the use of game 
theory to model how the stratagems, and associated payoffs, of States in exchanges over 
rules that direct the scope of a State’s authority outside its sovereign territory may lead to 
an optimal outcome in the supply of rules. Consequently, the supply of rules that arise 
from the need to maximize valued preferences creates spontaneous order within the 
international system of States.157 Once the rules are supplied, States are free to consume 
as many or as few rules that maximize their valued preferences. Deviations in how many 
                                                 
154 See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36. See also HANDBOOK supra note 123. 
155 Id. 
156 See supra note 4. 
157 See ELLICKSON supra note 9. 
43 
or which rules are consumed impose benefits and costs and risks that States will seek to 
manage over time, which may or may not include rule supply or consumption. 
Second, a comparative analysis of rules may be used to identify the core rules and 
their content, i.e., a rule’s definition, meaning, and scope, in order to measure the extent 
to which a State purchased what types of obligations (Proof of Purchase). When States 
supply rules to the supranational market, States are not obliged to purchase rules.158 
However, when States buy a rule of jurisdiction the content of the supplied rule(s) may 
vary depending on the source. This creates different types of obligations with respect to 
each source of rules. Moreover, States may purchase rules with respect to the same type 
of person, thing, or event outside their territories and thus accept the obligations of all the 
rules consumed. Other States may not purchase the obligation of all rules associated with 
the same type of person, thing, or event outside their territories. Such differences indicate 
variability in valued preferences and a stratification of obligations among States with 
respect to the same types of rules. Consequently, rules of jurisdiction will vary and the 
extent of a State’s authority beyond its sovereign territory will also vary.  
Strategy and Proof of Purchase Testing are a measure of the observable outcomes 
of States engaged in the supranational market of international relations. However, these 
tests must be taken in relation to the number of States that participate in supranational 
markets because market share and participation provides a separate measure of the degree 
to which States value the supply and consumption of rules with respect to the same types 
of persons, things, or events outside the territories of States. From these measures, 
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relationships among interested States governed by the same rules may be analyzed and 
compared to observed historical outcomes. 
Supranational markets of international relations come in a variety forms. 
However, each supranational market may be analyzed with respect to other supranational 
markets because of the many ways rules are supplied by States over time. Since the 
adoption of the UN Charter, States Parties have grown from the original fifty-one (51) 
members to one hundred and ninety-three (193).159 The expansion in the number of States 
in the international system necessarily affects how supranational markets function. 
Moreover, the development of subsequent supranational markets under the UN Charter 
directly and its auspices allowed for an expansion of a variety of supranational markets to 
deal with a variety of international problems across a variety of Earthly and space 
environments. For example, the UN Charter explicitly permits a very important 
supranational market under the UN Security Council (UNSC) whereby its five permanent 
members sell their valued preferences to other members to buy.160 The outcome of these 
exchanges leads directly to binding and non-binding rules of international law.161 In 
addition, States may cooperate and form specific supranational markets to coordinate or 
protect certain State practices.162 Thus, the type of obligations a State purchases on the 
supranational market will vary relative to how the market from where the rule originates 
operates and potentially imposes costs, benefits, and risks. 
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iv. Rules of Jurisdiction as the Allocation of Authority 
 
While axiomatic, fundamentally, a rule can arise in three ways. First, a rule can 
arise informally, i.e., through no formal means by which a State develops the rule 
institutionally. When a State practice arises from an occurrence in the course of 
international relations and that occurrence produces a State practice, other States may 
independently adopt the same rule. For example, when the Soviet Union launched its 
Sputnik objects into orbit around the Earth, only the Soviet Union had first engaged in a 
State practice of launching objects into orbit and over the territories of other States.163 
Within three months of the first Sputnik launch, the US launched its Explorer object into 
orbit independent of, i.e., not in cooperation with, the Soviet Union.164 Although the US 
followed suit, it could have also objected to such a State practice or other States could 
have objected to such a State practice; although there is no evidence of objection by 
States to the State practice of launching objects into orbit over the territories of other 
States. Thus, State practice itself can be evidence of rule formation independent of some 
formal means of exchange. 
 Second, a rule can arise formally, i.e., through some formal means by which a 
State uses an international institution or forms a temporary institutional framework to 
conclude the supply of a rule(s). In either case, formal rules are negotiated through some 
agreed upon procedures, i.e., rules that govern the cooperation among negotiating States 
Parties, within a particular institution or institutional framework.165 The outcome of the 
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process to negotiate a formal rule(s) provides evidence of the existence of the formal 
rule(s). For example, when the US sought to bring States together to negotiate a Charter 
for a United Nations, delegates operated within a temporary institutional framework that 
utilized rules of procedure to enable negotiations of formal rules.166 The outcome of the 
negotiations resulted in the adoption of a codified set of formal rules of law, namely the 
Charter of the United Nations.167 Where the institutional rules laid out the process for 
ratification, upon the satisfaction of those rules, i.e., satisfaction of the requirement(s) for 
which the treaty comes into force activating the treaty’s obligations to States Parties, the 
Charter of the United Nations transitioned to a set of rules of law.168 Subsequently, when 
States use the UN to formalize the negotiation of treaties, i.e., a set of rules of law, or the 
adoption of declarations and other documents that generate rules, these rules come about 
by formal means inherent to UN administration.169 
 Third, a rule can arise as a rule(s) of law, i.e., a codified rule or set(s) of rules 
from at least one objectively cognizable source of authority that directs a subject’s act or 
omission to prevent a breach of a rule of law. The negotiation of formal rules may give 
rise to a rule(s) of law when codified into at least one objectively cognizable source of 
authority, e.g., treaties and national law. Because codification provides evidence of the 
existence of a rule(s) of law, they can be considered an objective source of authority. 
However, the codification of rule(s) of law must also be cognizable, i.e., rules of law 
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must be clearly identifiable relative to the subject of the rule(s) of law and within the 
scope of the negotiated transaction(s), i.e., intent of the Parties, for a rule(s) of law.  
 While States can virtually engage in any exchange (i.e., occurrence or transaction) 
related to their valued preferences in the course of their international relations, this thesis 
however only considers rules as the consequence of negotiating and trading in 
components of power.170 Within the system of international relations of States, the 
economic character of rules can take the form of public and toll goods. First, public 
goods are defined as goods that are non-excludable and non- rivalrous. A rule is non-
excludable when States cannot prevent the consumption or use of a rule just because a 
State breached a rule. A rule is non-rivalrous when the consumption and/or use of the rule 
by one State does not reduce the availability of the rule to another State. In other words, a 
rule(s) apply to all States that have accepted or are under an obligation to accept a rule(s). 
For example, in the case of international custom, States cannot exclude other 
States from the rule or its obligation as a function of State practice; where consumption 
of a rule by a State does not reduce availability to other States (e.g., in the acceptance of 
rules that represent rights, duties, and obligations under the international custom). States 
that supply and/or consume rules of jurisdiction cannot reduce the consumption of rules 
by other States in the absence of such a rule that limits consumption (e.g., the obligation 
that international agreements must be kept). In other words, if a State chooses or is 
compelled to consume a rule (by way of some other rule), consumption does not 
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necessarily affect the supply of such a rule(s) to other States.171 In the absence of an 
overriding rule, a State cannot claim that a rule applicable to all is excluded to itself.172 
Second, toll goods are goods that are excludable, but non-rivalrous. A rule is 
excludable when a State can be prevented from accessing the rule when it does not pay 
the associated price of the rule. As with public goods, a rule is non-rivalrous when the 
consumption and/or use of the rule by one State does not reduce the availability or utility 
of the rule to another State. In other words, a rule(s) applies to all States that have 
accepted a rule(s), but only when a rule(s) is/are paid for through the acceptance of some 
cost – an affirmation of a voluntary acceptance of the rule, e.g., signature or ratification 
cost.173 
 For example, in the case of international agreements, States Parties first negotiate 
language that will comprise the set of rules of the agreement.174 The negotiation and 
conclusion of an international agreement each represent a type of transaction cost; 
however, these transaction costs do not necessarily represent the acceptance of the 
rules.175 Acceptance or intent to accept such rules of jurisdiction arises from the price 
paid by a State in ratifying or signing the agreement, respectively.  
 The utility in the development and exchange of rules and rules of law is that both 
can engender greater certainty about the costs and risks involved in engaging in 
international relations.176 States must balance the need for predictability and flexibility in 
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how rules and rules of law of jurisdiction are defined and scoped in a way that maximizes 
valued preferences but minimizes risks of international relations. When in the course of 
international relations, various unintended or unexpected costs and benefits might arise 
from the adoption, proliferation, and evolution of rules and rules of law, States will 
engage in exchanges (occurrences and transactions) to amend or resign from a rule(s) that 
no longer meet(s) the valued preferences of some or all States. 
While rule formation and consumption form the bases of the underlying analyses, 
the glue that binds States to rules is the concept of jurisdiction.177 Jurisdiction plays an 
important role in the international legal system because it forms the basis of State 
authority over persons, things, and events outside a State’s sovereign territory and 
represents what may be termed a “property right” of State sovereignty.178 The 
fundamental question here is how is authority allocated within the international system of 
States?179 Generally, jurisdiction allocates State authority in the international system on 
the basis of sovereign legal equality (i.e., each State in the international system possesses 
the same legal rights as any other sovereign State).180 Rules of jurisdiction take the form 
of a pre-transactional right because, unlike in municipal law, there is no requirement that 
States give consideration in the supply or purchase of rules of public international law.181 
While no supranational State exists that can compel States to accept rights, duties, or 
obligations under public international law, States by their sovereign nature are required 
and expected to adhere to established rules of public international law.182 Accordingly, a 
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State’s ability to conduct foreign relations and engage in international relations (i.e., 
politics) provides benefits and costs that are inherently scoped by jurisdiction because the 
distribution of authority over persons or things or events subject to State authority must 
be necessarily analyzed against the authority of other States in the international system, 
including, but not limited to, authority over rule-formation. 
When States engage in the supranational market of international relations, the 
outcome can be the formation of a rule(s) or a rule(s) of law of jurisdiction, depending on 
the circumstances of formation. A rule is defined as one or more instruction(s) of a 
policy. Policy is defined as a valued preference that guides a course of action from a 
subjectively legitimate source of authority that directs a subject’s act or omission to 
prevent a breach of the rule(s). For example, when a group of States enter into 
negotiations for the development of a rule that commits each State to take a voluntary 
course of action within a certain period of time, the rule that arises is a common rule to 
all participant States, i.e., States mutually agree to perform the rule that defines a course 
of action.183 The fact that the rule may be nonbinding or binding as a matter of law or that 
States voluntarily commit to follow the rule is sufficient evidence that a rule has formed, 
but not necessarily that the rule will be followed or imputes an obligatory effect on 
participant States absent certain facts.184 Although the rule in question may be voluntarily 
adopted by each State, the cost of breach will tend to limit rule-breaking because the 
more a State is seen to breach an agreed-upon rule, the more likely the breaching State 
could be subject to reputation costs or some other sanction in the future.185 Thus the cost 
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of breach may compel a State to honor its commitments, even if not followed out of a 
sense of a legal obligation.186 However, when a State devalues following the rule it may 
stop following the rule if the cost of breach is relatively low, the risk of breach is 
potentially small, or the State can negotiate with other potential defectors to undermine 
the effectiveness of the rule and minimize potential costs of breach to all defectors.187 
For example, the Allies of the Second World War sought to replace the League of 
Nations Charter with a United Nations Charter before the war had even ended.188 Since 
doing so required the abandonment of the set of rules that had been agreed upon under 
the League of Nations Charter since January 1920, the circumstances at the time, i.e., the 
prospect that the Allies could win the war, gave the United States a market to develop 
new post-war rules. The act of unilaterally replacing the old set of rules with ones set by 
the Allies could have only occurred if the costs of doing so were less than the benefit of 
establishing a new set of international rules under the vehicle of a United Nations Charter 
without participation of the Axis States.189 
When States engage in activities outside their sovereign territories – including 
participation in international fora, the exchanges in the supranational market that arise 
from State practice are inherently an exchange in the assignment of State authority.190 
The only general requirement is that a State has the capacity to engage in foreign 
relations. However, this ability does not necessarily lead to zero transaction costs or 
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efficient rule-development outcomes, but the capacity to engage in foreign relations may 
increase or reduce transaction costs and/or externalities in particular instances.191 For 
example, States created after the adoption of the UN Charter had no ability to negotiate 
the set of rules that comprise the Charter, but nonetheless purchased the rules of the 
Charter and general public international law because the principle of sovereign legal 
equality provides a necessary benefit.192 While some cost is paid by the State in the 
ratification of the Charter and rules of public international law, the assumption is that 
acceptance implies that the benefit is greater than the cost of not accepting how authority 
is allocated in the international system by way of jurisdiction over particular persons and 
things or events.193 Thus, when States engage in activities that give rise to the 
development of rules, States are inherently entering a supranational market of 
international relations to buy and sell their authority in the form of rules of jurisdiction.194  
Rules of jurisdiction represent the allocation of State authority in the international 
system and can take two basic forms: choice of law and prescriptive jurisdiction.195 
Choice of law rules represent the specific power of a State to assert authority over 
particular persons or things or events to which States will consensually agree. Without a 
proper basis of jurisdiction in international disputes, a State’s or a private party’s case 
may lead to a dismissal of claims before a tribunal.196 To deal with this potential 
situation, States may negotiate amongst themselves the allocation of authority to 
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determine which and in what instances a particular State will have jurisdiction over a 
particular dispute.197 For example, following the political integration of European States, 
members of the European Council negotiated and concluded an international agreement 
with regard to jurisdiction over civil and commercial disputes that may arise within the 
territories of member States.198 States may provide by international agreement such rules 
of jurisdiction over persons, things, or events and define elements of the rules of 
jurisdiction to manage risk, provide benefits, or reduce costs to the State and its subjects.  
Prescriptive jurisdiction, on the other hand, represents the general power of a 
State to assert authority over all persons, things, or events that stem from the principles of 
sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence from interference in the internal 
affairs of a State (i.e., Westphalian concepts of State sovereignty).199 There are five 
recognized bases of prescriptive jurisdiction under public international law.200 First, 
territorial jurisdiction is the most used allocation of authority in that a State has 
jurisdiction over all persons and things or events within its territory.201 Second, 
nationality jurisdiction represents the allocation of authority over nationals of the State 
anywhere.202 Third, passive personality jurisdiction represents the allocation of authority 
over events connected to a State’s national, usually where the national might be a victim 
of some harm arising from conduct not within the territory of the national’s State.203 
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Fourth, protective jurisdiction represents the allocation of authority over threats to the 
security, integrity, or economic interests of a State outside its territory.204 Fifth, universal 
jurisdiction represents the allocation of authority over specific acts deemed contrary to 
the interests of the international community of States as a whole.205 As can be observed in 
relation to each definition, prescriptive jurisdiction is not necessarily consensual in nature 
and provides the scope (narrow or broad application) of authority within and outside of a 
State’s territory.206  
Why is jurisdiction important to rule-formation? Fundamental to all legal analysis 
is the application of rules of jurisdiction.207 Jurisdiction helps identify the structure and 
scope of the allocation of authority that States utilize to formalize their exercises in power 
over subjects (e.g., natural and juridical persons) and objects (e.g., things) of the law.208 
When States seek to engage in the supranational market of international relations, they 
are effectively exercising their sovereignty in relation to other States because sovereignty 
is the highest valued part of a State that it can offer to the market.209 When States engage 
in practices related to its foreign relations, national security, or economic interests, they 
are guided by valued preferences, e.g., some utility assessment developed by their 
governments.210 States may or may not choose to cooperate in the international system; 
however, regardless of the choice, the benefits and costs of engaging in international 
relations may give rise to the need to minimize and manage risks associated with State 
practice.  
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Although international cooperation is not a predetermined result of State practice, 
when States do engage in activities outside their territories they tend to negotiate for rules 
of jurisdiction in relation to certain persons, things, or events that serve the interests of 
the State.211 In the case of choice of law rules, States bargain for rules and may be 
required to trade in some component of power to get agreement among other potential 
States Parties to conclude and eventually execute an international agreement. However, 
with respect to prescriptive jurisdiction, States create supranational markets more akin to 
an auction where States can bid up or down the price of the rule of jurisdiction based on 
State practice and the scope of the legal obligation as a function of that State practice.212  
 The important distinction between the law and economics literatures on national 
and international law arises from how and which types of goods are allocated within 
society.213 While goods and services are bought and sold among buyers and sellers at the 
national level, the things bought and sold by States are their valued preferences that are 
negotiated and priced as a rule of jurisdiction that may lead to a reallocation of State 
authority relative to other States. On one hand, choice of law rules enable States to 
determine which rules of law might apply in disputes between them as well as the 
consensual acceptance of rights, duties, and obligations regarding some type of act or 
omission in the course of a State’s international relations or the execution and 
administration of international agreements.214 On the other hand, prescriptive jurisdiction 
provides rules scoped to limit the authority of a State in relation to the authority of other 
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States. In other words, by virtue of the principles of sovereignty and sovereign equality 
and a State’s ability to engage in foreign relations, States may trade in components of 
power, like rules of jurisdiction, to achieve some individual utility. Whether or not the 
allocation or reallocation of authority is good or bad, efficient or inefficient is a separate 
issue.  
 To summarize, a State’s valued preferences inform how a State will seek to apply 
its authority extraterritorially. In doing so, a State enters the supranational market in 
relation to some valued preference. Market participation will lead to a supply of rules of 
jurisdiction. Once rules of jurisdiction are supplied, States may or may not seek to price 
out rules of jurisdiction in relation to facts that define a State’s valued preferences. Once 
States begin to price out supplied rules of jurisdiction, States may or may not buy or sell 
rules of jurisdiction that result from market participation. If a State does not buy a rule of 
jurisdiction in relation to some valued preference, then it may be no better off than other 
State that also does not consume the rule of jurisdiction. If, on the other hand, a State 
does buy and consume a rule of jurisdiction, it has bargained for that rule by some 
affirmative act.215 However, over time State practice may change because a State’s 
valued preferences may change. Hence, changes in State practice may instigate market 
participation again and necessitate a re-supply of rules of jurisdiction restarting the cycle 
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A. Sources of Rules of Public International Law 
 
Rules supplied to the supranational market have many sources. One codified 
source usually relied upon as a list of acceptable sources of public international law is 
found in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Article 38 
states that  
 
The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international 
law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: 
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law; 
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; 
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of 
law.217 
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This thesis analyzes each recognized source of public international law to 
demonstrate the evolution of those rules for which States have bargained in the supra-
national market of international relations relating to the outer space environment. The 
sources listed in article 38 above are formally recognized as sources of public 
international law.218 However, much of the modern literature on public international law 
argues that certain rules of international custom actually form the basis of formal sources 
of law.219 As Fitzmaurice argues, a treaty only contains the codification of material 
sources of law like contracts.220 In other words, treaties form sources of obligations for 
the States Parties. The formal source of the law of treaties comes from the rule of 
international custom defined by the phrase pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be 
kept”).221 Because international custom applies to all States that follow the same practice 
and have given notice of the purchase of the obligation of the practice, the authority to 
recognize and seek recognition of another State’s authority must necessarily derive from 
the shared valued preferences of States. 
This thesis treats any source of rules as potential sources of public international 
law without making formal or material distinctions. However, the foregoing analysis is 
limited directly to the application of international custom, treaties, and general principles 
of law in relation to the outer space environment. All subsidiary sources, such as “judicial 
decisions and the teachings of most highly qualified publicists,”222 provide only 
additional means of evidence of the definition, meaning, and scope of rules of public 
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international law. Thus, all subsidiary sources used in this thesis are not treated as formal 
sources of public international law, but provide a means to determine the scope of the 
definition and meaning of rules that may be supplied to the supranational market.  
 
1. International Custom 
 
 The rule of international custom may be defined as a general and consistent State 
practice performed out of a sense of legal obligation.223 Rules of international custom can 
be confined to a region, among States who use international custom in the course of a 
particular State practice, or broadened to all States who use the basis of State practice out 
of a sense of legal obligation.224 Because State practice is a product of the valued 
preferences of States, rules of international custom necessarily affect how States value 
the generation of such rules. 
 The formation and development of rules of international custom ultimately derive 
from State practice. However, the formalization of rules of international custom arise 
from the consensual nature of the international system of States. Moreover, changes in a 
State’s valued preferences will necessarily produce changes in State practice. Changes in 
State practice will lead to changes in how State’s supply rules to the supranational market 
of international relations. In doing so, these processes reflect how States value the need 
for such rules as a function of their perceived payoffs in relation to the strategies of other 
States engaged in the same State practice, rule supply, and/or rule consumption. 
However, the temporal measure of preference revelation can have significant effects on 
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the rate of rule formation and development due to inherently inertial forces within the 
State itself.225 
 Nonetheless, sometimes changes in State practice will result in the valued 
preference of objecting to rule generation because the developing practice does not 
manifest as a valued preference of other States.226 Applying the framework that the 
international system operates like a private legal system, the act of persistently objecting 
to a rule of international custom derives from the express consent of States in the 
international system.227 In order to provide sufficient notice to other States of their 
objection to a rule of international custom, States must manifest their objections through 
some express action.228 This express act signals an alternative value for the supplied rule 
to the supranational market and represents an express denial to any attempt at 
nonconsensual rule-making.229 
The act of persistently objecting has evolutionary effects on rule supply because 
States that consistently object to some types of rules that may be supplied or consumed 
puts those States in a different relationship with States who perform the same State 
practice and that have formalized the consumption of the rule in question.230 On one 
hand, the presumption against nonconsensual rule making sets forth the scope of which a 
State cannot be obliged to follow the rule, the breach of which may impose a liability on 
                                                 
225 See supra note 176. 
226 See BROWNLIE supra note 4. 
227 See Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Stability and Change in International Customary Law, 17 SUP. CT. 
ECON. REV. 279 (2009). 
228 Id. (“An exemption from the binding custom is obtained by subsequent objector states only to the extent 
to which the prospective beneficiaries of the rule acquiesce to the departure.”) 
229 See supra note 111. C.f. Ayres & Talley supra note 125. 
230 It is assumed that these processes are cyclic as a product of shifting valued preferences because States 
have the right to decide how best to manifest their own preferences. 
61 
the State that may be enforced by other States without its consent. On the other hand, a 
State may want to limit the content of a rule and therefore declare reservations or 
objections to certain interpretations of the rule in question.231 
However, because the two basic elements of international custom derive its 
meaning from the expression of State practice, evidence of rule consumption could 
manifest as a result of the outcome of exchanges in other supranational markets of 
international relations. For example, if a State enacts a national law that provides the 
basis for the State practice in question, then that act provides evidence of rule as a 
product of in the legal obligation defined by the State’s legislation.232 Alternatively, the 
codification and consumption of rules derived from international agreements, when 
concluded and in force, may also express State practice and will reflect the degree to 
which a State has purchased a particular legal obligation relative to other sources of 
rules.233 
However, the consumption of a rule in one supranational market does not 
necessarily mean consumption of a rule in another supranational market. In other words, 
the fact that the source of the rule (i.e., custom, treaty, national law) can arise in three 
particular supranational markets has at least one common element, i.e., State practice. 
Since State practice is the physical manifestation of the State in the international system, 
the process by which a State could consume a rule relative to the source(s) of the rule 
varies because States have the freedom to determine and choose how rules form and 
develop that express that valued preference in the form of State practice. This can be 
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modeled using game theory to determine which stratagems are the most optimal or sub-
optimal in attempting to maximize a valued preference. Consequently, rules of 
international custom are the product of the outcomes of State’s trying to supply specific 




 Article 38(1)(a) defines treaties as “international conventions, whether general or 
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states.”234 Treaties 
represent a codification of a set of rules supplied by States as a result of cooperative 
behavior in rule development. Once concluded, the set of rules that comprises a treaty are 
supplied to the supranational market of international relations and the ability to consume 
a treaty’s rules may have barriers to entry depending on the valued preference of States 
that negotiated the treaty to supply rules. Fundamentally, treaties codify the obligations of 
States under the international customary rule of pacta sunt servanda, i.e., agreements 
must be kept by States Parties.235 The obligations, duties, and rights for which States 
Parties negotiate are the substance of treaties. Moreover, many of the sources of rules of 
treaty law derive from international custom, and the codification (to a large extent) of 
international custom regarding international agreements is found in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).236 
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It is assumed that States act as individuals in the supranational market of 
international relations, where the intention of a State may be inferred from its observed 
State practice in satisfying its valued preferences in relation to other States. Since every 
State under study is a member of the UN, there is no question as to whether a State under 
study has the capacity to transact with other States to create and conclude a treaty. 
Incidentally, this quality permits States to collude, compete, enter or leave any 
supranational market of international relations or return the purchased obligation subject 
to the costs and benefits of State practice. 
 By definition, the international system of States does not exist with a 
supranational authority over it with the ability to enforce rules of international law.237 As 
such, compensating a State that is the victim of a breach of an international obligation 
does not function in the same way that disputes are resolved in national courts.238 This, 
however, does not mean that States cannot find ways to ensure conformity to rules of 
international law against other States that breach their “bargained for” or purchased legal 
obligations.239 When States have disputes, they may seek resolution from a variety of 
sources.240 Each possible remedy may be cooperative or non-cooperative in nature based 
on how the valued preference of a State arises in the form of a State practice.241 Since 
State practice is the mechanism by which States supply rules to the supranational market, 
States may supply rules for dispute resolution mechanisms, e.g., international tribunals or 
arbitration courts, which may only have a binding legal effect when States consent to the 
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64 
consumption of such rules that they may supply.242 Therefore, a resolution of what the 
law is occurs from the consensual supply and consumption of rules by States to a third 
party to adjudicate the dispute, the basis of which is an international agreement.243 
 Moreover, since the nature of the international system is based on consent and 
that consent forms the basis for the mutual exchange of rules of jurisdiction, such rules 
can only arise from cooperation among and between interested States.244 The primary 
example of the manifestation of cooperation among and between States is generally 
observed from the negotiation and conclusion of international agreements. 
Fundamentally, an international agreement is the codification of a set of rules of 
jurisdiction. States consume these rules with respect to the trading in components of 
power the cost of which may vary depending on the nature of the exchange in the 
supranational market. Consumption of treaty rules can arise in the form of a State’s 
signature, ratification, accession, or succession to/of a treaty.245 In the case of consuming 
rules through the price of signature, the associated cost is only that the State has an 
intention to be bound by the obligations of the treaty’s rules, not that the State actually 
paid the full price of the legal obligation.246 On the other hand, States may have a 
preference to consume rules by purchasing the legal obligation in order to extend their 
authority over the subject matter for which rules are supplied to the appropriate 
supranational market. When States consume rules by paying the price of ratification, 
accession, or succession, the associated costs is the purchase of the legal obligation that 
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signals to the supranational markets a rule’s value and price to other States that could 
enter the supranational market.  
The value of treaty adoption is measured by the number of States that sign and/or 
ratify a particular treaty. However, the value of any treaty must be taken in relation to the 
number of States in the international system at a particular point or period in time. This 
ratio provides an objective measure of a treaty’s relative value over time because it 
considers changes to the number of States that could enter the supranational market of 
international relations for rule development and consumption. 
 
(a) Treaty Interpretation 
  
As a codification of rules of customary international law, the VCLT provides two 
important methods in which to gauge the meaning of a treaty and its obligations and 
terms.247 First, the general rule of treaty interpretation under article 31 of the VCLT 
provides that 
 
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the 
light of its object and purpose . . . [and] special meaning shall be given to 
a term if it is established that the parties so intended.248 (emphasis added) 
                                                 
247 See supra note 236. 
248 Id., at art. 31. (“1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to 
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose. 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, 
including its preamble and annexes: 
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Second, the VCLT allows for supplementary means of interpretation under article 32, 
which includes “the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its 
conclusion . . .” [so that nothing] “leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure[,] or [] leads 
to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.249 
 Third, article 33 of the VCLT provides further rules on the authentication of two 
or more copies of the same treaty when codified in different languages.250 Although the 
text of each treaty in any official language that the Parties originally adopt is equally 
authoritative, when due to differences in translations each authoritative text diverges from 
the others, article 33 provides that “the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having 
regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, shall be adopted.”251 This rule is especially 
                                                 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty; (b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties. 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.”). 
249 Id., at art. 32 (“Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according 
to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable.”). 
250 Id. (”1. When a treaty has been authenticated in two or more languages, the text is equally authoritative 
in each language, unless the treaty provides or the parties agree that, in case of divergence, a particular text 
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2. A version of the treaty in a language other than one of those in which the text was authenticated shall be 
considered an authentic text only if the treaty so provides or the parties so agree. 
3. The terms of the treaty are presumed to have the same meaning in each authentic text. 
4. Except where a particular text prevails in accordance with paragraph 1, when a comparison of the 
authentic texts discloses a difference of meaning which the application of articles 31 and 32 does not 
remove, the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, 
shall be adopted.”) 
251 See supra note 236, at art. 33. 
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important to note given that the Outer Space Treaty and its sister treaties are multilateral 
treaties adopted in five official languages, each equally authoritative.252 
If or when actual substantive conflict arises between States as to any claim of a 
breach of an international obligation, duty, privilege, or right, a tribunal, whether 
international or national, will be required to look to the rules that comprise the corpus of 
public international law and the lex specialis of space law to resolve the dispute. This 
creates a problem that most treaties face over time, i.e., does modern evidence of 
intention correspond with the bargained for intent of the parties when States Parties 
concluded and/or ratified the treaty in question? (Emphasis added). In other words, is it 
permissible to interpret treaties in a manner that does not prohibit the evolution of the 
meaning of its terms? 
 Since this thesis depends on an understanding of how rules and rules of law 
evolve over time, it is important to understand what constitutes rule evolution and how 
the concept of rule evolution applies to the problems investigated. To begin, as a matter 
of treaty law, evolutive interpretation can be defined as “an interpretation where a term is 
given a meaning that changes over time.”253 As Helmersen notes,  
 
[a]s with all interpretations, the evolutive interpretation of a term is 
distinct from its application. This also means that a change of mind is not 
an evolutive interpretation. In interpreting a term that is open to multiple 
interpretations, a court may choose one interpretation in one case, and then 
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change its mind and prefer another in a later case. This way, the term’s 
meaning can be said to have ‘changed’ over time. However, if the change 
is not prompted by an evolution intended by the parties, the interpretation 
is not evolutive. The term has not evolved; only the opinion of the 
court.254 (Emphasis in the original).  
 
Moreover, a treaty term’s meaning usually evolves because of an evolution in the 
linguistic meaning of the term independent of the interpretation; “[h]owever, a term does 
not have to evolve linguistically to be interpreted evolutively.”255  
When States go to the trouble of expending resources to negotiate and conclude 
treaties, the process of rule development arises from the trading of components of power, 
i.e., rules of jurisdiction. The substance of this process is grounded in the intent that the 
States Parties had certain definitions and meanings for terms based on the convergence of 
their valued preferences into agreed upon rules. An issue then arises as to how temporal 
effects could change or expand the definition and meaning of terms within a treaty. Since 
economics, politics, culture, and technology change over time, rules of law are subject to 
social forces that affect the stability and flexibility of the original intent of the States 
Parties. While treaty amendment is possible in many cases, amendment is nevertheless 
difficult in practice and is not observed consistently within the practice of treaty law due 
to the high transaction costs usually associated with amending treaties.256 To what extent 
does the evolutive interpretation of treaty terms arise? 
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In THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES, Bjorge seeks to answer 
“[w]hat is the place of the evolutionary interpretation of treaties with the rules of treaty 
interpretation codified in the VCLT.”257 Bjorge’s study reviews approximately two 
hundred international and national law cases dealing with the methods by which jurists 
interpret treaty terms.258 Given the various methods of treaty interpretation by courts, the 
answer Bjorge arrives at is  
 
that the evolutionary interpretation is, in common with others types of 
interpretation, an outcome of the process described in the general rules of 
interpretation. There is thus nothing exceptional about evolutionary 
interpretation; in common with other types of interpretation it is based 
upon the objective establishment of the intention of the parties.259 
(Emphasis added). 
 
By way of example, the study begins with an analysis of the phrase “evolutionary 
interpretation” as proffered by the ICJ in the 2009 case Dispute regarding Navigational 
and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) (Navigational Rights case).260 In the 
Navigational Rights case, the question before the ICJ “was whether the phrase ‘for the 
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260 See Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicar.) (hereinafter Navigational 
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purposes of commerce’ in the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican treaty of limits of 1858[261] 
covered tourism, [i.e.,] the carriage of passengers for hire.”262 The ICJ held that the 
phrase “for the purposes of commerce” must be interpreted to extend to all modern forms 
of commerce.263 Since the Parties signed the treaty in question in 1858 and given the 
period of time that has elapsed, any analysis of the meaning of the term “for the purposes 
of commerce” must consider the “situation in which the parties’ intent upon conclusion 
of the treaty was, or may be presumed to have been, to give the terms used – or some of 
them – a meaning or content capable of evolving, not one fixed once and for all, so as to 
make allowance for, among other things, developments in international law.”264 As 
Bjorge explains “[w]here the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties 
necessarily having been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over 
time, and where the treaty has been entered into for a long period of time, . . . , the parties 
must be presumed, as a general rule, to have intended those terms to have evolving 
meaning.”265 (Emphasis added). Thus the primary issue in treaty interpretation is an 
analysis into the intent of the States Parties.  
 As discussed infra, the Outer Space Treaty and its subsequent sister treaties are 
over forty years old. Since technological development tends to occur more rapidly than 
the development of rules of law, the rules of international law as expressed in the space 
treaties analyzed will most likely create definition and application problems as outer 
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space activities continue to evolve with changes in the valued preferences of States. 
Criticisms today include arguments that view the rules that comprise each treaty, and in 
particular the Outer Space Treaty, signifying aspirations of law rather than binding legal 
obligations266 or becoming increasing irrelevant to deal with the legal issues associated 
with changes in State practice.267 Such arguments generally do not have legal validity and 
discount or reject evolutionary interpretative methods to treaties, which is grounded in 
the intent of the Parties. If the treaty terms are overly broad but clearly express the intent 
of the Parties, then courts will have recourse to extend such terms to some later in time 
application to fit within the intent of the States Parties. It should be expected that courts 
will continue to utilize such evolutionary interpretative methods in the future to reach 
decisions in disputes regarding State practice in the outer space environment. 
 
3. General Principles of Law 
 
 Per article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ, general principles of law are 
recognized as a legitimate, applicable source of rules of public international law that can 
be applied in international disputes.268 To international legal jurists, general principles of 
law help fill in the gaps found between other sources of rules of public international law 
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because comparative analysis of national laws provides a measure of consistency in 
determining rules of decision for particular types of disputes.269 The effectiveness of the 
use of general principles of law arises because those legal principles that are common to a 
large number of systems of municipal law (i.e., national law) forms a common foundation 
of rules of law that are “often the only source of international law in the absence of an 
applicable treaty.”270 Although States generate national law particularly independent of 
the supranational market of international relations, the promulgation of national law 
nevertheless represents a supply of rules to the supranational market of international 
relations because the act represents a signal of acceptable rules to the international 
community of States, i.e., acceptable to at least the supplying State. Consequently, the 
common usage (in terms of definition, meaning, and scope) of rules of jurisdiction among 
States that may develop from the exchanges and consumption of rules in the 
supranational market of international relations tends to intersect with rules that derive 
from the promulgation of national law. Convergence to one definition and meaning, with 
minimized scope, of a rule of jurisdiction creates observable consensus from among the 
State practices of the international community of States that may establish a common 
legal obligation.  
Because general principles of law derive from national law, evolution in rules of 
national law can give rise to changes in general principles of law over time.271 If 
international agreements are codified into the national law of a State, then that supply of 
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rules may also constitute a resupply of rules in the form of national law or State practice 
because of the acts of promulgation or ratification. This creates a feedback loop of rules 
of jurisdiction from State practice to purchasing the obligation arising from an 
international agreement. Moreover, the content of a rule(s) of jurisdiction, i.e., the 
definition, meaning, and scope of a rule, may also change due to changes in how a 
State(s) define(s) a particular rule of jurisdiction as a function of changes to its/their 
valued preferences. Furthermore, general principles of law are distinct from international 
custom in that the State practice element is only deemed necessary because the obligation 
of law is already satisfied by the national law’s internal promulgation by the sovereign.272 
For example, the rule of law defined as due process is found in many legal 
systems, both modern and historical.273 Although defined with greater specificity in some 
legal systems, due process is a general principle of law respected by almost all States 
because of the recognition that the marginal benefit of affording a person due process 
(i.e., respecting the minimal rights of the accused to enforce the rules of law of the 
sovereign by prescribing a specific process by which the fair administration justice must 
follow)274 is greater than the marginal cost of providing no process at all (i.e., arbitrarily 
ascribing justice to dispense with a perceived violation of a rule of the sovereign).275 
Those sovereigns who deny due process to persons do so because the State does not price 
the rights of the accused and therefore the State never had a preference to afford such a 
right in the first place. Nevertheless, due process represents a general principle of law as 
                                                 
272 See supra note 232. 
273 See POSNER supra note 32. See also Barnabas D. Johnson, Due Process of Law, available at 
http://www.jurlandia.org/dueprocess.htm accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
274 See POSNER supra note 32. 
275 Id.  
74 
much as it represents an international custom even if a difference in legal obligation 
exists.276 What matters is how congruent State practice is with respect to a rule(s) in 
question. Hence, the economic analysis of and in general principles of law seek to 
demonstrate the distinctions and connectedness of rules and rules of law arising from rule 
formation and evolution. 
 General principles of law derive from two major sources of jurisprudence, i.e., the 
common law and civil law.277 Stated simplistically, rules of law derived from the 
common law are said to arise because of the adversarial nature of rule-making, while 
rules of law derived from the civil law are said to arise from the inquisitorial nature of 
rule application.278 Where the life of the common law derives consistency and evolution 
in rule-making from precedent, the life of the civil law builds upon the codification of 
rules derived from the legislature and applied to each dispute without the need for 
precedent.279  
To illustrate this point, consider how both the common law and the civil law 
traditions treat the law of contracts. In American common law, the Holmes’s option 
theory of contracts280 posits a general rule of law for contracts in that “there is no 
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obligation to honor a contractual undertaking – just an obligation to pay the other party’s 
damages if you decide not to perform,” leaving open almost all possibilities of breach to 
provide for rule formation and evolution in rules of contract law.281 In the civil law 
tradition, the rule of law for contracts follows the rule of pacta sunt servanda 
(“agreements must be kept”), giving direction to the obedience of the obligation where 
the written source, i.e., the agreement, forms the basis of the obligation.282  
Where differences exist in contract law between the common and civil law 
traditions, so does State practice. However, the essence of general principles of law is 
that such rules of law have a common basis, both for procedural and substantive rules of 
law, across States. Where a State permits the formation of contracts, State practice in 
regard to contract formation exists and the national law creates an obligation of law 
internal to the sovereign. Consequently, when a sample of States that permit the activity 
of contracting, these States may also supply rules to limit how contracts may be formed, 
given that the appropriate measure of a general principle of law of contract formation 
exists.283 However, deviations in State practice with regard to limitations on contract 
formation can create international custom with respect to contract formation with 
attendant limitations because the obligation generally arises from the need to apply a 
State’s authority extraterritorially. Although common rules of contract between States 
exist, observable deviations in national law rules for contract formation from independent 
sources of the content, i.e., the definition, meaning, and scope, of the State practice in 
question and the obligation of law may no longer be assumed relative to other States. 
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Thus, such changes can give rise to changes in what may constitute a general principle of 
law and its ability to fill in gaps under public international law because of the common 
source and content of rules supplied from the promulgation of national laws indicate 
independent rule-development and supply.284 
                                                 




ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS AND METHODOLOGIES 
a. Overview of Methodological Approaches 
 
 The sum of this thesis represents the use of several methodological approaches 
from several fields of study interwoven with contextual historical analysis. This is done 
for two reasons. First, the quantification of rules requires, at a minimum, both a legal and 
historical foundation because it provides context to the underlying mathematics. Second, 
to measure how rules come into existence, proliferate, and evolve, the use of subjective 
and objective measures of analysis produces a means by which to identify relative 
patterns in preference revelation and rule development. Although economic 
methodologies have limitations, grounding how rules become law and how rules and law 
evolve over time to study patterns in rule development necessitates an evaluation of how 
an observer views particular problems identified in various literatures against what has 
historically occurred. Thus, the goal here is to identify those metrics which may be useful 
for future analyses. 
 In chapter III, preference revelation and rule development in the formation of the 
first rule of space law is explored. First, an application of historical analysis of the events 
leading up to the launch of Sputnik I is utilized to single out the necessary variables that 
enabled the generation of rules of jurisdiction that produced the supranational market 
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exchange from the strategic choices of the United States and the Soviet Union. Three 
variables are defined: (1) the technology to launch objects into the outer space 
environment, (2) the supply of, but failed consumption of, rules of jurisdiction for 
verification overflights of the US and the Soviet Union by each State’s representatives, 
and (3) the purchase of rules of jurisdiction relating to the International Geophysical Year 
of 1957-58. Second, basic game theory is applied to the three variables to test the 
stratagems used by the US and the Soviet Union leading up to the Sputnik and Explorer 
launches. Since State practice is the product of preference revelation, the stratagems 
employed by each State manifest from their respective State practices. Hence, a rule may 
be measured as a consequence of State practice by the stratagems each State employs. 
 In Chapter IV, historical, economic, and comparative analyses are applied to rule 
and supranational market development. First, economic analysis is applied to quantify 
market participation and rule consumption and generate possible trend lines to predict 
how future supranational markets and rules might evolve. Second, historical and 
comparative analyses are utilized to study how preference revelation and rule supply 
evolved from the State practice of launching objects into the outer space environment.  
 In Chapter V, economic analysis is applied to quantify rule supply and evolution 
as well as the growth of market participation. First, the data sets relating to national 
(space) law promulgation are analyzed as the product of rulemaking. Second, the national 
law data sets are compared to the treaty data sets to analyze the evolution and rates of 
rule consumption. Third, both the national law and treaty data sets are analyzed to 
measure the rate of market participation across the supranational markets for rules and 
rules of law relating to the activities of States in the outer space environment. 
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b. Game Theory 
 
 Game theory represents the analysis of strategic behavior in competitive situations 
among a set of players. Each player’s payoff relative to the possible strategies chosen by 
each player in a game is evaluated.285 A game is a mathematical construct that analyzes 
the interactions of rational, mutually cognizant set of players where each decision made 
by one player affects the payoffs of other players.286 The number of players, their 
representative strategies, and the resulting payoffs in a measured outcome comprises the 
essential elements of a game.287 A set of players may play a game once, over some period 
of time, for an undetermined period of time, or infinitely.288 But the characteristic 
element of a game is that each choice made by one player has consequences on the payoff 
to the other player.289 
 This thesis uses a very simple model of a game. For the purposes of Chapter III 
analysis, the game of initial rule formation is played by two players: the United States 
(US) (player 1) and the Soviet Union (SU) (player 2). Each player has two strategies: 
cooperate (C) or defect (D). Based on these two strategies, payoffs range between plus 
one (+1) and minus one (-1), where the value +1 represents the maximum benefit for a 
particular strategic choice, the value zero (0) represents neither a detriment nor a benefit 
to the player, i.e., no payoff (status quo), and the value minus one (-1) represents the 
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maximum detriment for a particular strategic choice.290 The payoff continuum ([α, β] = 
[1, -1]) represents the commoditized valued preferences of the players as defined by the 
historical record.291 The payoff scheme applies to each game played. 
 
Table 1: Strategy Payoffs Arising from Initial Rule Formation 
Payoffs US SU 
O 1 -1 
NO 0 0 
I 1 1 
NI -1 -1 
 
 As Table 1 above shows, the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (SU) have 
payoffs for each strategic choice for each game. With respect to the first game, if the US 
chooses to cooperate with the SU on the Open Skies Treaty (O), the US will earn a payoff 
of +1 because it has sought to maximize its valued preference of negotiating for 
overflight rules.292 If the US chooses to defect and not pursue the Open Skies Treaty 
(NO), then the US will earn a payoff of zero (0) because no change in circumstances 
occurred as a result of the strategic choice. Conversely, if the SU chooses to cooperate 
with the US on the Open Skies Treaty (O), then the SU will earn a payoff of -1 because 
the strategic choice would expose the military gaps between the two players and would 
create significant unacceptable strategic risks and costs.293 If the SU chooses to defect 
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and not pursue an Open Skies Treaty (NO), then the SU will earn a payoff of 0 because 
no change in circumstances occurred as a result of the strategic choice.294 
 With respect to the second game, if the US chooses to cooperate as a participant 
of the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (I), the US will earn a payoff of +1 
because it has sought to maximize its valued preference of launching an object over the 
territories of other States for surveillance purposes.295 If the US chooses to defect and not 
pursue participation in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (NI), then the US 
will earn a payoff of -1 because it would create a detriment in the form of political and 
technological outcomes that do not satisfy its valued preference to launch an object over 
the territories of other States.296 Conversely, if the SU chooses to cooperate as a 
participant of the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (I), then the SU will earn a 
payoff of +1 because it has sought to maximize its valued preference of launching an 
object over the territories of other States for technological and political propaganda in the 
Cold War.297 If the SU chooses to defect and not pursue participation in the International 
Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (NI), then the SU will earn a payoff of -1 because it would 
create a detriment in the form of political and technological outcomes that does not 
satisfy its valued preference to launch an object over the territories of other States.298 
The game type used for this game takes the extensive form. In this game, the 
historical record sets the values for the strategic outcomes, i.e., payoffs. As Figure 3 
below illustrates, the US and SU played a sequential game, the payoffs of which have

























































sixteen (16) possible outcomes. Of these sixteen (16) possible outcomes, two payoff 
strategies dominate for the game with three subgame equilibria that represent the optimal 
strategic set of choices for the players. 
Table 2 below illustrates the total number of possible payoff outcomes. The two 
dominant strategies arising from this game are highlighted in rows (e) and (m). Both are a 
combination of three equilibria that represent the optimal payoffs for each player. Table 3 
below divides the entire game into subgames. Given the possible choices, the US had two 
optimal strategies represented by (O, I) and (NO, I). The first strategy consists of the US 
agreeing to negotiate rules for the Open Skies Treaty and participating in the 
International Geophysical Year of 1957-58. The second strategy consists of the US 
foregoing cooperating with the Soviet Union on the Open Skies Treaty, but agreeing to 
participate in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58. On the other hand, the 
Soviet Union had only one optimal strategy. This strategy consists of not cooperating in 
the negotiation for the Open Skies Treaty, while accepting to participate in the 










Table 2: Final Payoffs for Each Strategy Employed in the Game of Initial Rule Formation 
 (US, SU, US, SU) 
a (1, -1, 1, 1) 
b (1, -1, 1, -1) 
c (1, -1, -1, 1) 
d (1, -1, -1, -1) 
e (1, 0, 1, 1) 
f (1, 0, 1, -1) 
g (1, 0, -1, 1) 
h (1, 0, -1, -1) 
i (0, -1, 1, 1) 
j (0, -1, 1, -1) 
k (0, -1, 1, 1) 
l (0, -1, -1, -1) 
m (0, 0, 1, 1) 
n (0, 0, 1, -1) 
o (0, 0, -1, 1) 












Each subgame assumes that the technological capability to launch an object into 
outer space is foreseeable because it is the basis for the payoff schema for each State. 
Since these payoff strategies are a function of the valued preferences of States, the 
optimal strategies are therefore a product of initial rule formation. No matter the reasons 
for which States seek to launch objects into the outer space environment, the fact that any 
reason underlies a valued preference manifested through State practice necessarily gives 
way to the need to design rules to ensure the continuation of the State practice. 
 
c. Quantification of Rule Supply, Consumption, and Evolution Rates and Market  
Participation 
i. The Sources and Methods Used to Compile Data Sets  
A. States Parties to the United Nations 
 
The UN Membership data set comes from the UN’s webpage titled “Growth in 
United Nations membership, 1945-present.”299 The data set begins in October 1945 with 
the thirty-two (32) original Members of the UN. For reasons of temporal congruency 
between data sets, the UN Membership data set is extrapolated out to October 2015, but 
                                                 
299 United Nations, Growth in the United Nations membership, 1945-present, WWW.UN.ORG, 
http://www.un.org/en/members/growth.shtml accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
 (O, I) (O, NI) (NO, I) (NO, NI) 
US (1, 1) (1, -1) (0, 1) (0, -1) 
SU (-1, 1) (-1, -1) (0, 1) (0, -1) 
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technically South Sudan became the last State Party to the UN in 2011. Moreover, to 
account for changes to the political and governmental identities of States since 1945, a 
pivot table was created to adjust the data set to a continuous set of data points. 
The set of the number of States that represent the total number of States Parties to 
the UN was constructed using a cumulative counting process. The count follows the 
historical sequence of State membership in the UN. The UN Charter entered into force in 
October 1945. Between October and December 1945, Argentina, Australia, Belgium, 
Bolivia,300 Brazil, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,301 Canada, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia,302 Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt,303 El Salvador, Ethiopia, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, 
India, Iran,304 Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippine Republic,305 Poland, Saudi 
                                                 
300 Id. (“On 7 April 2009, Bolivia changed its name to Bolivia (Plurinational State of).”) 
301 Id. (“On 19 September 1991, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic informed the United Nations 
that it had changed its name to Belarus.”) 
302 Id. (“Czechoslovakia was an original Member of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter 
dated 10 December 1992, its Permanent Representative informed the Secretary-General that the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic would cease to exist on 31 December 1992 and that the Czech Republic and the 
Slovak Republic, as successor States, would apply for membership in the United Nations. Following the 
receipt of their application, the Security Council, on 8 January 1993, recommended to the General 
Assembly that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic be both admitted to United Nations 
membership. Both the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic were thus admitted on 19 January of that 
year as Member States.”) 
303 Id. (“Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. Following a 
plebiscite on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was established by a union of Egypt and Syria 
and continued as a single Member. On 13 October 1961, Syria, having resumed its status as an independent 
State, resumed its separate membership in the United Nations. On 2 September 1971, the United Arab 
Republic changed its name to the Arab Republic of Egypt.”) 
304 Id. (“On 5 March 1981, Iran informed the Secretary-General that it had changed its name to Iran 
(Islamic Republic of).”) 
305 Id. (“In 1947, the Philippine Republic changed its name to Philippines.”) 
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Arabia, Syria,306 Turkey, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,307 Union of South 
Africa,308 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,309 United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia310 all became the first fifty one (51) Member States 
of the UN.311 
The set of State Parties to the UN has expanded since 1945. Growth of UN 
Membership continued in 1946 with the addition of Afghanistan, Iceland, Siam,312 and 
Sweden bringing the total to fifty-five (55) State Parties.313  
                                                 
306 Id. (“Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. Following a 
plebiscite on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was established by a union of Egypt and Syria 
and continued as a single Member. On 13 October 1961, Syria, having resumed its status as an independent 
State, resumed its separate membership in the United Nations. On 2 September 1971, the United Arab 
Republic changed its name to the Arab Republic of Egypt.”) 
307 Id. (“On 24 August 1991, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic changed its name to Ukraine.”) 
308 Id. (“In 1961, the Union of South Africa changed its name to South Africa.”) 
309 Id. (“The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was an original Member of the United Nations from 24 
October 1945. In a letter dated 24 December 1991, Boris Yeltsin, the President of the Russian Federation, 
informed the Secretary-General that the membership of the Soviet Union in the Security Council and all 
other United Nations organs was being continued by the Russian Federation with the support of the 11 
member countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States.) 
310 Id. (“The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an original Member of the United Nations, the 
Charter having been signed on its behalf on 26 June 1945 and ratified 19 October 1945, until its dissolution 
following the establishment and subsequent admission as new Members of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted as a Member of 
the United Nations by General Assembly resolution A/RES/46/237 of 22 May 1992. The Republic of 
Croatia was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General Assembly resolution A/RES/46/238 of 
22 May 1992. The Republic of Slovenia was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/46/236 of 22 May 1992. By resolution A/RES/47/225 of 8 April 1993, the 
General Assembly decided to admit as a Member of the United Nations the State being provisionally 
referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” 
pending settlement of the difference that had arisen over its name. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was 
admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/12 of 1 November 
2000. On 4 February 2003, following the adoption and promulgation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia 
and Montenegro by the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the official name of “Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia” was changed to Serbia and Montenegro. In a letter dated 3 June 2006, the 
President of the Republic of Serbia informed the Secretary-General that the membership of Serbia and 
Montenegro was being continued by the Republic of Serbia, following Montenegro's declaration of 
independence. Montenegro held a 21 May 2006 referendum and declared itself independent from Serbia on 
3 June. On 28 June 2006 it was accepted as a United Nations Member State by General Assembly 
resolution A/RES/60/264.”) 
311 Id. 
312 Id. (“On 11 May 1949, Siam informed the Secretary-General that it had changed its name to Thailand.”) 
313 Id. 
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In 1947, Pakistan and Yemen314 joined bringing the total of UN membership to 
fifty-seven (57).315  
In 1948, Burma316 joined the UN bringing membership to fifty-eight (58).317  
In 1949, Israel became the fifty-ninth (59) State Party to the UN.318  
In 1950, Indonesia319 joined the UN.320  
UN membership stayed constant until 1955 when Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, 
Cambodia, Ceylon,321 Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Laos,322 Libya,323 Nepal, 
Portugal, Romania, and Spain all joined the UN raising membership to seventy-six (76) 
States Parties.324  
In 1956, Japan, Morocco, Sudan, and Tunisia joined the UN bringing the total 
number of States Parties to eighty (80).325  
                                                 
314 Id. (“Yemen was admitted to membership in the United Nations on 30 September 1947 and Democratic 
Yemen on 14 December 1967. On 22 May 1990, the two countries merged and have since been represented 
as one Member with the name “Yemen”.”) 
315 Id. 
316 Id. (“On 18 June 1989, the Union of Burma informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to 
the Union of Myanmar. On 30 March 2011, the Union of Myanmar changed its name to the Republic of the 
Union of Myanamar [sic].”) 
317 Id. 
318 Id. 
319 Id. (“By letter of 20 January 1965, Indonesia announced its decision to withdraw from the United 
Nations “at this stage and under the present circumstances”. By telegram of 19 September 1966, it 
announced its decision “to resume full cooperation with the United Nations and to resume participation in 
its activities”. On 28 September 1966, the General Assembly took note of this decision and the President 
invited representatives of Indonesia to take seats in the Assembly.”) 
320 Id. 
321 Id. (“On 19 September 1991, Ceylon informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to Sri 
Lanka.”) 
322 Id. (“On 2 December 1975, Laos changed its name to the Lao People's Democratic Republic.”) 
323 Id. (“In 1969, the Kingdom of Libya informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya. Following the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 66/1, the Permanent 
Mission of Libya to the United Nations formally notified the United Nations of a Declaration by the 
National Transitional Council of 3 August changing the official name of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to 




In 1957, Ghana and Federation of Malaya326 became the eighty-first (81) and 
eighty-second (82) State Parties to the UN.327  
In 1958, Guinea become the eighty-second (82) State Party to the UN after the 
creation of a plebiscite established by a union of Egypt and Syria and continued as a 
single Member on February, 21 1958 to form the United Arab Republic.328  
In 1960, Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville),329 
Congo (Leopoldville),330 Cyprus, Dahomey,331 Gabon, Ivory Coast,332 Malagasy 
Republic,333 Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, and Upper Volta334 joined the 
UN raising member to one hundred members (100).335  
                                                 
326 Id. (“The Federation of Malaya joined the United Nations on 17 September 1957. On 16 September 
1963, its name was changed to Malaysia, following the admission to the new Federation of Singapore, 
Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak. Singapore became an independent State on 9 August 1965 and a 
Member of the United Nations on 21 September 1965.”) 
327 Id. 
328 Id. (“Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. Following a 
plebiscite on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was established by a union of Egypt and Syria 
and continued as a single Member. On 13 October 1961, Syria, having resumed its status as an independent 
State, resumed its separate membership in the United Nations. On 2 September 1971, the United Arab 
Republic changed its name to the Arab Republic of Egypt.”) 
329 Id. (“In 1970, Congo (Brazzaville) changed its name to the People's Republic of Congo, and on 15 
November 1971 — to Congo.”) 
330 Id. (“Zaire joined the United Nations on 20 September 1960 when it was known as the Republic of the 
Congo. On 17 May 1997, its name was changed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”) 
331 Id. (“On Nov 30 1974, Dahomey informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to Republic 
of Benin.”) 
332 Id. (“In 1985, Ivory Coast informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to Côte d'Ivoire.”) 
333 Id. (“In 1975, Malagasy Republic changed its name to Madagascar.”) 
334 Id. (“In 1984, Upper Volta informed the United Nations that it had changed its name to Burkina Faso.”) 
335 Id. 
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With the acceptance of Mauritania, Mongolia, Sierra Leone, and Tanganyika336 in 
1961, and the resumption of Syria as an independent State,337 membership in the UN 
grew to one hundred and five (105).338  
By 1962, the number of States Parties increased to one hundred and eleven (111) 
with the acceptance of Algeria, Burundi, Jamaica, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Uganda to the UN.339  
In 1963, Kenya, Kuwait, and Zanzibar340 joined the UN bringing membership 
totals to one hundred and fourteen (114).341  
By 1964, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar continued as a single 
member State, changing its name to the United Republic of Tanzania on 1 November 
1964342 and Malawi, Malta, and Zambia joined bringing membership to one hundred and 
sixteen (116).343  
                                                 
336 Id. (“Tanganyika was a Member of the United Nations from 14 December 1961 and Zanzibar was a 
Member from 16 December 1963. Following the ratification on 26 April 1964 of Articles of Union between 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar continued as a single Member, 
changing its name to the United Republic of Tanzania on 1 November 1964.”) 
337 Id. (“Egypt and Syria were original Members of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. Following a 
plebiscite on 21 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was established by a union of Egypt and Syria 
and continued as a single Member. On 13 October 1961, Syria, having resumed its status as an independent 
State, resumed its separate membership in the United Nations. On 2 September 1971, the United Arab 
Republic changed its name to the Arab Republic of Egypt.”) 
338 Id. 
339 Id. 
340 Id. (“Tanganyika was a Member of the United Nations from 14 December 1961 and Zanzibar was a 
Member from 16 December 1963. Following the ratification on 26 April 1964 of Articles of Union between 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar continued as a single Member, 





In 1965, membership in the UN rose to one hundred and nineteen (119) after The 
Gambia, Maldive Islands, and Singapore, as a newly formed independent State,344 joined 
the UN.345 
In 1966, Barbados, Botswana, Guyana, and Lesotho joined the UN raising 
membership totals to one hundred and twenty-three (123).346  
In 1967, the Democratic Yemen347 joined the UN as an independent State 
bringing total membership to one hundred and twenty-four (124).348  
In 1968, the UN grew to one hundred and twenty-seven (127) States when 
Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, and Swaziland were accepted as member States.349  
In 1970, Fiji became the one hundred and twenty-eighth (128) State to be 
accepted into the UN.350  
In 1971, Bahrain, Bhutan, Oman, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates all joined the 
UN bringing membership to one hundred and thirty-three (133).351  




347 Id. (“Yemen was admitted to membership in the United Nations on 30 September 1947 and Democratic 
Yemen on 14 December 1967. On 22 May 1990, the two countries merged and have since been represented 






In 1973, the UN accepted the Bahamas, the Federal Republic of Germany,352 and 
the German Democratic Republic353 as member States raising membership to one 
hundred and thirty-six (136).354  
In 1974, Bangladesh, Grenada, and Guinea-Bissau joined the UN raising 
membership to one and thirty-nine (139).355 
By 1975, UN membership increased to one hundred and forty-five members (145) 
when Cape Verde, Comoros, Mozambique, Papua New Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, 
and Suriname joined.356 
In 1976, Angola, Samoa, and Seychelles joined the UN increasing membership to 
one hundred and forty-eight (148).357 
In 1977, Djibouti and Viet Nam entered the UN as new States Parties bringing 
membership to one hundred and fifty (150).358 
In 1978, Dominica and Solomon Islands became UN member States raising 
membership to one hundred and fifty-two (152).359 
In 1979, Saint Lucia joined to become the one hundred and fifty third (153) 
member of the UN.360 
                                                 
352 Id. (“The Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were admitted to 
membership in the United Nations on 18 September 1973. Through the accession of the German 
Democratic Republic to the Federal Republic of Germany, effective from 3 October 1990, the two German 










In 1980, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Zimbabwe joined the UN bringing 
membership to one hundred and fifty five (155).361 
In 1980, with the inclusion of Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, and Vanuatu, UN 
membership totaled one hundred and fifty-eight (158).362 
In 1983, Saint Christopher and Nevis363 became the one hundred and fifty-ninth 
(159) State to join the UN.364 
In 1984, Brunei Darussalam joined the UN to become the one hundred and fifty-
ninth (159) State Party.365 
In 1990, Liechtenstein and Namibia joined the UN, but with the unifications of 
Yemen and Democratic Yemen in May to form one State Yemen and the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic in October to form one State 
the Federal Republic of Germany, this kept membership totals at one hundred and sixty 
(160).366 
 By 1991, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Republic of Korea joined the UN 
bringing membership totals to one hundred and sixty-seven (167).367 
                                                 
361 Id. 
362 Id. 






 In 1992, in light of the breakup of Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina368 and 
Croatia369 formed new States; with the addition of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Republic of Moldova, San Marino, Slovenia,370 Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan raised UN membership to one hundred and seventy-nine 
(179).371 
 In 1993, in light of the breakup of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, the acceptance 
of Andorra, Czech Republic,372 Eritrea, Monaco, Slovakia,373 and The former Yugoslav 
                                                 
368 Id. (“The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was an original Member of the United Nations, the 
Charter having been signed on its behalf on 26 June 1945 and ratified 19 October 1945, until its dissolution 
following the establishment and subsequent admission as new Members of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was admitted as a Member of 
the United Nations by General Assembly resolution A/RES/46/237 of 22 May 1992. The Republic of 
Croatia was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General Assembly resolution A/RES/46/238 of 
22 May 1992. The Republic of Slovenia was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/46/236 of 22 May 1992. . . . The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was admitted 
as a Member of the United Nations by General Assembly resolution A/RES/55/12 of 1 November 2000. On 
4 February 2003, following the adoption and promulgation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and 
Montenegro by the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the official name of “Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia” was changed to Serbia and Montenegro. In a letter dated 3 June 2006, the 
President of the Republic of Serbia informed the Secretary-General that the membership of Serbia and 
Montenegro was being continued by the Republic of Serbia, following Montenegro's declaration of 
independence. Montenegro held a 21 May 2006 referendum and declared itself independent from Serbia on 





372 Id. (“Czechoslovakia was an original Member of the United Nations from 24 October 1945. In a letter 
dated 10 December 1992, its Permanent Representative informed the Secretary-General that the Czech and 
Slovak Federal Republic would cease to exist on 31 December 1992 and that the Czech Republic and the 
Slovak Republic, as successor States, would apply for membership in the United Nations. Following the 
receipt of their application, the Security Council, on 8 January 1993, recommended to the General 
Assembly that the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic be both admitted to United Nations 
membership. Both the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic were thus admitted on 19 January of that 
year as Member States.”) 
373 Id. 
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Republic of Macedonia374 brought UN membership to one hundred and eighty-four 
(184).375 
 In 1994, Palau joined the UN raising membership to one hundred and eighty-five 
(185).376 
 In 1999, Kiribati, Nauru, and Tonga all joined the UN increasing membership to 
one hundred and eighty-eight (188).377 
 In 2000, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia378 and Tuvalu joined the UN raising 
membership to one hundred and eighty-nine (189).379 
 In 2002, Switzerland and Timor-Leste were accepted as States Parties to the UN 
increasing membership to one hundred and ninety-one (191).380 
 In 2006, Montenegro381 joined the UN bringing membership to one hundred and 
ninety-two (192).382 
                                                 
374 Id. (“By resolution A/RES/47/225 of 8 April 1993, the General Assembly decided to admit as a Member 
of the United Nations the State being provisionally referred to for all purposes within the United Nations as 





378 Id. (“The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was admitted as a Member of the United Nations by General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/55/12 of 1 November 2000. On 4 February 2003, following the adoption and 
promulgation of the Constitutional Charter of Serbia and Montenegro by the Assembly of the Federal 




381 Id. (“In a letter dated 3 June 2006, the President of the Republic of Serbia informed the Secretary-
General that the membership of Serbia and Montenegro was being continued by the Republic of Serbia, 
following Montenegro's declaration of independence. Montenegro held a 21 May 2006 referendum and 
declared itself independent from Serbia on 3 June. On 28 June 2006 it was accepted as a United Nations 
Member State by General Assembly resolution A/RES/60/264.”) 
382 Id. 
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 In 2011, South Sudan383 joined the UN as the one hundred and ninety-third (193) 
member States.384  
 
1. United Nations Member States Raw Data Table 
 
 To construct the table of raw data composed of UN State Parties from October 
1945 to October 2015, a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet was constructed using three 
columns.385 The first column listed each State Party to the UN. The second column listed 
the date on which a State in the row became a Member of the UN. The date of ratification 
used a month and year format. The third column consists of notes on if and when a State 
in the row changed its international legal personality after some event, e.g., due to 
revolution, coup d’état, de-colonialism, or some other form of political transition.386 This 
column was necessary to ensure that the graph in the growth of UN Membership was 
counted correctly over time. 
 
2. United Nations Member States Pivot Table 
 
 To fit the raw data to the graph of the Growth of UN Membership over time, a 
pivot table was designed in Microsoft Excel.387 The UN Membership pivot table was 
                                                 
383 Id. (“The Republic of South Sudan formally seceded from Sudan on 9 July 2011 as a result of an 
internationally monitored referendum held in January 2011, and was admitted as a new Member State by 
the United Nations General Assembly on 14 July 2011.”) 
384 Id. 
385 See Appendix for raw data. 
386 See supra note 48.  
387 See Appendix for raw data. 
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constructed using signature and ratification dates for each Member State over time.388 
The list of Member States was manually adjusted for the formation or break-up of States 
based on UN Membership history. 
The pivot table construction followed four general rules. First, if a State never had 
political or territorial transitions between 1945 and 2015, no changes were made to how 
that State was counted over time. For example, the US continues to have the same 
political character despite adding internally to its territory since 1945. Thus no change 
was made to how the US and other similarly situated States were counted over time. 
Second, if a State had a political transition that produced only one new political 
entity regardless of any loss in territory between 1945 and 2015, then no change was 
made to the table. For example, as the Soviet Union broke-up, the Russian Federation 
transitioned politically from the anchor State that formed the political Soviet Union. Thus 
no change was made to how Russia was counted over time. 
Third, if one State broke up into two or more States, a count of one was subtracted 
from the total count for the loss of the original State and a count of N number of new 
States into which the original State broke apart was added at the time break-up occurred. 
For example, in 1992, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia broke up into The 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, and the Republic of 
Slovenia. Here, a count of one (1) was subtracted with the dissolution of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in May 1992. Correspondingly, a count of three (N=3) 
was added with the acceptance Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia for UN 
membership. 
                                                 
388 Ratification counts include States that acceded or succeeded to the treaty. See supra note 48. 
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Fourth, if N States combined into one State, a count of N was subtracted from the 
total number of States at the time, and a count of one was added to account for the final 
formation of the new State. For example, in May 1990, Yemen and Democratic Yemen 
merged into one (1) State from two (N=2) States. The rule followed for this case required 
subtracting a count of two (N=2) and adding a count of one (1) in May 1990.  
 Once the pivot table was constructed using the adjusted time data for UN 
membership, a scatterplot was designed to graph the pivot table data in Microsoft Excel. 
Graph 1 below shows the growth of UN membership over time where the number of 
States admitted to the UN is listed on the y-axis and time, between October 1945 and 
October 2015, is listed on the x-axis. 
 
3. United Nations Member States Scatterplot 
 
 A scatterplot for the Growth of UN membership was graphed (see Graph 4) where 
the number of States that signed or ratified the UN Charter is listed on the y-axis and 
time, between October 1945 and October 2015, is listed on the x-axis.389 Because the 
entire set of rules that comprise public international law is dependent on the number of 
States putting their valued preferences into effect through State practice at any given 
time, relative market share and rule consumption may be inferred from observations of 
exchange.390 In other words, how, when, and how many States engage in the 
development of rules among and between States is dependent on how many States are 
                                                 
389 Ratification counts include States that acceded or succeeded to the treaty. See supra note 48. 
390 This is only a relative measure because it only seeks to capture how many possible market participants 
there are in the international system at each point in time relative to the number of States who supply and 
consume rules. 
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actually using particular supranational markets of international relations at any given 
time. Such changes represent perturbations in the supranational market itself due to 
shifting preferences of States due to the effects of the entrance and exit of States from the 
supranational market of international relations over time. Consequently, fewer or more 
States engaged in the supranational market of international relations may lead to 
measurable effects that would include, inter alia, power-disparities in bargaining between 
States who engage in rule-making, market failure, lower or higher transaction costs, 
potential externalities that may impose benefits or costs on some or all States in the 
system at or for a certain period of time, or less or more variability in preference 
satisfaction.391 
Accordingly, determining the total number of States engaged in rule supply and 
consumption through the various means provided by the supranational market of 
international relations establishes the upper bound of market participation at any given 
time. Moreover, changes in the international system of States provides a means by which 
to measure when and why States may or may not change their valued preferences when 
engaged in the supranational market of international relations. Over time, as States enter 
and exit the supranational market of international relations, the reevaluation of valued 
preferences and underlying facts about those preferences may lead to changes in the 
social dynamics among and between States and cause fluctuations in the international 
system. For example, in Graph 1, one can observe several dips and spikes in the number 
of State parties to the UN. The two most prominent dips and spikes an observer can 
notice are located around the mid-1950’s and the early 1990’s. The first dip corresponds 
                                                 
391 See supra note 4. 
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generally to de-colonialism, while the second dip corresponds to the breakup of the 
USSR and Yugoslavia.392 
Moreover, treaty success and the preference to be bound by or intended to be 
bound by the obligations and duties of a particular treaty can be quantified in terms of a 
relative percentage measure between the total number of UN member State Parties and 
the number of States Parties and/or signatories to a target treaty at any given time because 
the ratio establishes how many States seek to supply and/or consume rules over time.393 
When the curve for the Growth of UN Membership over time is compared with a curve 
representing observed supply or consumption of rules for space objects, the difference 
between the two curves provides an inferential general measure of the objective 
preference values of States. As any given rule supply or consumption curve approaches 
the curve of the Growth in UN Membership, i.e., the smaller the distance between two 
points between the baseline curve and test curve, that ratio provides a consistent measure 
of the successfulness of rule supply or consumption at each point in time. In other words, 
a measure of treaty success as a function of valued State preferences is based on how 
many States exist at the time a treaty is concluded or ratified through as long as the treaty 
remains in force. The larger the ratio, the greater the implied success of rule supply 




                                                 
392 See supra note 48. 
393 However, this thesis does not propose a way to rank these measured rations because the sample of rules 
considered is small. Future analysis and the inclusion of other sets of rules supplied and/or consumed 
would provide a means by which to more accurately  
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4. United Nations Member States Data Limitations 
 
While there exists one hundred and ninety-three State Parties to the UN, this does 
not necessarily represent all entities that may be called States. At least three entities exist 
that do not have a status of State Party to the UN. These are Kosovo, Taiwan (Republic 
of China), and the Holy See. Of these three States, Taiwan and the Holy See have either 
signed or ratified at least one of the four space treaties under study. Of these two, only the 
Holy See has Permanent Observer status at the UN.394 However, for the sake of 
congruency between data sets, Kosovo, the Holy See, and Taiwan (Republic of China) 
are not counted in the data UN set. 
 
                                                 
394 United Nations, About Permanent Observers, What are Permanent Observers?, WWW.UN.ORG, 










































B. Signatories to and Ratifying States of the Outer Space Treaty 
 
 The source of the Outer Space Treaty data set comes from the treaty lists kept in 
Washington, DC, London, and Moscow.395 The data set starts in January 1967 and is 
extrapolated out to October 2015, but ends in March 2013 when Lithuania became the 
last State to ratify the Outer Space Treaty.396 As of October 2015, the Outer Space Treaty 
has one hundred and four (104) States Parties and twenty five (25) signatories.397 
The Outer Space Treaty is a multilateral treaty that is open and remains open to 
all States to sign and/or ratify. As article XIV states: 
 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State 
which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance 
with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. 
Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited 
with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United 
                                                 
395 See United States Department of State, Status of Outer Space Treaty, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81123.pdf accessed Dec. 10, 2015; United Kingdom, Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, Status of Outer Space Treaty, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/treaty-on-principles-governing-the-activities-of-states-in-the-
exploration-and-use-of-outer-space-including-the-moon-and-other-celestial-bodies-lond accessed Dec. 10, 
2015; and United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Status of Outer Space Treaty, available at 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
396 Id. 
397 U.N. Comm. Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-Comm., Status of international agreements 
relating to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2015, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2015/CRP.8 (Apr. 8, 
2015), available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/limited/c2/AC105_C2_2015_CRP08E.pdf. 
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States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary 
Governments. 
3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments 
of ratification by five Governments including the Governments designated 
as Depositary Governments under this Treaty. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are 
deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter 
into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or 
accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory 
and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of 
each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of 
its entry into force and other notices. 
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments 
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.398 
 
Because the Outer Space Treaty was presented for signature and ratification in 
triplicate, the three lists, each individually maintained by the US in Washington, DC, the 
UK in London, and the Russian Federation in Moscow, were reviewed for completeness. 
Each list is authentic as a matter of public international law;399 however, individually, 
each list is not a complete list of signatory or ratifying States. Only the US and UK lists 
are publically available online through 2015. Because the Russian Foreign Ministry does 
                                                 
398 Outer Space Treaty supra note 21, at art. XIV. 
399 See supra note 105, at 262. 
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not have an accessible list online, the list maintained by the United Nations Office of 
Disarmament Affairs (Disarmament Affairs list) was used in its place because it includes 
data from all three lists from which all lists could be crosschecked.400 Furthermore, the 
complete list of signatory and ratifying States Parties were checked against the UN 
COPUOS document with the title “Status of international agreements relating to activities 
in outer space as at 1 January 2015” to ensure that the number of signatory and ratifying 
State Parties matched.401 
 
1. States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty Raw Data Table 
 
 The compilation of the data set for the Outer Space Treaty takes two forms. First, 
a table of raw data was constructed using Microsoft Excel. The table consisted of four 
columns. The first column listed each State that had either signed or taken steps to ratify, 
accede, succeed, or withdraw from the Outer Space Treaty. The second column listed the 
date of signature to the Outer Space Treaty for the State in that row. The third column 
lists the date of ratification, accession, or succession to the Outer Space Treaty for the 
State in that row. The fourth column contained notes about any changes to a State’s 




                                                 
400 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Status of Outer Space Treaty, DISARMAMENT.UN.ORG, 
available at http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
401 See supra note 397. 
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2. States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty Pivot Table 
 
To fit the raw data to the graph of the Growth of State Parties to the Outer Space 
Treaty over time, a pivot table was designed in Microsoft Excel.402 The Outer Space 
Treaty pivot table was constructed using signature and ratification dates for each States 
Party over time. The list of States Parties was manually adjusted for the formation or 
break-up of States based on UN Membership history constructed into the UN 
Membership pivot table. The Outer Space Treaty pivot table construction followed the 
same rules of construction as the UN Membership pivot table. 
 
3. States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty Scatterplot 
 
 Once the Outer Space Treaty pivot table was constructed using the adjusted time 
data for UN membership, a scatterplot was designed to graph the pivot table data in 
Microsoft Excel. Graph 2 below shows the Growth of States Parties to the Outer Space 
Treaty over time where the number of States that signed or ratified the treaty is listed on 
the y-axis and time, between January 1967 and October 2015, is listed on the x-axis.403 
Where States have signed or ratified the Outer Space Treaty, those data provide 
an indication of when and the degree to which a State has purchased those obligations 
deriving from the treaty. The conclusion of any treaty indicates a supply of rules for 
which a State may purchase the set of obligations inherent to the substance of the treaty. 
The graph of the Growth of States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty provides a measure 
                                                 
402 See Appendix for raw data. 
403 Ratification counts include States that acceded or succeeded to the treaty. See supra note 48. 
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of the rate of rule consumption over time. Furthermore, the number of States that 
purchase the obligation of the rule in order to assert authority relative to other States 
Parties also gives a sense of the demand for such rules because it demonstrates a State’s 
willingness to pay a price for the benefit that the treaty is meant to provide. 
 
4. States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty Data Limitations 
 
No data limitations were discovered as each treaty list was checked against 































































C. Signatories to and Ratifying States of the Rescue and Return Agreement 
 
The source of the data set comes from the treaty lists kept in Washington, DC, 
London, and Moscow.404 The data set begins in April 1968 with fourteen (14) original 
signatory States. The data is extrapolated out to October 2015, but ends in March 2013 
when Lithuania became the last State to ratify the Rescue and Return Agreement.405 As 
of October 2015, ninety six (96) States have ratified and twenty four (24) have signed the 
treaty.406 
The Rescue and Return Agreement is a multilateral treaty that is open and 
remains open to all States to sign and/or ratify. As article 7 states,  
 
1. This Agreement shall be open to all States for signature. Any State 
which does not sign this Agreement before its entry into force in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 
2. This Agreement shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. 
Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited 
with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United 
States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary 
Governments. 
                                                 
404 See United States Department of State, Status of Rescue and Return Agreement, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81125.pdf accessed Dec. 10, 2015, and United Kingdom, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Status of the Rescue and Return Agreement, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/agreement-on-the-rescue-of-astronauts-the-return-of-
astronauts-and-the-return-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space-london-2241968 accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
405 Id. 
406 See supra note 397. 
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3. This Agreement shall enter into force upon the deposit of 
instruments of ratification by five Governments including the 
Governments designated as Depositary Governments under this 
Agreement. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are 
deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Agreement, it shall 
enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory 
and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of 
each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Agreement, the date 
of its entry into force and other notices. 
6. This Agreement shall be registered by the Depositary Governments 
pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.407 
 
Because States Parties to the Rescue and Return Agreement presented it for 
signature and ratification in triplicate, there are three lists maintained by the US in 
Washington, DC, the UK in London, and the Russian Federation in Moscow.408 Each list 
is authentic as a matter of public international law;409 however, individually, each list is 
not a complete list of signatory or ratifying States. Only the US and UK lists are 
                                                 
407 Rescue and Return Agreement supra note 21, art. 7. 
408 However, the Moscow list could not be obtained.  
409 See supra note 48.  
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publically available online through 2015.410 Because the Russian Foreign Ministry does 
not have an accessible list online and attempts to locate a list proved unsuccessful, 
therefore the Russian list was not included in the count that makes up Table 5 in the 
Appendix. Furthermore, the complete list of signatory and ratifying State Parties were 
checked against the UNCOPUOS document “Status of international agreements relating 
to activities in outer space as at 1 January 2015” to ensure that the number of signatory 
and ratifying State Parties matched.411 
 
1. States Parties to the Rescue and Return Agreement Raw Data Table 
 
The construction of Table 5 consisted of a review of the US, UK, and Russian 
lists. With the US list, each State and each date of signature and ratification are placed in 
columns. As discussed above, changes in Statehood and corresponding treaty obligations 
were accounted for to form a continuous list over time. 
The compilation of the data set for the Rescue and Return Agreement takes two 
forms. First, a table of raw data was constructed using Microsoft Excel. The table 
consisted of four columns. The first column listed each State that had either signed or 
taken steps to ratify, accede, succeed, or withdraw from the Rescue and Return 
Agreement. The second column listed the date of signature to the Rescue and Return 
Agreement for the State in that row. The third column lists the date of ratification, 
                                                 
410 See United States Department of State, Status of Rescue and Return Agreement, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81125.pdf accessed Dec. 10, 2015, and United Kingdom 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Status of the Rescue and Return Agreement, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/agreement-on-the-rescue-of-astronauts-the-return-of-
astronauts-and-the-return-of-objects-launched-into-outer-space-london-2241968 accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
411 See supra note 397. 
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accession, or succession to the Rescue and Return Agreement for the State in that row. 
The fourth column contained notes about any changes to a State’s signatory, ratification, 
accession, succession, or withdrawal from the Rescue and Return Agreement.  
 
2. States Parties to the Rescue and Return Agreement Pivot Table 
 
To fit the raw data to the graph of the Growth of State Parties to the Rescue and 
Return Agreement over time, a pivot table was designed in Microsoft Excel. The Rescue 
and Return Agreement pivot table was constructed using signature and ratification dates 
for each States Party over time. The list of States Parties was manually adjusted for the 
formation or break-up of States based on UN Membership history constructed into the 
UN Membership pivot table. The Rescue and Return Agreement pivot table construction 
followed the same rules of construction as the UN Membership pivot table. 
 
3. States Parties to the Rescue and Return Agreement Scatterplot 
 
 Once the Rescue and Return Agreement pivot table was constructed using the 
adjusted time data for UN membership, a scatterplot was designed to graph the pivot 
table data in Microsoft Excel. Graph 3 below shows the Growth of States Parties to the 
Rescue and Return Agreement over time where the number of States that signed or 
ratified the treaty is listed on the y-axis and time, between April 1968 and October 2015, 
is listed on the x-axis.412 
                                                 
412 Ratification counts include States that acceded or succeeded to the treaty. See supra note 48. 
113 
Where States have signed or ratified the Outer Space Treaty, those data provide 
an indication of when and the degree to which a State has purchased those obligations 
deriving from the treaty. The conclusion of any treaty indicates a supply of rules for 
which a State may purchase the set of obligations inherent to the substance of the treaty. 
The graph of the Growth of States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty provides a measure 
of the rate of rule consumption over time. Furthermore, the number of States that 
purchase the obligation of the rule in order to assert authority relative to other States 
Parties also gives a sense of the demand for such rules because it demonstrates a State’s 
willingness to pay a price for the benefit that the treaty is meant to provide. 
 
4. States Parties to the Rescue and Return Agreement Data Limitations  
 
All efforts to track down an official Russian list was futile. No Russian list exists 




































































D. Signatories to and Ratifying States of the Liability Convention 
 
The source of the Liability Convention data set comes from the treaty lists kept in 
Washington, DC, London, and Moscow.413 The data set begins in March 1972 with 
fourteen (14) original signatory States. The data are extrapolated out to 2015, but end in 
July 2014 when Columbia became the last State to ratify the Liability Convention.414 As 
of October 2015, ninety five (95) States have ratified and twenty one (21) States have 
signed the treaty.415 
The Liability Convention is a multilateral treaty that is open and remains open to 
all States to sign and/or ratify. As article XXIV states: 
 
1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State 
which does not sign this Convention before its entry into force in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time. 
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. 
Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited 
with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United 
States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary 
Governments. 
                                                 
413 See United States Department of State, Status of the Liability Convention, available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/81127.pdf accessed Dec. 10, 2015, and United Kingdom, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Status of the Liability Convention, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/convention-on-international-liability-for-damage-caused-by-
space-objects-london-2931972 accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
414 Id.  
415 See supra note 397. 
116 
3. This Convention shall enter into force on the deposit of the fifth 
instrument of ratification. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are 
deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall 
enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or accession. 
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory 
and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of 
each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Convention, the 
date of its entry into force and other notices. 
6. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary 
Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United 
Nations.416 
 
1. States Parties to the Liability Convention Raw Data Table 
 
The compilation of the data set for the Liability Convention takes two forms. 
First, a table of raw data was constructed using Microsoft Excel. The table consisted of 
four columns. The first column listed each State that had either signed or taken steps to 
ratify, accede, succeed, or withdraw from the Liability Convention. The second column 
listed the date of signature to the Liability Convention for the State in that row. The third 
column lists the date of ratification, accession, or succession to the Liability Convention 
                                                 
416 See Liability Convention supra note 21, at art. XXIV. 
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for the State in that row. The fourth column contained notes about any changes to a 
State’s signatory, ratification, accession, succession, or withdrawal from the Liability 
Convention.  
 
2. States Parties to the Liability Convention Pivot Table 
 
To fit the raw data to the graph of the Growth of State Parties to the Liability 
Convention over time, a pivot table was designed in Microsoft Excel. The Liability 
Convention pivot table was constructed using signature and ratification dates for each 
States Party over time. The list of States Parties was manually adjusted for the formation 
or break-up of States based on UN Membership history constructed into the UN 
Membership pivot table. The Liability Convention pivot table construction followed the 
same rules of construction as the UN Membership pivot table. 
 
3. States Parties to the Liability Convention Scatterplot 
 
 Once the Liability Convention pivot table was constructed using the adjusted time 
data for UN membership, a scatterplot was designed to graph the pivot table data in 
Microsoft Excel. Graph 4 below shows the Growth of States Parties to the Liability 
Convention over time where the number of States that signed or ratified the treaty is 
listed on the y-axis and time, between March 1972 and October 2015, is listed on the x-
axis.417 
                                                 
417 Ratification counts include States that acceded or succeeded to the treaty. See supra note 48. 
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Where States have signed or ratified the Outer Space Treaty, those data provide 
an indication of when and the degree to which a State has purchased those obligations 
deriving from the treaty. The conclusion of any treaty indicates a supply of rules for 
which a State may purchase the set of obligations inherent to the substance of the treaty. 
The graph of the Growth of States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty provides a measure 
of the rate of rule consumption over time. Furthermore, the number of States that 
purchase the obligation of the rule in order to assert authority relative to other States 
Parties also gives a sense of the demand for such rules because it demonstrates a State’s 
willingness to pay a price for the benefit that the treaty is meant to provide. 
 
4. States Parties to the Liability Convention Data Limitations 
 
All efforts to track down an official Russian list were futile. No Russian list exists 
online or elsewhere that is publically available and up to date. This created a problem in 
discovering the correct ratification date for Lebanon. The British list has Lebanon signing 
the Rescue and Return Agreement.418 However, the official UN list published by OOSA 
shows that Lebanon is a ratifying State.419 To reconcile these two facts, Lebanon’s date of 
signature was chosen as the date of ratification.  
                                                 
418 Compare Russian Federation, The list of multilateral international treaties (the Russian Federation is 
the depositary), available at http://archive.mid.ru/spm_md.nsf accessed Dec. 10, 2015, with U.N. Comm. 
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Sub-Comm., Status of international agreements relating to activities 



































































E. Signatories to and Ratifying States of the Registration Convention 
 
Unlike the Outer Space Treaty, the Rescue and Return Agreement and the 
Liability Convention, the Registration Convention has only one list of signatory and 
ratifying States. The data set begins in May 1975 with two (2) original signatory 
States.420 The data are extrapolated out to 2015, but end in April 2014 when Kuwait 
became the last State to ratify the Registration Convention.421 As of October 2015, sixty 
five (65) States have ratified and four (4) States have signed the treaty.422 
The Registration Convention is a multilateral treaty that is open and remains open 
to all States to sign and/or ratify through the UN. As article VIII states: 
 
1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States at United 
Nations Headquarters in New York. Any State which does not sign this 
Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of 
this article may accede to it at any time. 
2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. 
Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited 
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
                                                 
420 See United Nations Treaty Collection, Status of the Registration Convention, available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIV-
1&chapter=24&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
421 Id.  
422 See supra note 397. 
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3. This Convention shall enter into force among the States which 
have depo- sited instruments of ratification on the deposit of the fifth such 
instrument with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are 
deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall 
enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or accession. 
5. The Secretary-General shall promptly inform all signatory and 
acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each 
instrument of ratification of and accession to this Convention, the date of 
its entry into force and other notices.423 
 
1. States Parties to the Registration Convention Raw Data Table 
 
The compilation of the data set for the Registration Convention takes two forms. 
First, a table of raw data was constructed using Microsoft Excel. The table consisted of 
four columns. The first column listed each State that had either signed or taken steps to 
ratify, accede, succeed, or withdraw from the Registration Convention. The second 
column listed the date of signature to the Registration Convention for the State in that 
row. The third column lists the date of ratification, accession, or succession to the 
Registration Convention for the State in that row. The fourth column contained notes 
                                                 
423 Registration Convention supra note 21, at art.VIII. 
122 
about any changes to a State’s signatory, ratification, accession, succession, or 
withdrawal from the Registration Convention.  
 
2. States Parties to the Registration Convention Pivot Table 
 
To fit the raw data to the graph of the Growth of State Parties to the Registration 
Convention over time, a pivot table was designed in Microsoft Excel. The Registration 
Convention pivot table was constructed using signature and ratification dates for each 
States Party over time. The list of States Parties was manually adjusted for the formation 
or break-up of States based on UN Membership history constructed into the UN 
Membership pivot table. The Registration Convention pivot table construction followed 
the same rules of construction as the UN Membership pivot table. 
 
3. States Parties to the Registration Convention Scatterplot 
 
 Once the Registration Convention pivot table was constructed using the adjusted 
time data for UN membership, a scatterplot was designed to graph the pivot table data in 
Microsoft Excel. Graph 5 below shows the Growth of States Parties to the Registration 
Convention over time where the number of States that signed or ratified the treaty is 
listed on the y-axis and time, between May 1975 and October 2015, is listed on the x-
axis.424 
                                                 
424 Ratification counts include States that acceded or succeeded to the treaty. See supra note 48. 
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Where States have signed or ratified the Outer Space Treaty, those data provide 
an indication of when and the degree to which a State has purchased those obligations 
deriving from the treaty. The conclusion of any treaty indicates a supply of rules for 
which a State may purchase the set of obligations inherent to the substance of the treaty. 
The graph of the Growth of States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty provides a measure 
of the rate of rule consumption over time. Furthermore, the number of States that 
purchase the obligation of the rule in order to assert authority relative to other States 
Parties also gives a sense of the demand for such rules because it demonstrates a State’s 
willingness to pay a price for the benefit that the treaty is meant to provide. 
 
4. States Parties to the Registration Convention Data Limitations  
 
Since the signatory and ratification lists for the Registration Convention are 























































F. States that Have Implemented the Term Space Object into their National Laws 
 
 As described infra, the term “object” is extrapolated from the Outer Space Treaty 
through the Rescue and Return Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the Registration 
Convention. While an analysis of the evolution from the term “object” to “space object” 
is discussed in Chapters III through V, it is important to briefly summarize the 
importance of this approach.  
 The set of States that have implemented the term “space object” into their national 
laws comprises States that have some space-faring experience, including being a member 
State of a multilateral space agency, a partner to the International Space Station, 
launching humans, animals, or other objects into outer space, or having had another State 
launch objects into outer space for it. Each State counted has, at a minimum, either signed 
or ratified the Outer Space Treaty or subsequent space treaties. Since the Outer Space 
Treaty is an initial set of rules that comprise law for, and uses the term “object” in 
reference to things launched or intended to be launched to, the outer space environment, 
those specifically referenced articles represent the baseline for which States have 
exchanged in the purchase of the treaty’s obligations that give effect to a State’s 
extraterritorial application of its authority.425 
 Since all States in the full sample have, at least, signed or ratified the Outer Space 
Treaty, obligations arising under treaty law may or may not have been given effect into 
the national law with respect to space objects.426 Moreover, the obligations that arise 
from any space treaty signed or ratified by the States sampled are with respect to the 
                                                 
425 See discussion supra in Chapter I. 
426 See supra note 48. See also BROWNLIE supra note 4. 
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obligations purchased as a matter of treaty law. However, the obligations that arise from 
treaty law generally have some legal effect in terms of rule supply within the national 
law. When States give legal effect to a treaty’s obligation under national law, States may 
publish or promulgate those obligations in the form of national law rules.427 In doing so, 
States resupply rules to the international market of international relations in the form of 
their national laws.428 When States resupply rules via the publication or promulgation of 
their national laws, those rules common to States in content (i.e., a rule’s definition, 
meaning, and scope) may signal to other States of the purchase of obligations relative to 
their powers as sovereign States.429 This arises because States have generally complete 
authority over their territories and thus the act or publishing or promulgation a rule 
internal to the State expresses the preferred source of a rule’s obligation.430 
 
1. National Law Data Set 
 
Two samples of State national space laws were taken. The first sample consists of 
thirty-nine (39) States. This set includes the following States: Algeria, Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, China, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, 
Romania, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the 
                                                 
427 See JULIAN HERMIDA, LEGAL BASIS FOR A NATIONAL SPACE LEGISLATION (Kluwer 2004). 
428 See discussion supra in Chapter I. 
429 Id. 
430 Id. States have attempted to copy, to some extent, national laws with respect to space objects. This 
creates a common source of rules for States that may be applied in disputes. See discussion infra in Chapter 
V. 
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United Kingdom, the United States of America, and Venezuela. This sample consists of 
States that have promulgated or published national laws with respect to the regulation of 
space objects and those States that have, at least, signed or ratified the Outer Space 
Treaty and several other space treaties.431 However, not every State sampled has signed 
or ratified all other space treaties analyzed for this thesis.432 
The second sample consists of twenty-nine (29) States from the sample of thirty-
nine States (39).433 This sample includes: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, 
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, China, France, Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, 
South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America, and Venezuela. The sample of twenty-nine (29) States was constructed because 
there are, at a minimum, twenty-nine States that have published or promulgated rules for 
space objects under their national law. This is a separate source of rules distinct from 
international agreements and international custom.434 As such, they represent some bound 
on the number of States that engage or participate in a State practice, in some form, of 
launching into and using space objects in the outer space environment. 
The compilation of the data set for National Space Laws is represented in Table 4 
in the Appendix. A table of raw data was constructed using Microsoft Excel. The table 
consists of seven columns. The first column listed each State counted in the sample. The 
second through fifth columns listed the date of ratification for the four space treaties for 
each sampled State. The sixth column lists the promulgation of rules regarding space 
                                                 
431 See Appendix for raw data. 
432 See supra note 397. 
433 See Appendix for raw data. 
434 See discussion supra in Chapter I. 
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objects. If a State had promulgated a national space law, then that date was used in the 
table. However, if a sampled State never promulgated a national space law, then the date 
of the last ratification of a definition of space object was chosen because the act of 
ratification integrates a treaty’s obligation into a State’s national law. The seventh 
column lists the dates on which States promulgated a national space law regarding space 
objects and does not incorporate any State sampled that has not promulgated a national 
space law in relation to other States sampled.  
 
2. National Law Pivot Table 
 
Due to the limited number of sampled States, the construction of a pivot table was 
unnecessary. 
 
3. National Law Scatterplot 
 
 A scatterplot was designed to graph the sample of national space laws data in 
Microsoft Excel. Graph 6 below shows the growth of the number of States that have 
promulgated national space laws regulating space objects and that have also incorporated 
obligations from one or more space treaties. The number of States that have published or 
promulgated a national (space) law is listed on the y-axis and time, between July 1958 
and October 2015, is listed on the x-axis.435 
                                                 
435 Ratification counts include States that acceded or succeeded to the treaty. See supra note 48. 
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 A curve was generated for each sample. The first curve relates to the sample of 
thirty-nine (39) States and is designated as NL uncorrected (uncorr.). This means these 
States have at least purchased the obligations of the Outer Space Treaty and/or gave 
effect to the treaty’s obligations through the publishing or promulgation of a national 
law.436 The second curve relates to the sample of twenty-nine (29) States that have only 
published or promulgated national laws relating to the launching into or use of space 
objects in the outer space environment. This curve is designated NL corrected (corr.) and 
represents the supply of rules to the supranational market of international relations. Each 
curve provides evidence of rule supply as a function of rules of general principles of law 
and rule consumption as a function of rules from international agreements. Generation of 
these curves enables comparison across the types of rules supplied and consumed across 
various supranational markets of international relations. 
 
4. National Law Data Limitations 
 
 Most national space laws surveyed are published in official or unofficial versions 
in English. The English versions are the basis for the construction of the table of national 
space laws. Each national space law was screened to ensure that each law or regulation 
had some mention of space object. For national laws sampled that did not have an 
English translation, Google Translator was utilized to distinguish whether the national 
law reviewed had some mention of the regulation of space objects. The procedure used 
                                                 
436 Again, the set of States sampled comprises those States that have some space-faring experience, 
including being a member State of a multilateral space agency, a partner to the International Space Station, 
launching humans, animals, or other objects into outer space, or having had another State launch objects 
into outer space for it. See supra note 427. See also BROWNLIE supra note 4. 
130 
involved looking for words like “object,” “space object,” satellite, launch vehicle, 





























































G. Member States of the COPUOS 
1. COPUOS Data Set 
 
The compilation of the data set for the Growth of Membership in COPUOS is 
represented in Table 6 in the Appendix. First, a table of raw data was constructed using 
Microsoft Excel. The table consisted of three columns. The first column listed each State 
that had become a member of COPUOS. The second column lists the date on which the 
listed State became a member of COPUOS. The third column lists the cumulative count 
of membership in COPUOS over time. 
 
2. COPUOS Pivot Table 
 
No pivot table was designed for COPUOS membership because no State member 
has transitioned off due to significant changes in its political composition over time. 
 
3. COPUOS Scatterplot 
 
A scatterplot was designed to graph the pivot table data in Microsoft Excel. Graph 
7 below shows the growth in COPUOS membership over time where the cumulative 
number of member States is listed on the y-axis and time, between December 1958 and 
October 2015, is listed on the x-axis.  
 The curve COPUOS generated represents market participation within the 
specialized UN committee regarding the outer space environment. COPUOS is its own 
133 
supranational market of international relations because each Member State of COPUOS 
has the ability to engage in preference revelation with other committee members as well 
as supply possible rules for States.437 Changes in membership to COPUOS indicate how 
States use the committee and therefore offer a measure of market participation. All of the 
space treaties analyzed were developed within COPUOS and COPUOS continues to 
facilitate exchanging ideas and rules for various types of space activities between and 
among States. 
 
4. COPUOS Data Limitations 
 
No limitations on COPUOS data were discovered. All member States are 
accounted for. 
 
                                                 
437 Since COPUOS members cannot put into force international agreements, the best the Committee can do 
is supply rules to the international community of States via processes internal to United Nations 
administration. Nonetheless, the supply of rules emanating from COPUOS may become consumed rules if 
the international agreement reaches beyond the Committee, i.e., to the General Assembly or open to all 































d. Quantification of Supranational Market Participation 
 
A Herfindahl Index is a general measure of the relative market power of an 
individual participant in relation to the total number of participants in an industry as an 
indicator of the level of competition within a particular market.438 A Herfindahl index is 
usually used in relation to competition among firms in an industry. In particular, the US 
Department of Justice uses a Herfindahl Index to determine whether the merger of two 
firms would produce market shares for the new firm in excess of the number permitted by 
law.439 This is done by looking at the relative market share of each firm and squaring the 
value of the market share to determine how much competition exists in a particular 
industry.440 
Competition for rules can be a basic measure of determining preference 
revelation. As discussed in subsequent chapters, market participation across different 
supranational markets of international relations can vary. Consequently, these changes 
can give rise to different ways in which rules of jurisdiction are supplied to the 
supranational market. Moreover, market participation also is indicative of what States 
value in particular supranational markets, those rules supplied, and rules consumed in any 
given supranational market because different States will seek to satisfy their valued 
preferences in different ways, which may not include the consumption of most or many 
rules already supplied or consumed by other States based on the source of the rule(s) in 
question. Hence, a Herfindahl index can be a useful tool to analyze to what extent States 
                                                 
438 See supra note 36. 
439 Id. See, .e.g., United States Department of Justice, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, WWW.JUSTICE.GOV, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
440 Id. 
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compete for the supply and consumption of rules within any given supranational markets 
of international relations.  
The use of a Herfindahl index is adapted here where States take the form of the 
traditional firm and pool of market participants by which competition among them is 
measured. To date, the total population of the international System of States that are 
members of the UN is N=193 States. As a function of sovereign equality, each State has 
the same market share of the supranational market of international relations  
In relation to rules supplied as a matter of international custom, market shares in 
the supranational market may be calculated by looking at the ratio of each individual UN 
member State in relation to the total number of States in the UN. Today, for example, a 
State has a market share of  
1
𝑁
∗  100 =
1
193
∗  100 = 0.52%.441 An individual value 
below 25% market share is considered a competitive market.442 Therefore, the 
supranational market of international relations is a highly competitive market because 
any given State has a market share quantified to 0.52% relative to other States, which 
enables States to supply any rules to the supranational market as a function of State 
practice.  
 In relation to rules supplied as a matter of international agreements, market shares 
in the supranational market may be calculated by looking at the ratio of members States 
of COPUOS in relation to the number of States that have consumed the space treaties 
analyzed at any given time. This measure provides a sense to which States may seek 
                                                 
441 This measure will vary in time and therefore the market share concentration of States will fluctuate over 
time providing a relative sense of the degree of market participation, rule supply, and rule consumption. 
442 See supra note 36. See also supra note 439. 
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participation in a particular supranational market and the extent to which States clearly 
have an interest in rule development for activities in the outer space environment.  
Furthermore, market shares may be analyzed in relation to the number of member 
States of COPUOS and all members of the United Nations. Where generally States have 
an equal market share in the supranational market of international relations for rules of 
international custom, the measure of the share of market concentration within COPUOS 




∗  100 =
1
83
∗  100 = 1.25%.443 COPUOS market shares are significantly 
greater than the general share of market concentration that States have with respect to 
rules of international custom. Thus, COPUOS member States have greater market power 
relative to non-member States – a factor of almost two and half times greater.444  
 In relation to rules supplied as a matter of national law, market shares in the 
supranational market of international relations may be calculated by looking at the 
number of States that have published or promulgated a national (space) law. This 
provides a measure of how States supply rules to the supranational market and provides 
an indication of their valued preferences. For example, today, in terms of rule supply, of 
the twenty-nine (29) States sampled, each State has an individual market share in the 




∗  100 =
1
39
∗  100 = 2.56%. Furthermore, this measure provides a sense of 
individual market participation for rule supply that may be compared to participation in 
other supranational markets of international relations. 
                                                 
443 This measure will vary in time and therefore the market share concentration of States will fluctuate over 
time providing a relative sense of the degree of market participation, rule supply, and rule consumption. 
444 While I do not provide an in depth analysis of this issue, I leave it for future work. 
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 Graph 8 below represents the supranational markets of international relations with 
respect to each source of rules of public international law studied in this thesis. Each 
market provides different risks, benefits, and costs to States and therefore give a sense of 
how States seek to be involved in supranational markets for rule development, rule 
supply, and rule consumption. As the graph seems to show, while the number of States in 
the international system continues to grow, market participation has only recently begun 
to increase, in the last fifteen to twenty years, where market participation was previously 
relatively flat. This seems to indicate that States have started to value the need to enter 
the supranational market of international relations for the outer space environment. 
Whether a State consume rules supplied once it enters a supranational market is a 













































THE EXISTENCE OF RULES FOR THE OUTER SPACE ENVIRONMENT 
a. Introduction 
 
Chapter III analyzes the initial rule formation for the outer space environment, 
which arose from the State practice of launching objects over the territories of other 
States. This chapter begins with a brief historical analysis of the supranational market of 
international relations for launching of objects into outer space that establishes the 
variables of study for the game theory approach to initial rule formation for the outer 
space environment. Game theory is applied as a means to assess the potential outcomes 
for initial rule formation that could have arisen from the Sputnik and Explorer launches 
and those solutions sets are analyzed against the observed historical outcomes. 
As a product of the Cold War, the programs to develop launch vehicle technology 
in the Soviet Union and the US had different meanings to each State.445 While the 
proliferation of dual-use launch vehicle technology spread among States throughout the 
1950’s, generally in the form of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, only two States had 
the capabilities, capacity, and resources to develop programs that could develop 
technology that would enable the launching of objects beyond the Earth’s atmosphere.446 
                                                 
445 See supra note 17. 
446 Id.  
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Consequently, the legal aspects of these motivations did not go unnoticed and there was 
some doubt initially as to the legal validity of launching objects over the territories of 
other States.447  
Irrespective of the possible legal concerns of the time, States were aware that this 
new technological capability would likely require interested States to enter the 
supranational market of international relations to ensure that the preference of continued 
use of launching objects into outer space environment remained a viable preference.448 
To this end, States were and are willing to trade in State sovereignty in the form of rules 
of prescriptive jurisdiction over activities involving the launch of objects over the 
territories of States into the outer space environment. Consequently, various 
supranational markets of international relations arose for rules relating to the outer space 
environment as a function of State practice. 
However, the source of these rules may be observed in the valued preferences 
materialized as State practice, which equates to both the supply and pricing of rules. The 
consumption of rules over time can lead to a variety of outcomes whether or not a State 
supplies, sells, or buys rules of prescriptive jurisdiction. In particular, as a function of the 
evolution of individual or collective valued preferences of a State(s), the potential 
outcomes of rule supply can take several forms, e.g., proposed rules may never be 
consumed (i.e., no buyers), supplied rules may converge into rules of law (i.e. market 
transition from the consumption of rules), markets may cease to produce rules (i.e., 
                                                 
447 See supra note 163. See also supra note 141.  
448 See ASIF A. SIDDIQI, RECONSIDERING SPUTNIK: FORTY YEARS SINCE THE SOVIET SATELLITE 43 (John M. 
Logsdon & Robert W. Smith ed., Harwood Academic Publ’rs 2000) [hereinafter SIDDIQI], available at 
http://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/siddiqi.html. See also supra note 141. 
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possible market failure), or rules and rules of law may converge as a function of rule 
consumption across supranational markets (i.e., possible obligatory convergence). 
In each case, initial rules that may converge into rules of law are the product of 
State practice. State practice is the basic measure of how rules arise, develop, and evolve 
over time. Therefore, with respect to initial rule formation, the genesis of all rules studied 
in this thesis started with the State practice of launching objects into the outer space 
environment over the territories of other States with the launching of the Sputnik and 
Explorer objects. 
 
b. From Proto-Market Signaling to Market Creation: Initial Development of 
Supranational Markets for the Outer Space Environment 
 
The preference to launch objects over the territories of States into and through the 
outer space environment arose at a time when two clear hegemonic States competed in 
the domain of international politics.449 Thus, the supranational market of international 
relations over initial activities in the outer space environment consisted of two States, 
which may be termed a duopoly, i.e., a market consisting of only two suppliers of rules. 
Each State had a market share equal to its capabilities starting at a particular time. For 
example, when Sputnik I launched on October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union had a monopoly 
on the supply of rules for the outer space environment because it had the capabilities to 
define such rules.450 As the Soviet Union was the only State with the necessary 
capabilities of spaceflight at the time, it controlled the market in terms of supply of 
                                                 
449 See supra note 17. 
450 Id. 
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rules.451 Consequently, the price and supply of rules of prescriptive jurisdiction over these 
types of activities was initially set by the Soviet Union. All other States in the 
international system would remain buyers of rules of jurisdiction until such time as they 
developed the same preferences and capabilities to compete in the supranational market 
of international relations.452 
On January 31, 1958, the United States entered the supranational market of 
international relations when it launched Explorer I into the outer space environment.453 
Starting at this time, the United States had an equal share in the development of rules 
(e.g., through initial supply of rules and technological capabilities) for the outer space 
environment. Because the United States had an equal share of the supply of rules of 
jurisdiction with the Soviet Union, each State had to compete with each other and use 
diplomacy and other means to attract buyers of rules of jurisdiction for activities that 
could occur in the outer space environment. Without other buyers in the market, the 
market would turn into a duopsony, i.e., a market which consists of only two buyers. 
Since rules of jurisdiction are considered purely substitute goods in the supranational 
market of international relations, the United States and Soviet Union were initially left to 
figure out who supplies and buys which rules of jurisdiction over what types of 
activities.454 However, the fact that a competition for rules of jurisdiction arose from the 
                                                 
451 Id. 
452 Thus, market entrance is a function of a State’s valued preferences in relation to particular supranational 
markets for rules and rules of law for the outer space environment. 
453 See supra note 17. 
454 If both States had been the only two buyers and suppliers of rules of jurisdiction, each would be left to 
develop rules between each other with no other possible buyers. If these two States were the only State’s 
that existed at the time, it would have been an interesting observation because it would put into question the 
structure of international political alignments at the time. 
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“space race” and this competition resulted from the hierarchical alignments between the 
hegemons necessarily increased the value of such rules rather quickly.455 
Generally, where no international forum exists, State practice represents the 
supply of rules to the supranational market of international relations. State practice is the 
physical manifestation of a State’s valued preferences. As such, when States conduct 
activities or preform actions outside their territories, they are subject to a variety of risks 
and costs to their authority. In order to manage these risks in relation to the activities of 
other States, States may seek to sell rules of prescriptive jurisdiction in the form of their 
State practice. While not every State practice may constitute a supply of possible rules, 
e.g., when States give notice that their respective practice is not conducted or followed 
out of a legal obligation,456 State practice nevertheless does supply rules. The question is 
how does an observer measure the formation and development of such rules? 
The next section describes the historical events that helped catalyze the launching 









                                                 
455 See supra note 17. See also LAKE supra note 9. 
456 See BROWNLIE supra note 4. 
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c. The Historical Bases for the Valued Preferences of the United States and the  
Soviet Union that Catalyzed Initial Rule Development for the Outer Space  
Environment457 
 
Scholars of space history have termed the date October 4, 1957, as the date on 
which the “space race” between the United States and the Soviet Union began.458 
However, the date also signifies another major moment, i.e., the initial State practice of 
launching and orbiting a space object over the sovereign territories of other States.459 In 
other words, the creation of the first rule regarding the activities and conduct of States in 
outer space. The establishment of this initial rule laid the foundation for subsequent rules 
regarding the outer space environment. But what were the specific catalyzing events that 
precipitated the development and formation of the initial rules for the outer space 
environment? From where did the valued preferences to launch objects derive and how 
did it manifest into State practice? 
This section summarizes the historical and necessary variables that helped 
catalyze the initial launching of objects into the outer space environment. Three critical 
variables are identified that represent catalysts for the launch of the Sputnik and Explorer 
objects. The first variable is the necessary technological development and utilization of 
rockets and payloads. This variable is implicit to the following analysis because it is 
common to both the US and the Soviet Union, but nonetheless a necessary element to 
                                                 
457 See Christopher M. Hearsey, A Historical Analysis of the Administrative Origins of NASA (Jan. 17, 
2011) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1742163. This section is adapted from unpublished 
work based on research while a Graduate Fellow at the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum in 
2008. 
458 See supra note 17. 
459 Id. 
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enter the supranational market for international relations relating to outer space activities. 
The second variable is the supply of a set of rules of jurisdiction for an Open Skies Treaty 
on the supranational market of international relations.460 This variable influenced the 
development of a preference to launch objects into outer space over the territories of 
States because the US and the Soviet Union could not converge on a price for negotiating 
rules for an Open Skies Treaty. In other words, the supranational market never produced 
a rule either State would be willing to buy. The third variable relates to the acceptance of 
the informal obligations arising from the goal of the International Geophysical Year of 
1957-58 (IGY).461 This variable represents the valued preference of seeking to purchase 
the authority to launch and orbit objects over the territories of States into the outer space 
environment pursuant to an international scientific project. Thus, the Open Skies Treaty 
and the IGY are linked because the valued preferences manifested simultaneously in time 
and form the basis of the stratagems and their constraints to the valued preferences of the 
US and Soviet Union. 
 
i. Origins of the Structure of the Supranational Market of International Relations 
Relating to Outer Space Activities 
 
Before the surrender of the Axis powers during World War II, President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt began advocating for and sought the drafting of two major new multilateral 
treaties. The first new multi-lateral treaty would establish the framework and legal 
structures for a post-War international civil aviation authority.462 Although signed onto in 
                                                 
460 Id. 
461 Id. 
462 See Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature Dec. 7, 1944, 15 U.N.T.S. 295. 
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1944 by fifty-two States, the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation did not 
go into force until 1947.463 The second multilateral treaty would replace the League of 
Nations464  with an international organization built to minimize international conflict and 
increase dialogue between States in order to prevent another World War.465 Even before 
the Empire of Japan had formally surrendered to Allied Forces, the victors of World War 
II finalized and signed the Charter of the United Nations.466 This new Charter 
significantly changed many fundamental relationships at the international level including, 
inter alia, the institution of new legal rules and governing structures.467 These two new 
multilateral treaties would reshape international relations and legal relationships and 
provide a backdrop to the birth of rules for the outer space environment. 
 The Chicago Convention is considered a major accomplishment of post-War 
international governance.468 As the basis for the regulation of international civil air travel, 
the Chicago Convention imported several well regarded rules of public international law. 
In particular, article I of the Convention states that “[t]he contracting States recognize 
that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its 
territory.”469 (Emphasis added). Moreover, despite several attempts to reach the upper 
atmosphere and the edge of outer space before October 1957, States still generally 
accepted that their sovereignty over their airspace was exclusive.470 However, the issue of 
                                                 
463 Id. 
464 See The Covenant of the League of Nations, opened for signature Jun. 28, 1919, 13 AM. J. INT’L L. 
SUPP. 128 (1919), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp.  
465 U.N. Charter. 
466 Id. 
467 See BROWNLIE supra note 17. 
468 See I.H.PH DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR &PABLO MENDES DE LEON, AN INTRODUCTION TO AIR LAW (Kluwer 
2012). 
469 See supra note 462. 
470 See supra note 17. 
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the delimitation of the airspace environment from the outer space environment did arise 
in discourse prior to October 1957 and continues to this day.471  
 The delimitation issue illustrates the effects of rule-making based on shifting 
valued preferences with respect to State practice, including the evolution of rules of 
public international law in relation to the boundary between the airspace and outer space 
environments. The fact that States have not consumed many rules of airspace delimitation 
implies that the price of these rules so far supplied do not satisfy the valued preferences 
of many States. Interestingly, despite the lack of supply or consumption of delimitation 
rules, this trend has not stopped the proliferation of outer space activities and the 
attendant rules generated by such activities. As the discussion in the following section 
presents, valued preferences are subject to change and change can manifest over a 
nominally long period of time.  
 
ii. The Formation of Valued Preferences to Launch into and Orbit Objects in the Outer 
Space Environment Over the Territories of States472 
 
One form of a valued preference manifests through a State’s foreign policy. 
Generally, a State’s foreign policy tends to be complicated, varied, and subject to change. 
Changes in and to the international system of States may force a State to revalue, replace, 
and/or innovate its valued preferences as a function of their foreign policies. For 
example, in the US, the doctrine of using science and technology as a means to achieve 
                                                 
471 Since the delimitation of the airspace environment from the outer space environment still has not 
produced a rule that has been significantly consumed by States, it does not arise as an initial rule of space 
law. See supra note 16 & 163. 
472 See supra note 457. 
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foreign policy goals began in the Truman Administration.473 Two principle proponents of 
this doctrine were Lloyd Berkner and James Webb.  
In April 1950, Berkner wrote a report for the State Department titled “Science and 
Foreign Relations.”474 In the report, Berkner “describe[ed] the nature and significance of 
basic problems in international relations raised by scientific and technical 
developments.”475 In a secret supplement to the report, Allan Needell notes that “Berkner 
… emphasized the usefulness for intelligence gathering from increased international 
contacts by American scientists.”476 Berkner believed that “[s]cience and national interest 
were both powerful motivations… [a]nd since they reinforced each other, it [was] 
difficult to rank them.”477 Webb was instrumental in trying to implement Berkner’s 
recommendations due to Webb’s seniority at the State Department.478 
On April 5, 1950, the same month in which Berkner finished his “Science and 
Foreign Relations” report, Berkner was invited to a dinner party at the home of James van 
Allen in Silver Spring, Maryland.479 Several historians have noted that during dinner 
Berkner reportedly proposed that the “world's scientists organize a third international 
polar year to take place during the period of maximum solar activity expected during 
1957 and 1958.”480 The outcome of the van Allen dinner ultimately resulted in the 
                                                 
473 See ALLAN A. NEEDELL, SCIENCE, COLD WAR AND THE AMERICAN STATE: LLOYD V. BERKNER AND THE 
BALANCE OF PROFESSIONAL IDEALS 297-98 (Hardwood Academic Publ’rs, 2000). 
474 See Lloyd Berkner, Science and Foreign Relations: Berkner’s Report to the U.S. Department of State, 
BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 293 (1950). 
475 HENRY W. LAMBRIGHT, POWERING APOLLO: JAMES E. WEBB OF NASA 63 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 
1995). 
476 Supra note 473, at 297-99. 
477 JOHN E. NAUGLE, FIRST AMONG EQUALS: THE SELECTION OF NASA SPACE SCIENCE EXPERIMENTS 
(NASA SP-4215 1991). 
478 The report itself strongly demonstrates Webb and Berkner’s shared attitude toward government-funded 
science and its relationship to foreign policy. 
479 See supra note 473, at 297-99. 
480 Supra note 477. 
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creation of the International Geophysical Year (IGY), which in seven years would result 
in the launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik I.481 
For two years, Berkner worked on organizing an IGY with the help of Sydney 
Chapman, another van Allen dinner guest. In October 1952, the International Council of 
Scientific Unions (ICSU) approved the idea and created the Comité Spécial de l'Année 
Geophysique Internationale (CSAGI) to plan the IGY.482 Chapman was elected president 
and Berkner vice-president by members of the CSAGI. Chapman and Berkner then 
lobbied Detlev Bronk, President of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and the 
National Research Council for help in organizing US participation in the IGY. On 
February 10, 1953, the United States National Committee for the IGY (USNC-IGY) was 
created and Joseph Kaplan was appointed as its Chair.483 A year later, “members of 
CSAGI recognized the possibility of using … ballistic missiles to place satellites in 
orbit.”484 On October 4, 1954, CSAGI sent letters to President Eisenhower and Soviet 
Premier Bulganin asking them to participate in the IGY by “plac[ing] small scientific 
spacecraft in orbit [with their ballistic missiles] to measure solar radiation and its effect 
on the upper atmosphere.”485 On July 29, 1955, the United States agreed to the CSAGI 
                                                 
481 See DONALD T. ROTUNDA, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE 
ACT OF 1958 21-22 (NASA HHN-125 Sept. 1972) [hereinafter ROTUNDA]. Donald Rotunda and other 
historians claim that the IGY idea was conceived by Lloyd Berkner, while John Naugle claims that the IGY 
idea originated from Berkner’s wife Abbie. Compare supra note 473, at 299, with supra note 477, at 
Chapter I, and ROTUNDA, at 4. No matter who suggested it first, it “set off,” as Naugle notes, “a chain of 
events that helped to create NASA.” Supra note 477, at Chapter I.  





request to place a small scientific satellite into orbit with an American missile for the 
IGY.486 
However, the Soviet Union’s participation in the IGY was far from clear at the 
time. Although Soviet representatives served on the CSAGI, their contributions to the 
proceedings were insignificant.487 As Siddiqi notes “the May 1954 deadline for 
submissions for participation in the IGY passed without any word from Soviet 
authorities.”488 Moreover, on October 4, 1954, Soviet representatives watched silently as 
the CSAGI adopted the US’s plan for the IGY.489 However, US agenda setting at the 
CSAGI surprised the Soviets and they subsequently moved to organize an internal 
Commission that would determine the plan for contributing to the IGY.490  
Although the CSAGI was successful in securing government support of satellite 
launches, the idea of using satellites for science did not originate with the CSAGI. Naugle 
notes that “even before the formation of CSAGI, the members of the Upper Atmosphere 
Rocket Research Panel [UARRP] had recognized that sounding rockets could play an 
important role in the IGY.”491 Moreover, the UARRP members were well aware of an 
earlier report on the subject of Earth satellites, first brought up in 1945 by the Navy’s 
Bureau of Aeronautics.492 The Bureau created a Committee for Evaluating the Feasibility 
of Space Rocketry (CEFSR). The CEFSR published their study in 1946 recommending 
that the Joint Research and Development Board should attempt to place a small satellite 
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in Earth orbit. The proposal was later rejected by the DOD for having an “insufficient 
military requirement.”493 Later, in April 1947, the Air Force’s Project RAND published a 
study on the feasibility of launching satellites with sounding rockets. The RAND study 
served as the basis for the military services’ development of their own rocket programs, 
which eventually led to the formation of the UARRP in 1946. Richard Hirsch and Joseph 
Trento note that James van Allen “proposed an Earth satellite experiment at the 1948 
meeting of the International Union of Geodesy and Geophysics.”494 However, van 
Allen’s early call for science satellites went nowhere due to the conservative mindedness 
of academe in the US at the time. 
By early 1950, scientists in government could not find support within the military 
for launching satellites. Scientists outside of government did not have the funding or 
facilities to build rockets nor did they have access to the rockets being developed by the 
US military in an effort to deter the Soviets from attacking the US. A shift in science 
policy occurred in 1954 when Eisenhower issued an Executive Order “declar[ing] … that 
the NSF should … be responsible for all federally funded basic research, while other 
agencies [must] stick to applied research related to their missions.”495 As a consequence, 
the “executive order … reduc[ed] D[O]D and AEC support for pure science, while the 
NSF lacked the funds to take up the slack[.]”496 In response, NSF Director “Alan 
Waterman protested, styling his appeal to the White House as a program for 
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“Maintenance of Technological Superiority.””497 Waterman’s protest was ignored at the 
fiscally conservative White House.  
The funding issue came to a head in July 1957 when scientist I.I. Rabi and the 
Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) Science Committee reported to the White House 
that  
 
the welfare of the U.S., incomparably more than at any other time in its 
history[,] [was] dependent on new scientific knowledge for the welfare of 
its people, for the advancement of its economy, and for its military 
strength…Research is a requisite for survival.498  
 
I.I. Rabi pleaded with the Eisenhower Administration, arguing that “government could 
encourage private investment in R & D, perhaps through tax policy, but [acknowledged 
that] the time had passed when national needs could be met from private sources.”499 
McDougall notes that this was a sudden change and that “[a]fter 1945, scientists advised 
Truman that even military related research ought to be directed and funded by a civilian 
agency . . .and [by] 1957, scientists advised Eisenhower that even civilian basic research 
ought to be sponsored by the military[.]”500 By the mid-1950’s, obstacles to increased 
science funding were already reaching critical mass. Coincidently, satellites were seen as 
feasible means of conducting science in space, and the US military services were 
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developing ballistic missiles with sufficient thrust to place a satellite into orbit around the 
Earth.  
When Eisenhower was elected President, he brought with him not only a fiscally 
conservative attitude toward government, but also a real fear of Soviet aggression. 
President Eisenhower was very concerned about a surprise attack from the Soviets and 
wanted better surveillance of Soviet movements and installations.501 On July 26, 1954, 
the President ordered the creation of a panel of scientists to advise him on the state of US 
technology and offer recommendations for national defense. James Doolittle, James 
Killian, and several other prominent scientists formed the Technological Capabilities 
Committee (TCP). In February 1955, the TCP “recommended accelerating procurement 
of intercontinental ballistic missiles … [and] a program to develop a small scientific 
satellite that would operate at extreme altitudes above national airspace.”502 The satellite 
recommendation was based upon a RAND follow-up study from 1954 on the technical 
feasibility of satellites for military observations.503 The first RAND study in 1947 was 
initially dismissed by the military before it was widely understood that a satellite could 
provide intelligence on the Soviet Union. However, as Hall notes, “James Killian, who 
chaired the TCP, viewed RAND’s … propos[al] [for a] military observation satellite as a 
“peripheral project” and … refus[ed] to support it until the Soviets launched Sputnik I 
nearly three years later.”504 Even without Killian's support, what later came to be known 
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as Operation Feed Back marked the beginning of the covert US satellite reconnaissance 
program, which represented first US military satellite program..505  
It is not entirely clear who among the USNC-IGY knew of Operation Feed Back 
or, if they did know, when they knew it. Historians have not thoroughly explored this 
issue. Needell notes that there is no evidence of Berkner’s involvement in the 1954 
RAND study or the TCP.506 Berkner’s previous clashes with the Air Force and RAND 
would have made it unlikely that he was consulted. However, there is some evidence 
Berkner was briefed on the RAND study prior to leaving for Europe for CSAGI 
meetings.507 Needell claims that “[t]he case is much stronger, although still 
circumstantial, that Berkner would have been familiar with the deliberations of the 
TCP.”508 Needell writes that at the January 7, 1955, USNC Executive Committee 
meeting, Berkner suggested that the recently enlarged USNC Panel on Rocketry meet in 
closed session to “study [the] proposal of launching [an] artificial satellite during or near 
the IGY.”509 Moreover, Needell points out that the committee members were willing to 
act secretly to make the satellite launch happen even if the answer was no from the 
Eisenhower Administration.510 
Following the closed meeting, the USNC-IGY Executive Committee met on 
January 22, 1955, to form a special group to report on technical feasibility of satellites. 
The Executive Committee named it the Long Playing Rocket (LPR) Committee, chaired 
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by Fred Whipple. During the LPR meeting, “[Athelstan] Spilhaus recommended that the 
USNC accept the task of building a completely unclassified instrument “head” section, 
which could be turned over to the military for launch on a rocket.”511 Needell notes that 
Merle Tuve objected to the idea. Needell writes that “[g]iven the origins of the project 
and the degree of collateral interest, [Tuve] thought the entire project should be 
undertaken by the military.”512 In response, Whipple “asserted, without elaboration, that 
the IGY association was necessary to “ease permission to go over other countries.””513  
With the satellite proposal finally adopted by the CSAGI in early 1955, USNC-
IGY members started to solicit the Eisenhower Administration for support. NSF Director 
Alan Waterman approached Secretaries Donald Quarles and Allen Dulles, of the Defense 
and State Departments, respectively, as well as Richard Bissell of the CIA regarding how 
to go about selling the IGY satellite proposal. Quarles, Dulles, and Bissell suggested 
obtaining high-level endorsements, which Waterman did. At this time, the DOD was 
reviewing Killian’s TCP report and Dulles agreed to bring the matter to the NSC’s 
Operations Coordinating Board.514 
While Waterman was soliciting support, so too was Berkner. Berkner was asked 
to a meeting on March 22, 1955, with Detlev Bronk and Robert Murphy at the State 
Department to discuss the satellite proposal. In late April, Murphy wrote a letter to 
Berkner giving him the go ahead from the State Department to proceed. Murphy’s letter 
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noted that “if successful, it would, as a matter of fact, undoubtedly add to the scientific 
prestige of the United States, and it would have a considerable propaganda value in the 
cold war.”515 
As the Eisenhower Administration figured out how to implement the TCP 
recommendations, the IGY Executive Committee presented its own proposal for the US 
government to launch a scientific satellite in support of the IGY’s goals. The proposal 
was approved by the NAS, which would organize the effort, while the NSF would fund 
the program. In tandem with the IGY proposal, the TCP panel’s recommendation, and the 
need for better intelligence of the Soviet Union, the National Security Council drafted 
NSC 5520, “which stated that the United States should develop small scientific satellite 
weighing 5 to 10 pounds.”516 The report also urged the development of large 
reconnaissance satellites, but only after a scientific satellite launch had established the 
principle of “freedom of space.”517 
Eisenhower and his national security advisors had been looking for ways to 
penetrate the Soviet Union. At first, US intelligence agencies attempted to float high 
altitude balloons across the Soviet Union, but this was not very reliable since the balloons 
could not be controlled remotely.518 It was ultimately decided that satellites would be the 
best means to keep constant surveillance on the Soviet Union, but the earliest a 
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reconnaissance satellite would be available would be 1958.519 Moreover, it was quickly 
realized that a covert satellite program could potentially violate international law.520 As a 
way of dealing with a potential violation of international law, Eisenhower’s national 
security strategy required that the principle of “freedom of space” be considered instant 
customary international law.521 Hence, the Eisenhower Administration deemed it critical 
that the US start a civilian operation to launch the first successful scientific satellite into 
outer space so as to be able to later argue that it is permissible to launch covert satellites 
into orbit.522 
On May 27, 1955, Eisenhower approved NSC 5520, authorizing the US to launch 
a scientific satellite, but stressed that the satellite proposals would only go forward as 
long as they did not interfere with the development of ballistic missiles.523 Deputy 
Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles then instructed the Committee on Special 
Capabilities to review the satellite proposals of the Navy, Army, and Air Force.524 On 
July 29, 1955, the U.S. formally announced to the world that it would launch a small 
scientific satellite as part of the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58.525 Later, in 
November 1956, Quarles made it known to the other branches that in no way would a 
military satellite precede a scientific one.526 
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On July 21, 1955, over a week before the US announced its participation in the 
IGY, President Eisenhower approached the Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin with the 
idea of an “Open Skies Treaty” at a summer conference in Geneva, Switzerland.527 At the 
time, the treaty would have called for the United States and the Soviet Union to exchange 
maps denoting military installations in their respective States and then authorize 
overflights of each State by the other States’ personnel.528 Immediately, Soviet Secretary 
General Nikita Khrushchev instructed Bulganin to reject the Open Skies Treaty because 
of Cold War concerns driven largely by the fact that the Soviet Union lagged behind in 
military capabilities and wanted to hide that fact from the United States.529 Ironically, the 
repeated overtures to Premier Bulganin to negotiate an Open Skies Treaty ended in 
failure precisely because the Soviet Union did not value overflights of its sovereign 
territory without permission. The launch of Sputnik I undercut the Soviet position and 
Eisenhower was free to move forward with developing a foreign policy that would 
include both military and civilian components.530 
The announcement by the US that it would seek to launch “small Earth-circling 
satellites” for the IGY set the Soviet Union into action.531 The first clear indication of 
Soviet IGY participation occurred following a US announcement regarding the IGY on 
August 2, 1955, in which Leonid I. Sedov told journalists “In my opinion, it will be 
possible to launch an artificial Earth satellite within the next two years,” and adding 
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“[t]he realization of the Soviet project can be expected in the near future.”532 
Coincidently, on July 16, 1955, Soviet Chief Designer Sergei P. Korolev finished his co-
authored study on arguments for the design of an object to launch on the R-7 launch 
vehicle.533 Korolev’s most provocative argument was that “the creation of [a satellite] 
would have enormous political significance as evidence of the high development level of 
our country’s technology.”534 Oddly enough, Soviet officials were initially tepid to the 
idea of launching a satellite on the R-7 launch vehicle as well as the political benefit 
argument.535 However, on August 30, 1955, Korolev won over Sputnik Committee 
Chairman Vasily Ryabikov, who approved the use of the R-7 for a modest satellite 
program.536  
Several reasons have been put forth as for why the Soviets decided to participate 
in the IGY. For one, it is speculated that the deliberations may have turned on the 
possibility of using satellites for military purposes.537 However, what is clear is that once 
the Soviet leadership approved Korolev’s plans for the IGY, Korolev, spurned by the US 
announcement in July 1955, moved to finish the satellite and set the launch date before 
the official start of the IGY in order to achieve the political victory of demonstrating 
Soviet technological superiority before the US could launch.538  
On October 4, 1957, less than three months after the official start of the IGY, 
Korolev’s team successfully launched “object-D” (later named Sputnik I) into orbit.539 










Months later, in January 1958, the US successfully launched its Explorer I object under 
project Vanguard.540 These two launches set in motion the “space race” where the US and 
the Soviet Union battled for “space firsts” in a bid to demonstrate technological and 
scientific superiority. Although the Soviets met their foreign policy objectives with the 
launch of Sputnik I and II, the Soviets also engaged in the first clear State practice of 
launching objects over the territories of sovereign States. Without objection from other 
States, the State practice of launching objects over the territories of sovereign States 
slowly proliferated among the international system of States, but States generally 
supported the State practice. As discussed in Chapter IV, support for this State practice 
quickly spread as States began to value space activities as part of their valued 
preferences.  
 In the next section, game theory is applied to the two main events that necessarily 
facilitated the development of the initial rule formation for the outer space environment. 
In particular, the rejection of rules with respect to mutually consented overflights of the 
US and Soviet Union and participation in the launching of objects into the outer space 
environment for the international scientific program the IGY. These two events helped 
define the valued preferences of the US and Soviet Union as well as defined the possible 
strategic outcome for developing a rule of State practice that permits States to launch 
objects over the territories of sovereign States. These events are modelled as iterative 
games to demonstrate how rules based on State practice arise from the strategic positions 
of the United States and Soviet Union. 
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d. Game Theory Model of Initial Rule Development 
 
As previously mentioned, preference revelation may be measured by looking at 
the strategic choices of the players in a game. Initial rule formation is the product of 
progenitor events that manifest in the form of State practice. State practice can take the 
form of cooperation or defection from rule formation and supply. The strategic outcomes 
of State practice may be modeled from history and relative payoffs constructed based on 
the relationship between outcomes for each potential action a State might take. 
As Table 1541  above shows, the United States (US) and the Soviet Union (SU) 
have payoffs for each strategic choice for each game. With respect to the first game, if the 
US chooses to cooperate with the SU on the Open Skies Treaty (O), the US will earn a 
payoff of +1 because it has sought to maximize its valued preference of negotiating for 
overflight rules. If the US chooses to defect and not pursue the Open Skies Treaty (NO), 
then the US will earn a payoff of zero (0) because no change in circumstances occurred 
as a result of the strategic choice. Conversely, if the SU chooses to cooperate with the US 
on the Open Skies Treaty (O), then the SU will earn a payoff of -1 because the strategic 
choice would expose the military gaps between the two players and would cause 
significant strategic risks and costs. If the SU chooses to defect and not pursue an Open 
Skies Treaty (NO), then the SU will earn a payoff of 0 because no change in 
circumstances occurred as a result of the strategic choice.  
 With respect to the second game, if the US chooses to cooperate as a participant 
of the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (I), the US will earn a payoff of +1 
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because it has sought to maximize its valued preference of launching an object over the 
territories of other States for surveillance purposes. If the US chooses to defect and not 
pursue participation in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (NI), then the US 
will earn a payoff of -1 because it would create a detriment in the form of political and 
technological outcomes that do not satisfy its valued preference to launch an object over 
the territories of other States. Conversely, if the SU chooses to cooperate as a participant 
of the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (I), then the SU will earn a payoff of +1 
because it has sought to maximize its valued preference of launching an object over the 
territories of other States for surveillance purposes. If the SU chooses to defect and not 
pursue participation in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58 (NI), then the SU 
will earn a payoff of -1 because it would create a detriment in the form of political and 
technological outcomes that do not satisfy its valued preference to launch an object over 
the territories of other States. 
 From these strategies and payoff schema, there were only three paths to the initial 
rule formation of launching objects into the outer space environment. In this game, the 
historical record sets the values for the strategic outcomes, i.e., payoffs. As Figure 3542 
above illustrates, the US and SU played a sequential game, the payoffs of which have 
sixteen (16) possible outcomes. Of these sixteen (16) possible outcomes, two payoff 
strategies dominate for the game and three equilibria arise from three subgames. Table 
2543 above illustrates the total number of possible payoff outcomes. The two dominate 
strategies arising from this game are highlighted in rows (e) and (m). Both are a 
combination of three equilibria that represent the optimal payoffs for each player.  
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Table 3544 above divides the entire game into subgames. Given the possible 
choices, the US had two optimal strategies represented by (O, I) and (NO, I). The first 
strategy consists of the US agreeing to negotiate rules for the Open Skies Treaty and 
participating in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58. The second strategy 
consists of the US foregoing cooperating with the Soviet Union on the Open Skies 
Treaty, but agreeing to participate in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58. On 
the other hand, the Soviet Union had only one optimal strategy. This strategy consists of 
not cooperating in the negotiation for the Open Skies Treaty, while accepting to 
participate in the International Geophysical Year of 1957-58. 
The model of the game represented by Figure 3545 not only shows the optimal 
strategies, but also the suboptimal strategies. The suboptimal strategies did not arise 
because the strategic constraints placed on both States by their valued preferences could 
not have enabled those suboptimal outcomes. For example, if the US and the Soviet 
Union agreed to conclude and ratify and Open Skies Treaty as well as publically accepted 
the obligations of the goals of the IGY, this would have exposed the Soviet Union to 
costs associated with the gaps resulting in the military positions between both States. 
Thus, for each suboptimal strategy, there is a corresponding limitation built into their 
valued preferences that would not have enabled deviation without incurring significance 
risks and costs to both States. 
 Once the initial rules for launching objects into outer space was initiated from the 
maximization of the valued preferences of the US and Soviet Union, various 
supranational markets of international relations began to form. In particular, member 
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States of the UN would create a special committee to deal with the outer space 
environment and State interests in conducting activities in it. As discussed in the next 
chapter, this new supranational market enabled exchanges in information, trades in 
valued preferences, and development of rules of jurisdiction for the outer space 
environment. This evolution of State practice laid the foundation for subsequent rule 




Sergei Korolev’s R-7 rocket launched a tiny sphere originally known as “object 
D” designated Sputnik I into orbit around the Earth on October 4, 1957. The launch of 
Sputnik I began an iterative game of rule formation and development in a newly created 
supranational market of international relations for outer space activities. As a 
consequence, the supranational market enabled the establishment of order without (space) 
law through the supply of rules that States began to accept and consume. In other words, 
the space race enabled spontaneous coordination for mutual benefit between the US and 
the Soviet Union without imposition by a supra-State or other States. This coordination, 
while self-serving, helped establish the rules by which the United States, the Soviet 
Union, and all other participating States in outer space activities would play the “game” 
for exchanges in the supranational market of international relations. Despite the lack of 
certainty about what future activities could or will eventually occur throughout the outer 
space environment, States nevertheless started a process by which rules could be 








 On October 8, 1957, four days after the Soviet Union gave notice to States that it 
had launched an object into Earth orbit, Donald Quarles, US Deputy Secretary of Defense 
in the Eisenhower Administration, is reported to have commented in a meeting that “the 
Russians have . . . done us a good turn, unintentionally, in establishing the concept of 
freedom of international space.”546 As NSC 5520 had originally laid out, the Eisenhower 
Administration had the goal of getting greater surveillance of the Soviet Union and 
getting the concept of “freedom of international space” accepted by States without 
objection served that goal.547 To underscore this point, once Quarles made the comment, 
“The President then looked ahead . . . and asked about a reconnaissance [satellite] 
vehicle.”548 Whether or not States would accept the orbiting of objects over their territory 
was affirmed and this affirmation changed how States reacted to the first rule for the 
outer space environment. 
Chapter IV seeks to analyze two issues. First, how did States organize to develop 
and supply rules of jurisdiction for the outer space environment after initial rule 
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formation? Second, how did the evolution in the supply of rules of jurisdiction lead to 
changes in the definition, meaning, and scope of the term space object subsequent to 
initial rule formation? 
 
b. Market Participation, Rule Supply, and Market Transitions after October 1957 
 
The international system is the product of State practice. Since the conclusion of 
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the international system has undergone several 
transitions in the way States promote their interests and protect those interests in relation 
to the interests of other States.549 As noted previously, the most significant change to the 
international system arose from the Allied Powers preference to replace the League of 
Nations with a United Nations Charter. The relative stability of the UN governance 
structure has further changed how States interact with each other in a forum outside the 
usual embassy system.550  
As stated previously, the supranational market of international relations can take 
many forms. These forms must be a function of State sovereignty so that States have at 
least one commodity in which to trade on the supranational market of international 
relations. Therefore, any forum where rules of jurisdiction over State activities can be 
supplied and bought and sold is a supranational market of international relations. Where 
State practice forms the basis of possible rules of jurisdiction as a function of 
international custom, political institutions like the UN offer the ability to create 
supranational markets for which States can trade in value preferences and rules. For 
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example, while COPUOS is a UN committee, it is also a supranational market of 
international relations. While COPUOS does not promulgate rules of law like a 
legislature, it does provide a market mechanism by which to order the flow of 
information regarding valued preferences of States and for rules over outer space 
activities. Hence, growth in COPUOS membership provides a measure of market 
participation and concentration. 
Shortly after the launch of Sputnik I, several States called for the UN to 
investigate State activities in the outer space environment.551 Consequently, the UN 
General Assembly approved the creation of an ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space (COPUOS).552 The UN General Assembly, itself a supranational market of 
international relations for valued preferences and rules regarding outer space activities, 
created the ad hoc Committee on December 13, 1958, with eighteen (18) initial State 
members.553 By December 12, 1959, COPUOS grew to twenty-four (24) in membership 
and also became a permanent UN committee.554 Since 1959, membership in COPUOS 
has grown 71.1% to 83 State members.555 Graph 7 shows how the growth of membership 
in COPUOS has increased over time.556 The growth of so many member States in the 
committee clearly demonstrates significant investment for discussing valued preferences 
                                                 
551 See I.H. PH. DIEDERIKS-VERSCHOOR & V. KOPAL, AN INTRODUCTION TO SPACE LAW (Kluwer 2008). 
552 See G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1348 (Dec. 13, 1958). 
553 See EDMUND JAN OSMANCZYK, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL 
AGREEMENTS, VOL. 1, A-F 1708 (Anthony Mango ed., Routledge 2003). See also G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/1348 (Dec. 13, 1958). G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), U.N. Doc. A/4351 (Dec. 12, 1959).  
554 United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs, Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: 
Membership Evolution, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/members/evolution.html accessed 
Dec. 10, 2015. 
555 See Table 6 in Appendix.  
556 See Graph 7. 
169 
and rules for the outer space environment in a supranational market that has a barrier to 
entry the payment of which requires the votes of UN Member States.557  
An interesting consequence of the COPUOS market is that as the acceptance of 
States onto the committee increases, the risk of a committee veto from a member State 
also increases because of the consensus voting rules: more State members equals more 
chances for a veto.558 Thus the cost of coordinating consensus on any discussion of 
valued preferences and rules regarding the outer space environment also increases. The 
question thus is what is the likely upper bound of marginal benefit beyond which States 
no longer participate in the COPUOS market because the cost exceeds the benefit?  
A likely but probably coincidental bound may be gleaned from the curve 
OSTRATF in Graph 9 below. First, as the graph below shows, the COPUOS curve is 
higher and outpaces the RCRATF and NL (corr) curves. Thus, the growth in COPUOS 
membership outpaces the development of national space law and the last set of treaty 
based rules regarding space objects that has the lowest ratification rate of any other space 
treaty in the sample.559 Second, the COPUOS curve has a positive slope and is trending 
toward the OSTRATF curve. Since the Outer Space Treaty has the highest ratification 
rate of all the space treaties, the total number of States Parties (in relation to the total 
number of UN Member States) indicates the greatest number of States that have accepted 
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rules of jurisdiction regarding activities in outer space at each time interval. While it 
remains to be seen, predictably, as the total number of States to COPUOS increases and 
approaches the total number of States Parties to the Outer Space Treaty, the benefits of 
discussing valued preferences and rules regarding the outer space environment may 
marginally increase until the costs of achieving the goals of the COPUOS exceed the 
marginal benefits. At which point State members likely would turn to other means and 
forms of rule development to maximize their valued preferences regarding outer space 
activities.560 
 The rate at which States entered the supranational market of international 
relations for the outer space environment rapidly increased over the first two ten year 
intervals after the launch of Sputnik I. As observed in the data relating to rule 
development, a movement toward the development of rules arose under national law, 
treaty law, and international custom within the span of the first ten years from the launch 
of Sputnik I.561 However, the overall growth in the pool of potential buyers (i.e., States) 
significantly outpaced the growth of buyers for rules of jurisdiction over activities in the 
outer space environment. 
Graph 9 above shows where changes took place in the period from October 1957 
to October 1977. First, in October 1957 there were eighty-two (82) States in the 
international system. By October 1967, the international system had increased to one 
hundred and twenty-two (122) States. That is a 32.8% increase in the number of States in 
the international system. Between October 1957 and October 1967, twenty-eight (28) 
                                                 
560 This transition could be under way by means of increased rule development outside of COPUOS, 
including the increase in national space laws and through other international fora. 
561 See supra note 20. 
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States had signed and twenty (20) States had ratified the Outer Space Treaty, one State 
had promulgated a national space law, and most likely at least one rule of international 
custom arose.  Hence, relative to the total number of States in the international system, by 
October 1967, 23% of States intended to be bound by treaty rules, 16.4% of States 
consented to be bound by treaty rules, and 0.82% of States invested in a national space 
law; but 1.64% of States had engaged in sufficient State practice to be considered a rule 
under international custom to launch and orbit an object over the territories of other 
States for peaceful purposes.562 
Second, by October 1977 there were one hundred and forty nine (149) States in 
the international system. This represents an increase of 18.1% in the pool of potential 
supranational market participants. Corresponding along the same interval of time, 
seventy-six (76) States had ratified and twenty-eight (28) States had signed the Outer 
Space Treaty. That is an increase of 73% of ratifying and, no change in the number of 
signatory, States. Thus, the second ten (10) year interval measured the greatest growth of 
States consenting to be bound to a set of rules relating to the outer space environment.563 
Comparing the growth of the international system of States to the development of 
rules for the outer space environment, within the period of time where the activity in 
spaceflight was dominated by the space programs of US and Soviet Union, gives an 
indication of the market concentration.  In particular, interested States aligned with the 
US and the Soviet Union sought to consolidate interest in the supranational market 
through the UN General Assembly and bilaterally.564 Moreover, the UNGA created first 
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563 See Graph 9. 
564 See MANUAL supra note 104. 
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an ad hoc and then a permanent COPUOS.  From Sputnik to the Outer Space Treaty’s 
entry into force as a set of rules of public international law, membership in COPUOS 
grew 35.7%. By December 1977, COPUOS membership increased 40.4%. Thus, 
following twenty years after the launch of Sputnik I, membership in COPUOS grew 
61.7%. 
As these data indicate, in over twenty years membership in the UN grew 45%, 
COPUOS membership grew 61.7%, and ratifying and signatory States Parties of the 
Outer Space Treaty grew 100%. Furthermore, because the growth in UN membership 
lagged behind the growth of COPUOS membership and States Parties to the Outer Space 
Treaty, in the twenty years since the launch of Sputnik the greatest supranational market 
concentration was observed. 
 
c. Evolution of the Term Space Object in Rules of Jurisdiction for Activities in the Outer  
Space Environment 
 
To date, the definition, meaning, and scope of the term “space object” has 
undergone various transitions over time. When the Soviet Union launched their Sputnik 
(meaning “fellow-traveler”)565 objects and the United States subsequently followed suit 
with the launch of their Explorer objects, the nomenclature of the time termed these 
objects “artificial Earth satellites.”566 Today, objects launched into outer space have a 
variety of names depending on the context, but the most common term of art used is a 
shortened version of the old term, namely “satellite”. No matter the term of art used to 
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describe these objects, i.e., things without international legal personality,567 the focus of 
this thesis is on how any term used to describe a thing launched or intended to be 
launched by a State into outer space has evolved as a primary element of rules for the 
outer space environment. Over time, the content (i.e., the definition, meaning, and scope) 
of the term “space object” and its relation to rules became a legal definition with legal 
meaning and scope forming the foundation of much of the laws that govern the outer 
space environment. 
 
i. Scope of the Issues Investigated  
 
The theme of this thesis revolves around the term space object as it is used as a 
necessary element of rules and rules of law that apply to State activities within the outer 
space environment. The goal here is to define how the term “space object” and its 
associated terms of art have evolved over time into rules of law as well as how the term 
space object subsequently evolves in definition, meaning, and scope. 
The term “space object” and its associated terms of art are found today in rules of 
national law and the corpus of public international space law. As discussed in Chapter V, 
States have defined the term “space object” in their national laws in different ways. In 
order to understand the meaning and scope of the definition of the term “space object” 
under public international law, two issues must be addressed. The first issue is whether 
the way States have used and defined the term “space object” in their State municipal 
laws in conformity with the treaty definition demonstrates evolution in rule adoption into 
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national space laws. If States have implemented only the treaty definition into their 
national law, then States are subject to that specific definition. If States have not 
implemented the treaty definition but instead have redefined the meaning of space object, 
then a question arises as to how this difference might affect the scope and meaning of the 
treaty definition and the duties and obligations of States under general public 
international law. In other words, to what extent can we say that the use of the term 
“space object” in State municipal law expresses a general principle of law and thus 
provides a mechanism to address international space issues not already subject to treaty 
provisions? 
The second issue is whether States that use the term “space object” to form rules 
for the outer space environment that represent a general and consistent State practice and 
are performed with a sense of legal obligation, thereby extending the evolution of the 
term space object underlying such rules, potentially transcend the rule’s original use and 
application by States. If a rule composed of the term “space object” represents an 
international custom, then that rule’s content and obligation would supersede the content 
and obligation of a treaty rule because international custom would bind all States that 
have purchased the rule via State practice while the obligation of a treaty only binds those 
States Party to it.568 Moreover, if a rule depends on a specific meaning of the term “space 
object” and that term does not categorically represent a set of specific rules carved out by 
a particular source of rules, then its utility as an element of a rule may be inapplicable as 
a source of specific obligations because they are distinct obligations. As will be discussed 
in Chapter V, the way States have constructed the term “space object,” and have made 
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the term a necessary element of rules and rules of law for the outer space environment, 
arises relative to a particular source of rules. Thus, objects made in, used in, and launched 
or intended to be launched into outer space may be outside the scope of the terms original 
meaning and intent thereby necessitating further rule evolution. Thus, a resolution of both 
issues will determine the meaning and scope of the definition of space object and provide 
an objective standard with which to understand the meaning of the term “space object” 
under general public international law and thus demonstrates the point of rule evolution 
this thesis seeks to show.  
 Finally, while important, the study developed in Chapter V does not determine 
when the use of the term space object applies or what principles apply in what types of 
circumstances involving space objects. This study means only to clarify the meaning of 
space object in international law through a review of treaty acceptance, State practice, 
and national law definitions of space object as a function of rule evolution. 
 
ii. The Importance of this Study to the Development and Evolution of Space Law 
 
This section lays the foundation of the study conducted in Chapter V. This is 
important because it analyzes the extent to which States have complied with duties and 
obligations under each treaty that defines legal rules for space objects. Since the term 
space object arises in different treaties in different ways, a particular treaty limits the 
applicability of the term space object. This is important because not all States that have 
signed or ratified the Outer Space Treaty have also signed or ratified all the other space 
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treaties; however, some have signed one or more of the other space treaties and not the 
Outer Space Treaty.569 
To illustrate this point, let us consider some of the important rules that form some 
important duties and responsibilities of States Parties to the first four space treaties that 
relate specifically to the use of space objects. Under the Outer Space Treaty, space object 
implicates, inter alia, international liability and responsibility, jurisdiction and control, 
registration, and the prohibition on the placement of weapons of mass destruction into 
outer space.570 Under the Rescue and Return Agreement, inter alia, the treaty defines 
whether a State can request or send back a space object found in its territory, as well as 
the extent to which a State may be compensated for the effort. 571 Under the Liability 
Convention, inter alia, space object defines the extent to which a State can apply a theory 
of liability and specific proceedings in seeking compensation or restitution for damage 
caused by a space object to other objects in outer space, on the surface of the Earth, or 
aircraft in flight as a matter of treaty law.572 Finally, under the Registration Convention, 
inter alia, a State party must register its space objects in order to give notice to other 
States of its existence and provides a mechanism by which a State can assign nationality 
to a space object.573  
Thus, as a matter of public international law, the various treaty definitions and 
meanings of space object show specific application of rules under different treaties. 
Therefore, it becomes important to discover whether a broader meaning exists under 
                                                 
569 See Table 5 in Appendix. 
570 See Outer Space Treaty supra note 21, at arts IV, VII, VIII & X. 
571 See Rescue and Return Agreement supra note 21, at art. V. 
572 See Liability Convention supra note 21, at arts. II & III. 
573 See Registration Convention supra note 21, at arts. I, II, IV & V. 
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public international law, including under international custom and general principles of 
law. Changes over time to the application and characteristics of the term space object 
demonstrate rule evolution because the definition, meaning, and scope of the term space 
object represents a necessary element to particular rules that apply to various types of 
activities that the space treaties seek to regulate. Whether such rules are or become legal 
rules is a matter of how a State may purchase the obligation of the rule. 
“Space object” has a variety of meanings depending on its application in a 
particular context. Given the increase in the number of States operating in outer space, 
whether individually or multilaterally, what exactly constitutes a space object continues 
to evolve beyond what States contemplated beginning in the late 1950’s. Because the 
term “space object” represents a treaty term, only a State Party has purchased the 
obligation to follow provisions to which it is subject under a particular treaty.574 
Moreover, the term space object forms the keystone of the Outer Space Treaty, the 
Rescue and Return Agreement, the Liability Convention, and the Registration 
Convention because the term itself activates obligations, affects rights, as well as 
establishing duties under each specific space treaty and generally under public 
international law. Therefore, the evolution of much of space law is centered on the 
definition, meaning, and scope of the term space object over time. 
Additionally, this study is important because not every State Party to the Outer 
Space Treaty is a party to either the Liability or Registration Conventions – treaties that 
actually define space object in the exact same way.575 Most States have ratified the Outer 
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Space Treaty; however, some States that have ratified the Outer Space Treaty have not 
ratified either or both the Liability and Registration Conventions.576 Since only these two 
treaties specifically define space object, this study therefore seeks to find those common 
elements that give meaning to the term space object under general public international 
law and to eventually show how States have evolved the codification of the term in their 
national laws.577 
A discussion of the types of objects that could constitute a space object in 
scholarly writings abound. A review of literature written by international legal scholars 
shows that under the space treaties the term of “space object” can mean almost anything 
that a State can, at least, attempt to launch into outer space. This invites representative 
and tautological problems. The first problem, which may be termed the “ham sandwich 
problem,” indicates that anything launched into outer space, even a ham sandwich could 
be considered a space object. As stated, this example probably elicits an absurd reaction 
in the reader, yet when scholars speak of rocket fuel exhaust as representing an example 
of a space object, as such, strains the history of the meaning of the term space object.578 
Fortunately, State practice does not seem to have borne out these absurdities because 
States tends to constrain how the term is defined and used under their national (space) 
                                                 
576 See Tables 4 & 5 in Appendix. 
577 As no definition for space object existed prior to the Liability Convention, commentators drew 
inferences on the term’s meaning. Writing in 1969, Gal notes that the Outer Space Treaty employed the 
term space object as “a collective term . . . [used] to designate objects ‘launched into outer space’ (Article 7 
and 8), objects ‘placed into orbit around the Earth’ (Art. 4), or simply ‘launched’ (Art. 10).” GYULA GAL, 
SPACE LAW 207 (I. Mora trans., Oceana Publ’ns 1969) [hereinafter GAL]. Gal points out that the Outer 
Space Treaty did not define space object and that the definition in the Outer Space Treaty was developed 
vis-à-vis aircraft taken à rebours. Id.  
578 As discussed infra, the delegates to the Liability Convention discussed to some degree the scope of this 
problem. In particular, if rocket fuel exhaust could be considered a space object, then damaged caused to 
the surface of the Earth by the exhaust would subject a launching State to strict liability under the Liability 
Convention; something not contemplated by the drafters of the Liability Convention. 
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laws. Therefore, the study presented in Chapter V seeks to parse out those elements of the 
term space object that could represent a rule of international custom or a general principle 
of law within national legal systems demonstrating rule evolution. 
The second problem involves the “tautological problem.” This problem has two 
sides. On one hand, when exactly does a space object become a space object? On the 
other hand, when does a space object cease to be a space object? This problem arises 
partly because no legal definition has been accepted that delimits the sovereign airspace 
of States in public international law.579 While scholarly writings have cut one way or 
another, very few States have yet to indicate through practice or law where they divide 
airspace and outer space, i.e., the legal altitude where a State ends its sovereignty in the 
airspace above its territory.580 Does an object become a space object when it enters outer 
space?581 Where does outer space begin?582 Delegates to the Liability Convention 
negotiations seemed to have sidestepped these questions and instead discussed an intent 
element of launching an object into outer space as part of the definition of space object.583 
Consequently, for example, this has had a major impact on the development of space 
                                                 
579 See supra note 16. 
580 See supra note 551, at 15-19. 
581 By way of example, when NASA developed the Space Transportation System (Space Shuttle), a 
question of whether it was a space object was raised by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). See 
OUTLOOK ON SPACE LAW OVER THE NEXT 30 YEARS 117 (Gabriel Lafferranderie & Daphne Crowther eds., 
Kluwer 1997). Because the Space Shuttle could launch like a rocket, but return like an aircraft, the question 
arose whether the flight of the Space Shuttle required aircraft like regulation from the FAA. It was 
determined that since the purpose of the Space Shuttle was intended for movement in outer space, the 
Space Shuttle qualified as a space object and did not fall within the sphere of the FAA. Furthermore, the 
dichotomous technology of the Space Shuttle, i.e., the spatial and aerial abilities, poses a continuing issue 
in the context of suborbital launch vehicles. Some scholars have dubbed these types of technologies 
aerospace objects. This further confuses the term space object, especially if one type of technology is used 
to launch the object into outer space and it breaks off and lands under its own power or is launched by an 
aircraft. Nevertheless, this issue has yet to be taken up by the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS. However, 
the issue has made some movement with the adoption of the demarcation of the airspace agenda item. 
582 See supra note 16. 
583 See MANUAL supra note 104. 
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debris mitigation guidelines and has led to ways in which proponents of debris removal 
seek to redefine the meaning of space object in order to justify removal.584 Hence, if the 
term space object could mean specific types of objects, then the definition could be 
limited to certain types of objects and not others. 
 
iii. Definition, Meaning, and Scope of the Term Space Object 
 
When Sputnik I became the first object launched into Earth orbit on October 4, 
1957, no definitive legal classification existed for such an object.585 Considered State 
property, objects launched by the United States and the Soviet Union into orbit 
represented the height of technological capability at the time.586 By 1975, two 
international treaties legally classified objects launched or intended to be launched into 
space as “space objects.” Article I of both the Liability and Registration Conventions 
define a space object as including the space object itself and “component parts of [the] 
space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof.”587 Because international 
negotiation for a definitive term proved difficult to devise, States settled on a definition 
of space object that would not require definitive classifications.588 As discussed infra, the 
debate continues to persist as to the scope of the meaning of the term space object. 
The term space object has had a curious evolution. The term object in reference to 
outer space was first used in 1961 in UNGA Resolution 1721 (XVI) titled International 
                                                 
584 See FRANCIS LYALL & PAUL LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE 253-58 (Ashgate 2009). 
585 See J. Sztucki, Legal Status of Space Objects, 9 PROC. COLL. L. OF  OUTER SPACE 108 (1966). 
586 See supra note 17. 
587 See supra note 21, Liability Convention and Registration Convention. 
588 See MANUAL supra note 104, at 116-19. 
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co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, which issued an invitation to record any 
object launched by States into outer space with the UNCOPUOS through the UN 
Secretary General.589 In context, object meant such things that could assist in the 
exploration and understanding of outer space such as scientific instruments, satellites, and 
launch vehicles.590 In 1967, the term object became a binding treaty term for the first time 
when the term found its way into the Outer Space Treaty.591 However, a definition for the 
term did not arise until the 1972 Liability Convention came into force.592  
Generally, space object includes terms of art used in the commercial, civil, and 
military space sectors. As noted in statutes, codes, and regulations as well as by scholars 
and commentators, Earth manufactured technologies colloquially termed “space vehicle”, 
“spacecraft”, “spaceship”, “satellite”, and “space station” represent the types of objects 
launched into outer space.593 Cheng has noted that members of the COPUOS during 
negotiations over the space treaties treated spacecraft and space vehicles as synonymous 
terms.594 This point is illustrated by the fact that article V of the Outer Space Treaty uses 
the term “space vehicle;” articles I(1), II, III, and IV of the Rescue and Return Agreement 
use the term “spacecraft;” and article XII of the Outer Space Treaty “distinguishes ‘space 
vehicles’ on celestial bodies from ‘stations, installations, [and] equipment’, to which the 
                                                 
589 See G.A. Res. 1721 B (XVI), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/4987 (Dec. 20, 1961) (“Calls upon States launching 
objects into orbit or beyond to furnish information promptly to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of 
Outer Space, through the Secretary-General, for the registration of launchings” (emphasis added)), 
available at http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_16_1721E.pdf accessed November 30, 2015. But see 
G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), U.N. Doc. A/4351 (Dec. 12, 1959) (“Noting with satisfaction the successes of great 
significance to mankind that have been attained in the exploration of outer space in the form of the recent 
launching of artificial earth satellites and space rockets, . . .” (emphasis added)), available at 
http://www.unoosa.org/pdf/gares/ARES_14_1472E.pdf accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
590 See supra note 17. 
591 See Outer Space Treaty supra note 21. 
592 See Liability Convention supra note 21. 
593 See BIN CHENG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 463 (Clarendon Press 1997). 
594 Id., at 462. 
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Moon Treaty”595 uses the term facilities (articles VIII, X, XI, XII & XV) and spacecraft 
(articles III & X).596 
During the Liability Convention negotiations, delegates debated two definitions 
for the term space object. The first definition was a narrow definition that “included the 
object itself and its component parts, as well as the means of delivery and its component 
parts.”597 A second definition consisted of a broader meaning for the term space object in 
that it “would have included articles on board the space object and articles detached, 
thrown or launched from the space object.”598 Delegates chose the former definition to 
classify a space object.599 
In addition, the delegates debated the scope of the term “space object.”600 A 
proposal submitted by Argentina, Belgium, and France, which was not adopted, included 
a definition of space object without mention of outer space.601 The proposal suggested 
that a space object mean: “any object made and intended for space activities” and that 
“For the purpose of [the] Convention, the term ‘space object’ also includes a launch 
vehicle and parts thereof, as well as all component parts on board, detached or torn from 
the space object.”602 The reason for the proposal was to move away from a discussion of 
where airspace ended and outer space began.603 The United States, in particular, neither 
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597 GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 210 
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603 See Gyula Gal, Thirty Years of Functionalism, 40 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SPACE 125 (1997) [hereinafter 
Functionalism]. 
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wanted to get into the technical aspects of delimitation of outer space in order to preserve 
the greatest latitude for technological development of launch vehicles and space systems 
nor wanted to agree to any limitations on State sovereign airspace. 
Under the Liability and Registration Conventions, a space object includes 
component parts to the launch, but neither the treaty’s travaux preparatoires nor scholars 
agree which component parts remain space objects after launch. Gorove has concluded 
that “the component parts of a space object would include all elements normally regarded 
as making up the space object, including fuel tanks and perhaps even the fuel itself. Thus 
any object without which the spacecraft would be regarded incomplete, may be taken to 
be a component part.”604 Cheng has suggested that a space object covers “any object 
launched by humans into outer space, as well as any component part thereof, together 
with its launch vehicle and parts thereof.”605 Thus, objects launched into orbit are ipso 
facto space objects. Nevertheless, the definitions advanced by Gorove and Cheng 
generally conform to what the delegates to the Liability Convention had contemplated, 
however it is unclear how far the treaty negotiators wanted to extend the definition of 
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GOROVE STUDIES]. See H.A. BAKER, SPACE DEBRIS: LEGAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 63 (1989). 
605 Bin Cheng, “Space Objects”, “Astronauts” and Related Expressions, 34 PROC. COLL. L. OUTER SPACE 
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A. Space object: Spatialist vs. Functionalist Arguments 
 
When does an object become a space object? The delimitation of airspace issue 
centers on the spatialist and functionalist arguments.607 The spatialist argument advances 
the point that where the atmosphere legally terminates, outer space legally begins.608 Gal 
raises the point of airspace demarcation, i.e., altitude in flight/orbit, which affects when 
an object launched becomes a space object.609 Gal concludes, “only those objects can be 
regarded as space objects which perform an orbiting movement round the earth or other 
celestial bodies, or which have been launched with that purpose,” with the deciding 
criterion of a space object dependent upon its orbital motion.610 If the space object does 
not have sufficient velocity to achieve orbit, then it is not a space object.611 
The functionalist argument rejects a technical or arbitrary delimitation of airspace 
but delimits legal airspace from outer space by the character or nature of the activity 
under regulation.612 Thus, an object becomes a space object by virtue of how the object is 
placed into outer space, i.e., launched by a launching State.613 Kopal has suggested that 
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corresponding rules of the law of space (e.g. state responsibility) should apply in respect of such objects as 
have been launched with the aim of an orbital motion, but they need not necessarily be considered as space 
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613 Hurwitz categorizes the term launching State to mean “(1) the State which launches the space object . . . 
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which owns the facility used in the launching.” BRUCE A HURWITZ, STATE LIABILITY FOR OUTER SPACE 
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“Space Objects should be considered any object launched by man for a mission into outer 
space, be it into orbit around the Earth, or beyond into planetary space to and around the 
Moon and other celestial bodies of the Solar system, or into deep space.”614 As noted 
Chapter V, the functionalist paradigm reigns dominate within national space laws. Only a 
few States have adopted the spatialist paradigm. 
 
B. Problems with the Scope of the Space Object Definition under the Space  
Treaties 
 
Several additional problems arise with respect to the scope of the meaning of 
space object under the Liability and Registration Conventions. First, some commentators 
argue that the term space object is an incomplete term because it fails to address the issue 
of functional vs. nonfunctional objects in outer space.615 While the intent to launch a 
space object is the first threshold question, once launched, which element of the launch is 
still a space object and how long does it legally remain a space object? Hurwitz notes that 
ambiguity arises as to whether an object continues to have the legal status of a space 
object under the Liability Convention when it is abandoned and uncontrolled, or 
destroyed in outer space.616 Past scholarship seems to conclude that no limit exists in 
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which an object ceases to be classified as a space object under the article I definition of 
the Liability and Registration Conventions.617 However, a debate has arisen challenging 
the current space object paradigm utilizing maritime law analogies and general 
international law.618 However, States have yet been observed to adopt such changes to the 
term space object in practice.  
Second, a question arises as to whether the launch of a space object must originate 
from Earth.619 This question presented itself in the policy debates surrounding the 
development of an international space station.620 If a structure is built in outer space from 
“materials not originating from the Earth and if, as a result, those materials are not 
regarded as a “space object”, there may be no State required to register the object” and a 
State may not be liable for damage caused by its object under the Outer Space Treaty or 
Liability Convention.621 Resolution of these issues could be found in analyzing 
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States, non-appropriation, and general principles of space law. See IMRE CSABAFI, THE CONCEPT OF STATE 
JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW: A STUDY IN THE PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE 
LAW IN THE UNITED NATIONS 124 (Martinus Nijhoff 1971). See also CHENG STUDIES supra note 592, at 72 
& 86. However, control is more than competence in technical capability; it is the right of a State “to adopt 
technical rules to achieve the space object mission,” as well as “to direct, to stop, modify and correct the 
elements of the space object and its mission.” G. Lafferranderie, Jurisdiction and control of Space Objects 
and the Case of an International Intergovernmental Organization (ESA), 54 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR LUFT- UND 
WELTRAUMRECHT 228, 230 (2005). Consequently, as Lafferranderie points out, “Jurisdiction should induce 
control, and control should be based on jurisdiction.” Id., at 231. Even when a space object becomes non-
functional, a State does not lose its jurisdiction and control, ownership, or obligation to register. See 
Registration Convention supra note 21, at art. II, and COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW: OUTER 
SPACE TREATY 154 (Hobe, et al. eds., Heymanns 2009). 
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international responsibility under public international law, generally, and the Outer Space 
Treaty, specifically, which would limit this issue to jurisdiction and control over State 
property or responsibility over the activities and conduct of non-governmental entities.622 
However, the application of rules different than those expressed under a particular treaty 
or more generally the use of a definition of the term space object different from its 
meaning and scope under treaty law requires the interpolation of the term space object to 
other sources of law. This too demonstrates rule evolution from its previous in time usage 
and rule applicability. 
Third, a space object’s presence in outer space does not affect its ownership or 
nationality.623 Ownership extends beyond the operation of the space object, including 
when it ceases to function at end-of-life, malfunctions, or fails to reach intended orbit 
because of a failed launch.624 Moreover, States have the responsibility to ensure that the 
rights of entities subject to its jurisdiction follow accepted rules and practices in outer 
space.625 Hence, national law plays an important role in defining the scope of the rights, 
duties, and obligations of States and their non-governmental entities who conduct 
activities or have traceable interests in outer space. Thus, national legal obligations 
                                                 
622 See Outer Space Treaty supra note 21, at art. VII. See also ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
241-45 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005) (2001) [hereinafter CASSESE].  
623 See PAMELA L. MEREDITH & GEORGE S. ROBINSON, SPACE LAW: A CASE STUDY FOR THE PRACTITIONER 
54 (Martinus Nijhoff 1992) [hereinafter MEREDITH & ROBINSON]. Compare George S. Robinson, Artifacts, 
Abandonment, Salvage . . . And the Jolly Roger in Space, 2 SAN. FRAN. ST. U. BUS. J. 65 (1990) (where 
although NASA transferred ownership of the Viking I lander, still located on Mars, to the Smithsonian 
Institution indicating that NASA believed that it retained ownership of the space object, Viking I, beyond 
its operational life) with Leonard David, Privately Owned Soviet Moon Rover Sparks Space Law Talks, 
SPACE.COM, available at http://www.space.com/8073-privately-owned-soviet-moon-rover-sparks-space-
law-talks.html accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
624 See MEREDITH & ROBINSON, at 55. 
625 See Outer Space Treaty supra note 21, art. VI. See also CASSESE supra note 622. 
189 
undertaken by States help reinforce the basis of principles, duties, and obligations of the 
space treaties and public international law in general. 
Finally, given the possibilities of interpretation, space object could have no upper 
limit in meaning under the space treaties. However, because the term space object 
implicates different treaties, national regulations, and terms of art, it becomes important 
to figure out what space object means in a variety of contexts to determine which 
obligations States purchase with respect to the source of rules. Chapter V thus studies 
how State municipal law and State practice affects and has affected the definition of 




The proliferation of market participants and rule supply led to the creation of 
several supranational markets of international relations regarding the outer space 
environment. Within a year of the launch of Sputnik I, interested States cooperated to 
create COPUOS as a forum to discuss the international issues associated with the outer 
space environment. Moreover, COPUOS enables trading in valued preferences and the 
development of rules of jurisdiction among and between States. Between October 1958 
and October 1975, COPUOS grew from eighteen members to thirty seven members. 
Although market participation grew 50%, relative to the entire pool of potential market 
participant States, COPUOS membership reflected the views of a minority of States who 
had in interest in developing such rules.  
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Coincidently, while the number of COPUOS member States has almost tripled 
since October 1975, the rate of rule supply to the international system remains steady, but 
consumption of rules generated out of COPUOS has significantly declined. The process 
by which COPUOS supplies rules of jurisdiction to States through supranational market 
mechanisms is consent based. However, this defining aspect of COPUOS also limits 
member States’ abilities to supply rules where there is no consensus, but may have value 
to other States. This characteristic of COPUOS illustrates that rule supply in one 






THE EVOLUTION OF RULES FOR THE OUTER SPACE ENVIRONMENT 
a. Introduction 
 
In July1958, the United States enacted the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 
1958 that established the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.626 
Consequently, the United States became the first State to enact a national space law. 
Since then at least twenty nine States have promulgated national space laws the content 
of which governs the launch into and operation of space objects in the outer space 
environment. 
 Space object is arguably the most important term in all of the corpus of space law 
because the entire legal regime for space is centered on what is launched into and used in 
outer space. Since the term space object has been defined rather broadly in the outer 
space treaties, the definition, meaning, and scope of the term as a function of rules of 
jurisdiction takes on important meaning as State practice evolves. Moreover, since the 
definition, meaning, and scope of terms that define a State’s legal obligation in relation to 
the international community of States must have some common basis, the supply of rules 
over time may provide further clarity to the extent to which a State has authority over 
persons, objects, and events in the outer space environment. Therefore, this Chapter 
                                                 
626 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426. 
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analyzes how States have supplied rules of jurisdiction in the form of rules of national 
and the extent to which States have defined the content of the the term “space object.”  
 
b. Evolution toward Convergence of Rules into Rules of Law for the Outer Space  
Environment 
 
This case study comprises a comparative study of the definition of the term 
“space object” in national space laws. This chapter analyzes those States that have or 
have not implemented the term “space object” and its definition into their national legal 
systems and the legal effect it has under international law. This study surveys the supply 
of rules to the supranational market from a sample of States.627 The first sample consists 
of thirty-nine States, all of which have purchased rules with respect to the regulation or 
use of space objects. Each State has some space-faring experience, including being a 
member State of a multilateral space agency, a partner to the International Space Station, 
launching humans, animals, or other objects into outer space, or having had another State 
launch objects into outer space for it.628 The second subsample consists of those States 
that have internally promulgated or published rules with respect to the regulation or use 
of space objects as a matter of rule supply. Moreover, the survey also includes a review 
                                                 
627 Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, China, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, India, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian 
Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, the United States of 
America, and Venezuela. 
628 In addition, each State surveyed has membership in COPUOS, except for Denmark, Finland, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, and Norway. See United Nations, Office of Outer Space Affairs, List of UNCOPUOS 
Members, available at http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/COPUOS/members.html accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
193 
of which States in the sample are party to the first four space treaties and analyzes 
whether States have implemented the treaties into their national law.629  
 
i. Space Object Defined Under National Space Laws 
  
This section discusses how the thirty-nine (39) States sampled define space 
object. Not all States have defined space object using the definition expressed in the 
Liability and Registration Conventions. Several States have redefined space object in 
their national law using terms of art generally through national licensing and registration 
regimes. Moreover, national licensing and registration regimes seem to form the basis for 
which States either use the treaty definition of space object or redefine the term to include 
a specific list of objects that States consent to launch into outer space. These national 
legal requirements seem to limit generally the scope of the type of object a space object 
can be via State practice. 
 Generally, States segment the scope of their national space laws between civil and 
military space activities, while some States also permit commercial/private space 
activities.630 States regulate civil, military, and commercial activities through a variety of 
national law mechanisms. Depending upon the structure of government, some States have 
created regulatory agencies or have created regimes that require government 
authorization for entities under their jurisdiction to seek approval for launching objects 
into outer space, while some States allow other States to launch objects into outer space 
for them. Hence, those types of “objects” States generally launch into the outer space 
                                                 
629 See supra note 21. 
630 See, e.g., SPACE POLITICS AND POLICY 33-39 (Eligar Sadeh ed., Kluwer 2002). 
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environment represent State practice necessary by which to judge what may or may not 
be a “space object.” The measure the evolution of the term depends on how a State 
manifests its valued preferences for the classification of the term “space object.” 
 
A. Thirty-Nine States Sampled 
1. States with “Space Object” Defined in National Law 
 
 For States that have defined space object in their national law, this analysis 
reveals two types of definitions utilized. The first category of States define space object 
utilizing a specific national law definition of space object. The second category of States 
define space object in national law utilizing the article I definition from the Liability and 
Registration Conventions. Each category is listed below. 
 
(a). Category I States: Specific Definitions 
 
 Australia defines space object under Section 8 of the Space Activities Act of 1998. 
631 Under Section 8,  
 
‘space object’ means a thing consisting of: (a)  a launch vehicle; and (b)  a 
payload (if any) that the launch vehicle is to carry into or back from an 
area beyond the distance of 100 km above mean sea level; or any part of 
such a thing, even if: (c)  the part is to go only some of the way towards or 
                                                 
631 See NATIONAL REGULATION OF SPACE ACTIVITIES 37-59 (Ram S. Jakhu ed., Springer 2010) (Australia 
has promulgated a national space law that includes a licensing and registration regime). 
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back from an area beyond the distance of 100 km above mean sea level; or 
(d)  the part results from the separation of a payload or payloads from a 
launch vehicle after launch.632 
 
 Russian Federation law currently defines space object in a variety of ways. 
Russian law defines space object as “an immovable property that is subject to 
registration;”633 “an object designed for exploration and use of outer space, the Moon and 
other celestial bodies for civil purposes;”634 and “a space mechanical device, which is 
designed to conduct specific tasks and is capable of independent long-term functioning in 
outer space.”635 
 Several States use the term “any object” to define a space object. These States 
qualify the term “any object” with an intent element. States that define “any object” 
include Netherlands – space object “is any object launched or destined to be launched 
into outer space;”636 Norway – space object is “any object” launched with permission of 
government;”637 and Republic of Korea – ““space objects” are objects designed and 
manufactured for use in outer space including space launch vehicles, artificial satellites, 
and spaceships and their components.”638 Furthermore, Iran’s Statute of the Iranian Space 
Agency defines the scope of its regulatory powers in article (3)(IV), which states 
                                                 
632 Space Activities Act 1998, No. 123, Section 8 (Austl.), available at 
http://corrigan.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/saa1998167/s8.html accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
633 Supra note 631, at 315-34. 
634 Id. 
635 Id. 
636 Supra note 631, at 225-46. See Rules Concerning Space Activities and the Establishment of a Registry 
of Space Objects (Space Activities Act), BILL (13.06.06), 1.1.c (2006) (Neth.). 
637 Act on launching objects from Norwegian territory etc. into outer space. (13 June. 1969) (Nor.). 
638 Space Development Promotion Act, Art. 2(3) (2005) (S. Korea).  
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“Agency’s tasks and authorizations are as follows:  . . . Doing research, designing, 
manufacturing and launch of the commercial, scientific and research satellites, and 
designing and establishing control center and launch of national satellites in cooperation 
with related institutions.”639 Nigeria’s National Space and Development Space Agency is 
“charged with the responsibility for building and launching satellites.”640 Thus, any 
object intended to be launched into the outer space environment is a space object. 
 
(b). Category II States: Article I Definitions 
 
 Austria, Belgium, China, Spain, and the United Kingdom utilize the article I 
definition of space object. The Austrian Federal Law on the Authorisation of Space 
Activities and the Establishment of a National Space Registry defines space object as “an 
object launched or intended to be launched into outer space, including its components.”641 
Belgium’s Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Operation or Guidance of Space 
Objects defines space object as “any object launched or intended to be launched into 
outer space, including the material elements composing that object.”642 Under the Outer 
Space Ordinance, China defines space object as the space object itself “includ[ing] the 
                                                 
639 Statute of the Iranian Space Agency 10 Dec. 2003 (Iran), in 34 J. SPACE LAW 492 (2008), available at 
http://www.spacelaw.olemiss.edu/jsl/pdfs/back-issues/jsl-34-2.pdf.  
640 An Act to establish the National Space Research and Development Agency; and for related matters, § 
6(b) (2010), available at http://nass.gov.ng/document/download/5892 accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
641 Austrian Federal Law on the Authorisation of Space Activities and the Establishment of a National 
Registry [Austrian Outer Space Act], Oct. 11, 2011, § 2(2) (Austria), available at 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/pdf/spacelaw/national/austria/austrian-outer-space-actE.pdf (English 
translation provided by the Government of Austria) accessed Dec. 10, 2015. The Austrian government must 
authorize all space activities, which requires approval from the Minister for Transport, Innovation, and 
Technology. 
642 Law on the Activities of Launching, Flight Operations or Guidance of Space Objects, Art. III(1) (Belg.). 
Interestingly, the Law does note that component parts of a space object includes material elements. Thus, 
e.g., rocket fuel exhaust would not likely be considered a space object under Belgium law. 
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component parts of a space object, its launch vehicle and the component parts of such 
launch vehicle.”643 Spain has defined the term space object “to include both component 
parts thereof and the launch vehicle and parts thereof,”644 while the United Kingdom has 
defined space object to “include[] the component parts of a space object, its launch 
vehicle and the component parts of that.”645 
 
2. States That Do Not Have “Space Object” Defined in Their National Space Law, But  
Have a Licensing or Registration Regime as Part of Their National Law 
 
 Some States have established a licensing or registration regime in which to govern 
space activities. In most cases, either regime will use the term space object without 
definition, define a synonymous term to represent a space object, or will only mention 
specific types of objects, e.g., satellites. Those States that have developed a law, 
regulation, or decree to establish a licensing or registration regime demonstrate some 
compliance with certain outer space treaty obligations. A list of those States that have 
developed a licensing or registration regime follows. 
 Argentina has no licensing regime or procedures to regulate the authorization of 
launch services.646  However, under Executive Decree 125/1995, “all acts related to a 
space object launched or promoted by the national State or launched from its territory or 
                                                 
643 Outer Space Ordinance, P.R.C. LAWS CAP 523. 
644 Royal Decree 278/1995, Feb. 24 1995. 
645 Outer Space Act, 1986, Eliz. 2, c. 2, § 13(1)(b) (Eng.). 
646 See Argentine Decree 995/1991, art.  2, available at 
http://www.conae.gov.ar/eng/sobre/legislaciones/l99591.pdf (Spanish version) accessed November 30, 
2015. See also supra note 631, at 23-35, and supra note 627. CONAE has no regulatory authority, but 
adopts resolutions with wide legal scope and effect; however, CNC has overlapping jurisdiction and 
authority with CONAE. 
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facility, whether by the State itself or private entities, are to be recorded in the National 
Registry.”647 At a minimum, the National Registry provides a list of objects that could be 
considered a space object, if registered.  
 Brazil has a licensing and authorization regime that focuses on launch 
activities.648 Under its License Regulation, Brazil defines launch activities as “the 
operation to place or attempt to place a launching vehicle and its payload into suborbital 
trajectory, in Earth orbit or otherwise in outer space.”649 Hence, by the plain reading of 
the language, the License Regulation provides a list of objects that can represent a space 
object. Furthermore, Brazil uses several terms in its national space laws to denote the 
types of things that require license, registration, promotion, and protection under national 
law, including launch or space activities, space systems, space products and services, 
satellite, and  launch vehicle.650  
 Under the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (as amended), the United 
States defines “space vehicles [as] . . .  satellites, and other space vehicles, manned and 
unmanned, together with related equipment, devices, components, and parts.”651 While 
the United States Code and the Code of Federal Regulations do not explicitly define 
space object, each does however define synonymous terms. 51 U.S.C. § 50902(10) 
defines payload as “an object that a person undertakes to place in outer space by means of 
a launch vehicle or reentry vehicle, including components of the vehicle specifically 
                                                 
647 Supra note 631, at 30. 
648 See supra note 631, at 61-80. 
649 Supra note 631, at 75.  
650 Id. 
651 51 U.S.C. § 20103(2).  
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designed or adapted for that object.”652 Further, the United States Code defines launch 
vehicle as “(A) a vehicle built to operate in, or place a payload or human beings in, outer 
space; and (B) a suborbital rocket.”653 Finally, 14 C.F.R. § 417.19 mentions the term 
space object as part of the implementing regulation for the Registration Convention as it 
pertains to commercial launch vehicles, but also does not define the term 
independently.654 
 Lastly, Canada, France, India, South Africa, Sweden, and Ukraine all have 
licensing regimes incorporated into their national laws.655 However, none of these States 
have defined space object in their national law. A review of the States with licensing 
regimes reveals no evidence of terms or phrases to indicate the types of object that may 
be considered a space object, except for the specific terms object, satellite, and launch 
vehicle.656 
 
3. States That Neither Have “Space Object” Nor Have a Licensing or Registration 
Regime as Part of Their National Law 
 
 A review of the national laws of the Chile, Columbia, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Kazakhstan, Mexico, 
Romania, and Switzerland found that none of these States have promulgated a national 
                                                 
652 Id. at. § 50902(10). 
653 Id. at § 50902(8). See Sara Langston, Suborbital Flights: A Comparative Analysis of National and 
International Law, 37 J. SPACE L. 321-23 (discussing whether a suborbital rocket is a space object). 
654 14 C.F.R. § 417.19 (2011) (“all objects placed in space by a licensed launch, including a launch vehicle 
and any components, . . . ”. This regulation applies to commercial launches regulated by the Secretary of 
Transportation not launches by the US Government). 
655 Supra note 631, at 81-107. 
656 See supra note 631, at 81-122, 153-98, 267-314 & 335-56. See also Act on Space Activities (1982:963) 
(Swed.). 
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space law or defined space object in national law. Of these fifteen States, all States have 
ratified, acceded, or succeeded to the Liability Convention and only the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Greece, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, and Switzerland have ratified, acceded, or 
succeeded to the Registration Convention. Furthermore, of these sixteen States, all have 
ratified or succeeded to the Outer Space Treaty and only Luxembourg has not ratified or 
succeeded to the Rescue and Return Agreement. Thus, these States have at least 
incorporated the Liability Convention’s article I definition of space object into their 
national laws.  
 
B. Analysis of the Thirty-Nine Sampled States 
 
 Because every State has its own internal processes for internalizing its 
international obligations, the treaty provisions of the first four space treaties do not oblige 
a State to pass national space laws to implement the duties and obligations of each treaty 
only that it finds some way to do so.657 Recently, however, many States have 
promulgated implementing legislation to authorize and supervise the space activities of 
governmental and nongovernmental entities. Licensing and registration regulations and 
decrees provide sources of rules that describe how States define the content of the term 




                                                 
657 See HERMIDA supra note 627, at 244. 
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1. Observations on the Way in Which States Have Sought to Define Space Object in 
Their National Law 
 
 Some States have attempted to define space object in a specific way, while most 
States promulgate the term space object in close conformity to the article I definition of 
the Liability and Registration Conventions. Of the thirty-nine (39) States surveyed, 
nineteen have licensing regimes for civil and commercial space objects, five have an 
authorization regime, and fifteen do not have a licensing regime for the launching of 
space objects. Of these thirty-nine States, thirty eight are party to the Liability 
Convention and thirty three are party to the Registration Convention.  
 These data reveal several observations worth noting. First, Australia, Netherlands, 
Norway, Republic of Korea, and Russia have defined space object in a particular way 
under their national laws. Australia is the only State surveyed that used a spatialist 
paradigm to delimit airspace. In addition, while Australia’s Space Activities Act does not 
define payload, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), an 
independent statutory authority required to manage the radio spectrum for the Australian 
government, does have the authority to determine what types of objects are or are not 
space objects for the purposes of the Radiocommunications Act of 1992 (RA92).658 RA92 
uses the terms satellite, satellite system, and space system to describe the types of space 
objects under ACMA authority that may be licensed and regulated in the context of space 
telecommunications.659 
                                                 
658 Supra note 631, at 57-59. 
659 Id. (Australian law also makes a distinction between Australian space objects and foreign space objects.) 
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 Second, no Argentine national law specifically defines a space object, but several 
decrees mention the term satellite and Argentine Decree 532/2005 mentions space 
vehicles.660 Since Argentina has ratified the first four outer space treaties, the treaty 
definition of space object has binding legal effect as a matter of national law.661 
 Third, Brazil’s License Regulation seems to incorporate a hybrid spatialist and 
functionalist definition of space object. A launch vehicle and payload must achieve at 
least suborbital velocity without specifying the type of trajectory a suborbital trajectory 
would represent. Again, intent language appears with respect to launch, but the License 
Regulation does not specify the type of payloads that could be launched.662 
 Fourth, a common theme among States that have codified the term space object in 
their respective national laws is that those States have utilized the article I definition 
rather than devise a more sophisticated definition. Further, Netherlands, Norway, and the 
Republic of Korea do not place limits on the types of objects that require authorization 
for launch. Hence, any object launched with the approval of the State is a space object. 
 Fifth, ten of the States surveyed (Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Greece, 
India, Ireland, Luxembourg, Mexico, Romania, and Switzerland) have not promulgated a 
national law space law. Each State has accepted as a matter of treaty law the term space 
object. 
                                                 
660 Argentine Decree 532/2005. See supra note 631, at 23-36.  
661 Argentina ratified the Outer Space Treaty on December 4, 1968 and ratified the Rescue and Return 
Agreement on March 26, 1969, as well as subsequently ratified the Liability Convention pursuant to Act 
No. 23335 of July 30, 1986 and the Registration Convention pursuant to Act 24158 on September 30, 1992.  
See Office of Outer Space Affairs Treaty Database, available at 
http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/oosatdb/showTreatySignatures.do accessed Dec. 10, 2015. 
662 Moreover, the License Regulation states that “liability for damages due to space launching shall be 
settled in accordance with space treaties and conventions to which Brazil is a signatory. . . .” Supra note 
631, at 76. See art. 4(1). As of October 2015, Brazil has ratified the Liability Convention and the Outer 
Space Treaty as well as acceded to the Registration Convention and the Rescue and Return Agreement. 
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2. Common Elements of a Space Object in National Space Laws 
 
 A review of the sampled national space laws has yielded seven common 
definition elements: (1) object, (2) intent to launch, (3) launched, (4) launch vehicle, (5) 
payload, (6) component parts and parts thereof, and (7) satellite. First, the meaning of the 
term object has a narrow meaning in some States under domestic registration and 
licensing regimes. In addition, object tends to be defined with respect to the functional 
paradigm. Second, almost all States sampled with a definition of space object, whether 
specifically or by synonym, utilize an intent element relative to the action of launch. 
Thus, a space object is not a space object unless launched. Third, an object has been 
qualified in many national space laws by terms of art that include satellite, rocket, 
payload, spacecraft, space system, and launch vehicle. For each term, the definition of 
space object includes, from almost every State sampled, those component parts of each 
constitute a space object. This would suggest that the physical component parts of these 
types of objects would be considered a space object, but not necessarily rocket fuel or 
humans. Finally, the term satellite has tended to have a specific meaning under the 
national laws of States sampled. In most cases, the term “satellite”, while considered a 
space object is limited by two types of objects: telecommunications and remote sensing 
satellites. Because of the importance of these types of objects, States tend to clearly 
regulate their uses. As such, this indicates that States seek to constrain or provide a clear 






 The term space object is arguably the most important legal term in all of space 
law. Without a definition of space object, the rights, duties, and obligations of States 
engaged in activities in the outer space environment would have no meaning. As a treaty 
term, space object only has legal effect with respect to States that have ratified the outer 
space treaties. Moreover, the scope of the legal effect the term has on States is limited by 
the provisions that give the term legal effect and the number of State parties to the treaty 
that utilize the term space object. In order to understand the scope of the legal effect of 
the term space object outside of any of the space treaties, an inquiry must be made in 
which to discern whether the space object has risen to the status of consisting as a rule of 
customary international law or a general principle of law.  
The use of the term “space object” has most likely reached a level of practice 
beyond the space treaties. All States surveyed have purchased the obligation relating to 
the term space object as a matter of treaty and national law. Consistent use of the term as 
a purchased obligation has most likely given the term a status under customary 
international law. Moreover, the article I definition of the term has most likely reached 
the level of a rule of customary international law because the launching of objects is 
fundamental to all other types of rules and their associated obligations across all 
supranational markets. At a minimum, the national laws that define those objects 
registered or licensed as a space object, whether termed a launch vehicle, payload or 
satellite as well as its component parts, provide the operative source of the type of objects 
that can be a space object. As such, space object includes at least the following elements: 
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(1) an object, (2) intended to be launched, or (3) launched, that includes a (4) launch 
vehicle, (5) payload, or (6) satellite – which also includes remote sensing, scientific, 
telecommunication satellites, as well as (7) including the component parts and parts 
thereof of a launch vehicle, payload, or satellite. In addition, almost all of the States 
surveyed utilized the legal meaning of the term space object under a functionalist 
paradigm. Moreover, only two States sought to define space object by when an object 





CONCLUSIONS AND OBSERVATIONS 
a. Conclusions 
 
 States are the primary units of analysis in the international system. As such, they 
are endowed with sovereignty. Moreover, the rule of sovereign equality with other States 
can manifest in a variety of ways. However, States are not necessarily commensurate, 
inter alia, in resources, capabilities, or State practice.  
As individual actors in the international system, States seek to maximize their 
valued preferences within and outside their territory. In particular, State’s seek to extend 
their authority beyond their territory in relation to certain types of activities. In order to 
manage the risk and minimize the costs of extending State authority extraterritorially, 
States may seek to trade in components of power to ensure their authority extends beyond 
their territorial borders with respect to the need to satisfy valued preferences. To 
accomplish this extension of authority extraterritorially, States may engage in State 
practice the act of which supplies rules of jurisdiction to the supranational market of 
international relations. 
 By seeking to maximize State preferences, States tend to design their State 
practice in accordance with rules supplied and/or consumed by States as a function of 
their sovereignty. Not every State practice connotes a bargained for legal obligation the 
product of which manifests from the consumption of rules through State practice. 
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Nevertheless, because the international system is based on the consent of States, the rules 
that govern international relations can take the form of choice of law rules 
(cooperative)or rules of prescriptive jurisdiction (non-cooperative).  
 Since States supply rules of jurisdiction to the supranational market of 
international relations, other States may bargain for such rules in a variety of international 
fora. The act of bargaining can take many forms. In particular, international fora for 
bargaining may be open and multilateral or closed to States without a need or reason to 
enter the supranational market. As such, by measuring market participation in rule 
supply, negotiation, and consumption, an observer may draw inferences from which and 
how many States engage in the supranational market of international relations. In the case 
of rules for the outer space environment, the data show variation, but some growth, in 
market participation and rule supply. However, rule consumption has remained relatively 
flat since about 1980 in terms of choice of law rules, but there has been substantial 
growth in rule supply and consumption among States that enact national space laws. This 
is a curious trend because since October 1957, only thirteen (13) States have developed 
their own launch capabilities. Furthermore, as of October 2015, approximately fifty-eight 
(58) States have space objects of some variety in orbit around the Earth or beyond cis-
lunar space. Yet one hundred and four (104) Sates have ratified the Outer Space Treaty. 
So what do these facts mean in light of rule formation and evolution? 
One possible explanation is that given the importance of rules for outer space 
activities, States initially benefited from international negotiations within the UN system. 
The supply of rules through COPUOS to the UNGA and consequently to all States 
provided a means to more efficiently bargain for rules because only a few States self-
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selected into the COPUOS supranational market. Subsequently, States that did not 
participate in rule-making were supplied rules and thus the rules developed from the first 
four space treaties were easy to consume. Furthermore, political alignments among and 
between States affected how States valued these rules in relation to the hegemons (US 
and Soviet Union) whose initial State practice set the foundation for subsequent rules. 
Therefore, collectively, the initial rule development arose because the market participants 
reacted to the signals provided by States that initially engaged in the practice of launching 
objects into the outer space environment. 
A second possible explanation is that the majority of States on Earth find value in 
basic rules of jurisdiction. However, rules that do not align with a State’s valued 
preferences will tend not to be consumed by the State. States that have no capabilities or 
resources to enter the outer space environment may use other States capabilities and 
resources to do so. Moreover, those States will bargain only for rules that are 
commensurate with the valued preferences of States despite not possessing the 
technology to launch objects into the outer space environment. Conversely, if the value of 
the rules supplied diminishes over time, the probability of rule consumption will tend to 
decline. Thus, changes in how States value rules will also evolve where the measurable 
effect on rule supply and consumption may shift across the different types of 
supranational markets of international relations. 
 Finally, as rules get more detailed and sophisticated to handle changes in the 
valued preferences of States, State practice will supply additional rules for potential 
consumption. Consequently, changes in State practice will also led to changes in the 
content of rules. Because a re-supply of rules must necessarily include rules not 
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specifically on the supranational market, new rules will always seek to augment the old 
rules. The consequence of this process is that rules may have shifting meaning to States. 
When States try to shift the meaning of consumed rules of jurisdiction, they engage in a 
redistribution of the intent of the State Parties to the original rule. Depending on the 
valued preferences of other States in the supranational market, new rules supplied to the 
supranational market may or may not be valued or consumed by States. However, State 
cooperative behavior tends to assist in the supply, negotiation, and consumption of rules 
of jurisdiction over time. This process closes the loop on rule evolution enabling the 
process to reinitiate over time. 
 Graph 10 below illustrates the complexity and interconnectedness of the 
supranational market of international relations for the outer space environment. Each 
source or rules is analyzed against how many States engage in a practice to launch 
objects over the territories of other States into the outer space environment, or engage in 
rule supply, rule consumption, and preference revelation. Moreover, the entire 
international legal system is bounded by the number of States in existence at any given 
time. Therefore, when States begin to supply or consume rules, you can measure how 
many States engage in a practice against how many States there are in the international 
system at any observable time. 
 Consumption of rules is also indicated in Graph 10. With respect to the space 
treaties, each State that signs or ratifies one or more of the space treaties has consumed 
the obligation of the rule in return for a trade in extraterritorial authority relative to other 
States Parties. Relative to non-States Parties to the space treaties, the OSTRATF curve 
provides an upper bound on the consumption of rules of law relating to the launching of 
210 
space objects. The variability in the consumption of rules across all supranational markets 
indicates a level of supply and demand through supranational market participation 
because of the price paid in the consumption of rules, i.e., the consensual exchange of an 
obligation for a right among the group of interested States.  
However, States also supply rules relative to their State practice in a 
nonconsensual manner. If a State manifests a valued preference to launch objects over the 
territories of States into the outer space environment, then it may supply rules by some 
internal manifestation of its valued preferences or it may engage in a State practice and 
give notice of the acceptance of the rule’s obligation. If a State promulgates a national 
law that regulates the launching and use of space objects, it has engaged in preference 
revelation and rule supply. If a State gives notice to the international community without 
clearly and consistently objecting to the obligation of a rule, it has supplied rules to the 
supranational market of international relations as an international custom. However, the 
State practice must be consistent and persist for some period of time in order to give the 
international system sufficient time to observe the State practice. Since States continued 
to engage, without objection, in the State practice of launching objects over the territories 
of States into the outer space environment for at least ten years from the launch of 
Sputnik I, such a State practice has certainly been purchased by mutual consent among 
the international community of States who engage in such a State practice. Therefore, to 
what degree has the particular uses or activities of space objects been supplied, priced, or 
consumed on the supranational market and thereby enabling the measure of the rate of 















































































































i. Case Study I 
 
As a result of the launches of the Sputnik and Explorer objects, the initial supply 
of rules of prescriptive jurisdiction provided a framework by which States could negotiate 
future rules regarding the outer space environment. The origin of the supranational 
market for outer space activities is the consequence of the development of the first rule of 
State practice relating to the launching of an object into the outer space environment over 
the territories of States. The supranational market for space activities arose in October 
1957 as a monopoly until January 1958 when it became a duopoly. For ten years, both the 
United States and the Soviet Union dominated State practice in space activities. 
Moreover, the competition in terms of State practice in the outer space environment can 
be traced back to a series of events that produced the catalysts for the launch of Sputnik I. 
Thus, the launch of Sputnik I necessitated the creation of a supranational market for the 
trading in valued preferences to produce rules and rules of law for outer space activities 
because a few States chose to engage in the State practice of launching objects over the 
territories of States into the outer space environment. 
 
ii. Case Study II 
 
 The proliferation of market participation and rule supply led to the creation of 
several supranational markets of international relations regarding the outer space 
environment. Within a year of the launch of Sputnik I, interested States cooperated to 
create COPUOS as a forum to discuss the international issues associated with the outer 
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space environment. Moreover, COPUOS enables trading in valued preferences and the 
development of rules of jurisdiction among and between States. Between October 1958 
and October 1975, COPUOS grew from eighteen members to thirty-seven members. 
Although market participation grew 50%, relative to the entire pool of potential market 
participant States, COPUOS membership reflected the views of a minority of States who 
had in interest in developing such rules. Coincidently, while the number of COPUOS 
member States has almost tripled since October 1975, the rate of rule supply to the 
international system remains steady, but consumption of rules generated out of COPUOS 
has significantly declined. The process by which COPUOS supplies rules of jurisdiction 
to States through supranational market mechanisms is consent based. However, this 
defining aspect of COPUOS also limits member States’ abilities to supply rules where 
there is no consensus, but may have value to other States. This characteristic of COPUOS 
illustrates that rule supply in one supranational market does not produce the same effects 
in other markets.  
A rule of customary international law must include general and consistent State 
practice performed out of a sense of legal obligation.663 A rule of international custom 
can be confined to a region, among States who use the term in the course of a specific 
State practice, or broadened to all States who use the term in practice out of a sense of 
legal obligation. The term space object could also extend as a rule of international custom 
to those States that do not engage in outer space activities depending on if and how the 
obligation of the rule is purchased, i.e., that supranational market from where the rule 
could be purchased.664 This analysis of State practice indicates that out of the thirty-nine 
                                                 
663 See supra BROWNLIE note 4. 
664 Id.  
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space-faring States surveyed, all States have incorporated the term “space object” into 
their national laws in some form. Thus, all States sampled generally use the term “space 
object” out of a sense of legal obligation, i.e., all States surveyed in some form have at 
least purchased the obligation of the term and have launched or attempted to launch space 
objects for State purposes. On the other hand, the definition of space object has evolved 
over time with the innovation in the types of technologies that can be launched into outer 
space. States have sought to generalize how they define such objects or kept the 
terminology open-ended.  
To a large degree, treaties govern the national activities of States in outer space. 
One hundred and four States have ratified the Outer Space Treaty; ninety-six States have 
ratified, acceded, or succeeded to the Rescue and Return; ninety-five States have ratified, 
acceded, or succeeded to the Liability Convention; and sixty-five States have ratified, 
acceded, or succeeded to the Registration Convention. On one hand, a large number of 
States, i.e., one hundred and four, have purchased the obligation of the rule relating to the 
term space object by ratification of any of the first four outer space treaties. On the other 
hand, a significant number of States, i.e., ninety-five States, have purchased the article I 
definition of space object.  
 By utilizing articles 31 and 32 of the VCLT, an understanding of the intention of 
the term arises. However, the definition of space object, as expressed in article I of the 
Liability and Registration Conventions, provides only a basis by which to understand the 
content of the term’s legal effect under public international law. Thus, through State 
practice, a State could specifically define the types of objects launched into outer space.  
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 A review of national law indicates, moreover, that States have regarded the use of 
the term generally within a functionalist paradigm. In addition, given the history of the 
Liability Convention negotiations, the term space object has generally meant those 
objects such as a launch vehicle, spacecraft, or satellite. Subsequent treaties have 
narrowed the meaning of the term by leaving off humans, i.e., astronauts, as space 
objects. In the same way, national law has begun to narrow the meaning of space object 
through the promulgation of national space laws. Because an open-ended treaty definition 
leaves open possibilities for States to cap the meaning of the term space object, those 
terms used to describe space object can take legal effect parallel to the treaty term and 
definition. 
 
iii. Case Study III 
 
States will seek the most efficient means by which to develop and supply rules 
that maximize the utility of their valued preferences, but efficiency in the supply of rules 
does not translate into the efficient consumption of rules. States define and use their 
technologies to launch into and orbit objects in the outer space environment in ways that 
maximize the utility of their valued preferences. However, seeking to maximize the 
utility of their valued preferences can arise through any supranational market to which 
States have access. In particular, the most efficient way States develop rules is through 
promulgating national laws. While supplying rules through State practice does not 
necessarily lead to rule consumption, when States agree on rules that are traceable across 
States with the same or similar practice in outer space activities they create general 
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principles among and between those interested States. These general principles manifest 
from the national law and collectively represent the consensus among States regarding 
the content (i.e., the definition, meaning, and scope) of rules that apply to all States that 
engage in the same or similar types of State practice. Finding a common basis for the 
rules promulgated by States, without objection and put into effect through their 
international relations, establishes the foundation of the consent required to consume 
rules of jurisdiction from the promulgation of their national laws. 
General principles of law are those legal principles that are common to a large 
number of systems of municipal law. At least ninety-five States have incorporated the 
specific definition of space object from the Liability Convention into national law 
through domestic ratification processes. All States sampled have incorporated the term 
space object into their respective national laws. In addition, every State sampled has 
incorporated the article I space object definition, of the Liability or Registration 
Convention, into their national laws. Nevertheless, thirteen States (Australia, Russian 
Federation, United States, Canada, France, Iran, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Republic 
of Korea, South Africa, Sweden, and Ukraine) have promulgated into national law a 
specific definition using synonymous terms. Each State has generally restricted objects 
intended to be launched into outer space to objects termed payload, satellite, launch 
vehicle, and the component parts of each. These terms could represent rules of general 
principles of law limited by the State practice of those objects launched or registered 
under national law.  
 A space object has legal effect as a general principle of law if the object launched 
falls into two categories. The first category is any object intended to be launched into 
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outer space by an authorizing government, as registered, or by way of a national activity. 
This first category is the broadest. The second category includes those terms of art that 
express a space object in national law that are intended to be launched into outer space by 
an authorizing government, as registered, or by way of a national activity. Thus, while the 
term most likely represents a general principle of law, the definition of space object is 
subject to two constraints, i.e., (1) any object and (2) those objects specifically defined in 
a State’s national law subject to licensing or registration regimes. 
 
b. Observations for Future Research 
 
Since the fall of 1957, rules for outer space have proliferated across national laws 
and regulations, treaties, international declarations, arbitration rules, nonbinding 
agreements, and other written media. All of these rules, however, can be traced back to 
the events that precipitated the space race. Nonetheless, looking at how States have 
evolved their State practice over time, new activities and proposed activities will 
necessarily lead to the supply of rules of jurisdiction through State practice. When States 
seek to cooperate in developing and supplying rules to supranational markets, it is 
implicit that these rules are meant to manage risk and minimize costs relative to the 
benefits of engaging in activities in the outer space environment. However, it is not 
entirely clear that rules of jurisdiction to which States have agreed are sufficient to deal 
with the proposed State practices currently being contemplated by a variety of States. 
This trend toward the evolution of rules for the outer space environment based on State 
practice will test the limits of the authority for which States have bargained. For example, 
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what happens when the definition of a space object and the scope of the bargained for 
rule no longer applies because the object launched or made in situ is not launched from 
Earth? How will States develop, supply, and consume rules for activities in environments 
significantly distant from their territory? 
 As States seek to develop and achieve new valued preferences for activities in the 
outer space environment, the bargained for rules thus far will most likely be inadequate to 
deal with the extension of authority over persons and things subject to their jurisdiction. 
Is it possible to measure these transitions and provide results by which States seek to 
manage their own risks or will the economics of rule formation strain the international 
system of States as activities proliferate in the outer space environment? Further analysis 
will be needed to determine whether the current system set up on Earth to develop and 
supply rules relative to the number of States participating in such supranational markets 
will evolve or break down as humans move beyond the confines of the Earth. If such 
events transpire, this should lead to a new cycle of evolution in the formation and 
development of rules of jurisdiction because such rules provide States the glue that binds 






a. Glossary of Terms 
Basis of State Authority – Jurisdiction (e.g., Territorial, Nationality, Passive Personality, 
 Protective, Universal). 
Buying/Purchasing – Accepting the costs of the obligation and benefits of the extension  
of authority from the rule(s) supplied. 
Choice of Rules (of Law) – Generally, the bi- or multi-lateral supply of rules regarding 
the consensual allocation of obligations and authority in a supranational market of  
 international relations. 
Consumption – The act of giving notice to the acceptance of the obligation of a rule of  
jurisdiction. 
Environments – Any location outside the territory of a State where the State may engage  
in a State practice. 
International Legal System – System of rules based on the principle of consent that gives  
rise to obligations and the extension of extraterritorial authority among and  
between States. 
Market Participation – State practice in the form of exchanges (occurrences or  
 transactions) in the supranational market of international relations. 
Preference revelation – Measuring the valued preferences of a State. 
Prescriptive Rules (of Law) – The unilateral assertion of authority extraterritorially. 
Rule(s) – A rule is defined as one or more instruction(s) of a policy. Policy is defined as a 
valued preference that guides a course of action from a subjectively legitimate  
source of authority that directs a subject’s act or omission to prevent a breach of  
the rule(s). 
Rule Development – The processes by which States seek to design rules that are supplied  





Rule Formation – The observable processes of States engaged in the supranational market 
of international relations to supply to and consume rules from supranational  
markets of international relations. 
Rule(s) of Law – The product of exchanges in the supranational market of international  
relations where the price paid takes the form of a legal obligation; the extent to  
which a State’s authority may apply extraterritorially. 
Rule(s) of Jurisdiction – A component of State power as the basis for a State’s authority  
 as a function of State sovereignty within the international system. 
State – An entity that has a territory, a population, a government, and the ability to  
 conduct foreign relations. 
State Practice – Observable acts or omissions of a State in the course of conducting its 
international relations. 
Sovereignty (Westphalian) – Territoriality and Exclusion of External Actors from  
 Domestic Authority (Presumption Against Nonconsensual Rulemaking). 
Sources of Rules – These include State practice, scholarship, opinions of tribunals, public  
 international law (i.e., International Custom, International Agreements, General  
 Principles of Law). 
Selling – Rules supplied for consumption by States via some State practice. 




b. Raw Data Sets 
i. National Law Data Set 














United States  Oct-67 Dec-68 Oct-73 Sep-76 Jul-58 Jul-58 
Japan Oct-67 Jun-83 Jun-83 Jun-83 Jun-69 Jun-69 
Norway Jul-69 Apr-70 Apr-95 Jun-95 Jun-69 Jun-69 
Ireland Jul-68 Aug-68 Jun-72 - Jun-72 - 
Switzerland Dec-69 Dec-69 Jan-74 Feb-78 Jan-74 - 
Mexico Jan-68 Mar-69 Apr-74 Mar-77 Apr-74 - 
Finland Jul-67 Sep-70 Feb-77 - Feb-77 - 
Denmark Oct-67 May-69 Apr-77 Apr-77 Apr-77 - 
Greece Jan-71 Jul-75 Apr-77 Mar-03 Apr-77 - 
Romania Apr-68 Jun-71 Mar-80 - Mar-80 - 
Sweden Oct-67 Jul-69 Jun-76 Jun-76 Nov-82 Nov-82 
Italy May-72 Mar-78 Feb-83 Dec-05 Jan-83 Jan-83 
Luxembourg Jan-06 Signatory Oct-83 - Oct-83 - 
United Kingdom Oct-67 Dec-68 Oct-73 Mar-78 Jul-86 Jul-86 
Canada Oct-67 Feb-75 Feb-75 Aug-76 May-90 May-90 
Czech Republic Jan-93 Jan-93 Jan-93 Feb-93 Jan-93 - 
South Africa Sep-68 Sep-69 Dec-11 Jan-12 Jun-93 Jun-93 
Russian Federation  Oct-67 Dec-68 Oct-73 Jan-78 Aug-93 Aug-93 
Brazil Mar-69 Feb-73 Mar-73 Mar-06 Feb-94 Feb-94 
Spain Nov-68 Feb-01 Jan-80 Dec-78 Feb-95 Feb-95 
Argentina Mar-69 Mar-69 Nov-86 May-93 Jul-95 Jul-95 
Ukraine Oct-67 Jan-69 Oct-73 Sep-77 Nov-96 Nov-96 
India Jan-82 Jul-79 Jul-79 Jan-82 Jun-97 - 
Australia Oct-67 Mar-86 Jan-75 Mar-86 Dec-98 Dec-98 
Belarus Oct-67 Dec-68 Signatory Jan-78 Dec-98 Dec-98 
People's Republic of China Dec-83 Dec-88 Dec-88 Dec-88 Feb-01 Feb-01 
Chile Oct-81 Oct-81 Dec-76 Sep-81 Jul-01 Jul-01 
Iran Signatory Dec-70 Feb-74 Signatory Jun-05 Jun-05 
Belgium Mar-73 Apr-77 Aug-76 Feb-77 Sep-05 Sep-05 
Republic of Korea Oct-67 Apr-69 Jan-80 Oct-81 Dec-05 Dec-05 
Algeria Jan-92 Signatory Oct-06 Mar-07 Jun-06 Jun-06 
Colombia Signatory Signatory Jul-14 Jan-14 Jul-06 Jul-06 
Netherlands Oct-69 Feb-81 Feb-81 Jan-81 Jan-07 Jan-07 
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Venezuela  Mar-70 Signatory Aug-78 - Oct-07 Oct-07 
Germany Feb-71 Feb-72 Aug-72 Oct-79 Nov-07 Nov-07 
France Aug-70 Dec-75 Dec-75 Dec-75 Jun-08 Jun-08 
Nigeria Nov-67 Mar-73 Dec-05 Jul-09 Aug-10 Aug-10 
Austria Feb-68 Feb-70 Jan-80 Mar-80 Dec-11 Dec-11 




ii. Comparative Analysis Data Set 
Table 5: Comparative Analysis Data Set 





Oct-45 32                       
Nov-45 45                       
Dec-45 51                       
Nov-46 54                       
Dec-46 55                       
Sep-47 57                       
Apr-48 58                       
May-49 59                       
Sep-50 60                       
Dec-55 76                       
Nov-56 79                       
Dec-56 80                       
Mar-57 81                       
Sep-57 82                       
Jul-58                   1 1   
Dec-58 82                     18 
Dec-59                       24 
Sep-60 99                       
Sep-61 100                       
Oct-61 102                       













Sep-62 108                       
Oct-62 110                       
May-63 111                       
Dec-63 113                       
Dec-64 115                       
Sep-65 117                       
Sep-66 118                       
Dec-66 122                       
Jan-67     20                   
Feb-67     24                   
Mar-67   1                     
Apr-67   2 25                   
May-67   3 26                   
Jun-67   4 27                   
Jul-67   6 28                   
Sep-67                         
Oct-67   20                     
Nov-67   21                     
Dec-67 123 22                     
Jan-68   24                     
Feb-68   26                     
Mar-68   28                     
Apr-68 124 31     14               
May-68   32     16               









Jul-68   36   2 23               
Aug-68   37   3 25               
Sep-68 125 40                     
Oct-68   41   4                 
Nov-68 126 44                     
Dec-68   45   10                 
Jan-69   46   14                 
Feb-69       19                 
Mar-69   50   23                 
Apr-69   51   28                 
May-69       31                 
Jun-69       33           3 3   
Jul-69   52   35                 
Sep-69       36                 
Oct-69   53                     
Dec-69   54   39                 
Feb-70       41                 
Mar-70   56   42                 
Apr-70       44                 
May-70       45                 
Jul-70   57                     
Aug-70       46                 
Sep-70   60   47                 
Oct-70 127                       
Nov-70       48                 









Jan-71   61                     
Feb-71   62   51                 
Jun-71   63   52                 
Jul-71       53                 
Sep-71 130                       
Oct-71 131                       
Dec-71 132                       
Feb-72       54                 
Mar-72           1 14           
Apr-72             15           
May-72   64       2 17           
Jun-72   65   55   4 19     4     
Jul-72   67   56     20           
Aug-72           6 21           
Sep-72           8             
Oct-72           10             
Nov-72   68   57                 
Dec-72           11             
Jan-73           12             
Feb-73       58   14             
Mar-73   69   59   16             
Apr-73           19             
May-73           21             
Aug-73   70   60   22             
Sep-73 135                       









Dec-73                       37 
Jan-74           28       5     
Feb-74           29             
Mar-74           30             
Apr-74           31       6     
Jun-74           32             
Sep-74 138                       
Oct-74           33             
Jan-75           34             
Feb-75       62   35             
Mar-75           36             
Apr-75           37             
May-75             22   2       
Jul-75       63                 
Aug-75           38             
Sep-75 141         39             
Oct-75 142         40             
Nov-75 143               3       
Dec-75 144     64   41   1         
Apr-76           42             
May-76               2         
Jun-76           43   3         
Aug-76   72   65   44   4 4       
Sep-76 145 73   66       5         
Dec-76 147 74       46   6         









Feb-77   75       48   7   7     
Mar-77               8         
Apr-77       67   50   9   9     
Jun-77   76       51             
Aug-77               10         
Sep-77 149             11         
Oct-77               12         
Dec-77               13       47 
Jan-78   77   68   53   15         
Feb-78               16         
Mar-78       69       17         
Apr-78               18         
Jul-78               19         
Aug-78           54             
Sep-78 150                       
Nov-78               20         
Dec-78 151             21         
Feb-79   78                     
Mar-79       70       22         
Jun-79   79                     
Jul-79       71   55             
Sep-79 152                       
Oct-79               23         
Dec-79           56             
Jan-80           59             









Mar-80           62   24   10     
Apr-80                         
Jun-80   80                     
Aug-80 153                       
Sep-80 154                       
Oct-80   81   72   63             
Nov-80                       53 
Jan-81               25         
Feb-81       73   64             
May-81                         
Sep-81 156             26         
Oct-81   82   74       27         
Nov-81 157                       
Jan-82   83           28         
Feb-82           65             
Nov-82           66       11 4   
Jan-83                   12 5   
Feb-83           67             
Mar-83           68             
Jun-83       75   69   29         
Sep-83 158                       
Oct-83           70       13     
Dec-83   84                     
Jan-84   85                     
Apr-84       76                 









Sep-84 159                       
Apr-85               30         
Jan-86   86                     
Feb-86               31         
Mar-86       77       32         
Jun-86   87                     
Jul-86                   14 6   
Nov-86   88       71             
Mar-88   89                     
Nov-88   90   78   72             
Dec-88       79   73   34         
Jan-89   91                     
Jun-89   92                     
Apr-90 160                       
May-90                   15 7   
Sep-90 159                       
May-91                         
Sep-91 166                       
Oct-91                         
Jan-92   93                     
Mar-92 175                       
May-92 178     80   74             
Jul-92 179                       
Jan-93 180 93   81   75       16     
Feb-93               35         









May-93 183             37         
Jun-93                   17 8   
Jul-93 184                       
Aug-93                   18 9   
Feb-94                   19 10   
May-94       82   76             
Aug-94       83   77             
Dec-94 185                     61 
Feb-95           78       20 11   
Apr-95                         
Jun-95               38         
Jul-95                   21 12   
May-96   94       79             
Jun-96                         
Nov-96                   22 13   
Jun-97                   23     
Jul-97               39         
Jun-98   95   84   80             
Dec-98                   25 15   
Feb-99               40         
Apr-99               41         
May-99   96   85   81             
Jun-99       86                 
Sep-99 188                       
Sep-00 189                       









Nov-00 189             42         
Jan-01               43         
Feb-01       87           26 16   
Mar-01               44         
Jul-01                   27 17   
Dec-01                       64 
Jun-02   98                     
Sep-02 191                       
Nov-02           83             
Dec-02                       65 
Mar-03               45         
Jun-04                         
Dec-04                       67 
Jun-05                   28 18   
Sep-05                   29 19   
Nov-05                         
Dec-05           84   46   30 20   
Jan-06   99                     
Mar-06               47         
Apr-06           85   48         
Jun-06 192     89   86   49   31 21   
Jul-06           87       32 22   
Oct-06               50         
Dec-06       90                 
Jan-07                   33 23   









Mar-07               51         
Oct-07                   34 24   
Nov-07                   35 25   
Dec-07                       69 
Jun-08                   36 26   
Mar-09   100           52         
Jul-09               53         
Nov-09       91   89             
Jan-10               54         
Apr-10   101                     
Aug-10                   37 27   
Oct-10               55         
Dec-10                       70 
Jul-11 193                       
Oct-11                         
Dec-11       90           38 28 71 
Jan-12               56   39 29   
Feb-12                         
Mar-12   102   92       57         
Jul-12               58         
Sep-12               59         
Dec-12                       74 
Mar-13   103   93   91   60         
Dec-13                       76 









Apr-14               62         
Jul-14           92             
Dec-14                       77 
Jun-15                         





iii. COPUOS Membership 
Table 6: COPUOS Membership 
States Date Count 
Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia 
(  now Czech Republic), France, India, Iran, Italy, Japan, Mexico, 
Poland, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (  now 
Russian Federation), the United Arab Republic (  now Egypt), the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland & the United 
States of America 
Dec-58 18 
  Albania , Argentina, Australia,  Austria , Belgium, 
Brazil, Bulgaria , Canada, Czechoslovakia (  now Czech Republic ), 
France,  Hungary , India, Iran, Italy, Japan,  Lebanon , Mexico, 
Poland, Romania , Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(  now Russian Federation ), the United Arab Republic ( now 
Egypt ), the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
& the United States of America 
Dec-59 24 
  Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada,  Chad , Czechoslovakia (  now Czech Republic ), France, 
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